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Abstract 
Children's ability to develop an accurate perception of reality, that is differentiate between 
what is 'real' and 'not-real', is an important issue for research (Harris, 2001). Their 
understanding of real/not-real distinctions is often assessed using questions containing 
words such as real and pretend. This is problematic because these words can be used to 
refer to two different perceptions of reality: existence and authenticity; for example, a 
question about whether Father Christmas is 'real' can be interpreted as a question about 
existence (i.e. whether he exists) or about authenticity (i.e. whether someone dressed-up as 
him is the genuine Father Christmas). The current studies explored children's use and 
interpretation of words such as real in relation to their understanding of real/not-real 
distinctions. In Study 1, children's everyday uses of real were analysed from parental 
diary records and this revealed that they described the authenticity of objects and both the 
authenticity and existence of fantasy characters. This suggested that in experimental tests 
children may not interpret a question about existence as intended. This hypothesis was 
supported in Studies 2-4 in which children justified their real/not-real judgements for 
everyday objects and fantasy characters by referring to aspects of authenticity and 
existence. In light of these findings, in Studies 5-7 children's understanding of the 
ontological status of fantasy characters was compared in two different paradigms: one 
relied on use of the terms real and not-real (a categorisation task) and the other did not (the 
Scenarios task, a novel paradigm in which children chose appropriate characters to fulfil 
certain role$). The results from these tasks revealed that children had a better understanding 
of the fictional nature of fantasy when the terms real and not-real were not used, 
suggesting that previous research has underestimated children's understanding in this 
domain. The discussion centres on the implications of these results for designing research 
tasks to assess children's understanding of distinctions between 'real' and 'not-real'. 
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Introduction 
"Reality (or unreality) is not a simple dichotomy or unidimensional construct. It can be 
defined at different levels ranging from the reasonable, if simplistic, to the abstractly 
metaphysical" (Wright, Huston, Reitz & Piemyat, 1994, p.299). 
The experiments in this thesis stemmed from consideration of the paradoxical evidence 
regarding children's understanding of distinctions between what is 'real' and what is 
'not-real'. There are two distinct, albeit related, areas of research in Developmental 
Psychology that examine the extent to which children hold a realistic conception of the 
world. One area investigates children's understanding of pretend-real distinctions and the 
other examines children's understanding of the distinction between what is real and what 
is fantasy. The paradox arises from studies showing that, by the age of 3-years, children 
can distinguish a mental entity, such as a thought or image, from the real physical object 
it represents (Wellman & Estes, 1986), but they sometimes experience confusion about 
the reality status of creatures that they have merely imagined (Harris, Brown, Marriot, 
Whitthall & Harmer, 1991). Similarly, although children realise that their imaginary 
companions are 'not-real' (Taylor, Cartwright & Carlson, 1993), they believe in the 
existence of supernatural beings such as monsters, ghosts, and Father Christmas 
(Rosengren & Hickling, 1994). 
Reconciliation of these findings has been a primary concern in this research and 
factors that have been proposed to account for them are primarily methodological ones. 
These include: the difference between testing children's understanding using verbal, as 
opposed to behavioural, measures; the effect of the context in which the experiment is 
conducted; the type of entity in question; individual differences; and the real-world 
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consequences, or lack thereof, of engaging in (un)realistic thinking. This thesis raises 
another factor that has received little empirical investigation as a possible reason for 
inconsistencies amongst the findings; that is, the ambiguity of the language used to 
discuss and question children's understanding of these distinctions. In particular words 
such as real and pretend are often used in task commands and/or questions but these have 
more than one different use. 
One use of real and pretend is to discuss the notion of existence, for example 
when considering whether Father Christmas or angels are 'real' (i.e. whether they exist) 
or whether they are 'just pretend'. This is the meaning implied by questions that test 
children's understanding of the fantasy-reality distinction, such as asking whether 
witches are 'real' or 'pretend' (Morison & Gardner, 1978). Another use of real and 
pretend is to discuss the notion of authenticity, for example when considering whether a 
wallet has been made from 'real' leather or 'artificial' leather. This is the meaning 
implied by questions that assess children's understanding of the pretense/reality 
distinction, such as the one used by Harris, Kavanaugh & Meredith (1994) to test whether 
children understand that cotton wool, used in a pretense episode to represent milk, is 
'real' milk or 'pretend' milk. 
These two different uses of real and pretend, which concern the notions of 
authenticity and existence, are related because it is not possible to discuss whether 
something is an authentic version of X if X does not exist. It does not make sense, for 
example, to consider which Father Christmas (as portrayed in shopping centres at 
Christmas time) is 'the real one' if one is cognisant of the fact that Father Christmas does 
not exist. The authenticity of a particular Father Christmas may, however, be a 
significant concern for children who believe in his existence. Thus although these two 
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meanings are related they are also distinct and selecting one interpretation rather than the 
other may lead to a rather different understanding of a particular question or statement. 
This thesis explored children's use and understanding of real and not-real in 
relation to the notions of authenticity and existence. The aim of Study 1 was to explore 
children's everyday uses of these words to determine whether they reflect these two 
notions. Studies 2-4 examined children's interpretation of the tenns 'real' and 'not-real' 
by seeking their judgements and justifications for those judgements with regard to a 
variety of 'real' and 'not-real' phenomenon. These included real and toy objects such as 
a real and toy banana (Study 2) and real and fantasy characters such as Bob the Builder 
and a builder (Studies 3 and 4). These results indicated that children's interpretation of 
such words in the context of fantasy characters is equally likely to relate to notions of 
existence as well as authenticity. Therefore in Studies 5, 6 and 7 children's 
understanding of the nature of existence of real and cartoon characters was examined 
without using words such as real or pretend in the procedure. In the final chapter 
(Chapter 10), the implications of the findings are discussed in relation to designing 
suitable tasks for testing children's understanding of distinctions between 'real' and 'not-
real. ' 
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Chapter 1 
Realities and Non-Realities 
1.1 Introduction 
Much of the story of early cognitive development concerns children's increasing 
competence at developing a veridical understanding of the world (Harris, 2001). One 
such component concerns "finding realities amidst their many guises" (Woolley & 
Wellman, 1990, p.946). Two 'guises' that have been popular topics for research are the 
pretend and the fantastical. The pretense-reality distinction involves a number contrasts 
about which children need to learn and these can be illustrated using the following 
examples: pretending that a banana is a telephone (Leslie, 1987); pretending to brush 
one's teeth by grasping an imaginary toothbrush; and pretending to be a princess by 
taking on the appearance of one by wearing dressing-up clothes. One of the reasons for 
the interest in children's understanding of pretense is because children enjoy and 
participate in pretend play from an early age and it grows rapidly in its frequency and 
complexity in the second year of life (Bretherton, 1989). Another reason is because the 
child misconstrues reality in pretense, not by mistake, but by intentionally and 
meaningfully interpreting things otherwise (Wellman & Hickling, 1993). Finally, 
children's understanding of pretense is of theoretical and empirical significance because, 
rather than being 'the staid culmination of intellectual development', it appears 'playfully 
and precociously' in the very beginning of childhood (Leslie, 1987). 
The fantasy-reality distinction involves an awareness of the nature of existence 
of fantasy beings as well as the nature of the ontological divide between possibilities 
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afforded in the realm of fantasy and those that are possible in the real world. Children's 
understanding of the nature of fantasy has also been an important area of research, not 
least because of the prevalence of fantasy in children's lives: children are exposed to 
fantasy when reading story books, watching television, going to the theatre, or watching a 
magic show. Woolley and Van Reet (2006) point out that it is no easy task for children 
to learn that these events do not necessarily represent reality because effective fantasy 
offers a 'seamless blend' of the real and the fantastical: for example the 'Harry Potter' 
novels feature an 'ordinary' boy who is, in fact, a wizard. Another reason why this is an 
important area of research is because of the negative consequences that have attracted 
media attention in recent years when a child has been unable to distinguish between 
fantasy and reality. Woolley (1997) reports the case of a child, purportedly after 
watching a show in which characters joked about setting things on fire, set a trailer on 
fire resulting in serious injury. 
In this chapter, research is reviewed that has examined children's conceptions of 
reality, as masked by the pretend and the fantastical. This research is broad in scope and, 
not surprisingly, there are inconsistencies among the findings. Some studies show that 
children have a sophisticated understanding of some aspects of these distinctions while 
others have found that some children experience uncertainty about the reality/non-reality 
boundaries, for example by acting as if what they have merely pretended can become 
real. This chapter discusses this research with the aim of establishing why these 
inconsistencies are present, as well as describing theoretical and methodological attempts 
at reconciliation. First, however, a description of the traditional classification of young 
children's awareness of reality will be presented. 
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1.2 The traditional view of children's conception ofreality 
"The child is a realist in its thought and its progress consists in ridding itself of this 
initial realism" (Piaget, 1929, p.166). 
The traditional view of young children's conception of reality, as exemplified in the 
above quote, was negatively described as global and undifferentiated (Subbotsky, 1992). 
This stance, which has dominated developmental research for much of the last century, is 
rooted in the clinical observations of children amassed by Jean Piaget (1896-1980). 
Piaget (1929) proposed that young children are dominated by the mode of egocentric 
thought. This form of thought is characterised as a failure to recognise basic limits 
between self and the external world, leading to "perpetual confusions between objective 
and subjective, between the real and the ostensible" (Piaget, 1929, p.34). 
Egocentric thought was interposed by Piaget between autistic thought and 
logical thought, echoing the distinction made by Freud (Freud, 1961). Freud argued that 
autistic thought characterises the early mental processes of infancy that are dominated by 
the pleasure principle, which seeks the fulfilment of biological needs (Freud, 1961). The 
emergence of intelligent thought occurs later in development. This mode is guided by the 
reality principle and is concerned with establishing a rational and objective view of 
reality. According to Piaget (1959) intelligent thought is conscious, meaning that it is 
adapted to reality and logical. Autistic thought on the other hand, is subconscious, not 
adapted to reality, and is dominated by wishful thinking. Egocentric thought, therefore, 
is characterised by a failure to differentiate fully between self and the outer world: real is 
simply what is desired. 
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Piaget devoted much attention to one early mode of egocentric thinking, 
symbolic, or pretend play. Piaget saw the enactment of symbolic playas the beginning of 
one of two processes of differentiation between realities (the other being the development 
oflanguage). In symbolic play Piaget describes how one thing is symbolised by another 
by means of an object or of a gesture that is removed from the real situation, for example 
a child pushing a box and imagining it as a car is symbolically representing the car by the 
box (Piaget, 1962, p.112). Thus the symbol-object (the box) is not only the 
representative of the signified (the car) but also its substitute. Piaget viewed symbolic 
playas egocentric thought in its 'pure state' because the signified is "an assimilation of 
reality to the ego, rather than an objective adaptation of the mind to things" (Piaget, 
1959, p.266). Thus Piaget's view of symbolic play was that it is initially used to signify 
reality, as also seen in his example of a child who, pretending to sleep, signifies the real 
act of going to sleep. Piaget, however, saw pretense as "a tool, and a poor one at that, 
for the assimilation of reality " (Piaget, 1962, p.71) and when the child can accommodate 
reality more effectively (at around the age of7-8 years), symbolic play is discarded. 
In the traditional Piagetian view, therefore, symbolic play was characterised as a 
negative activity and one that was destined to give way to more logical and rational 
modes of thought. As Leslie (1987) points out, however, if the function of symbolic 
representations were to reflect reality then pretense creates a problem because pretense 
can, and often does, distort reality. Thus Piaget probably underestimated pretense as a 
behaviour that may actually facilitate children's understanding of reality (Harris, 2000). 
Nonetheless, his ideas serve as an important starting point from which to explore current 
evidence concerning children's comprehension of pretense. 
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1.3 Current views on children's conception of the pretense-reality 
distinction 
1.3.1 Children's understanding of symbolic pretense 
Recent years have witnessed a growing body of research exammmg children's 
understanding of symbolic pretense. The characterisation of pretend play offered by 
Harris and Kavanaugh (1993) differs considerably from that of Pia get. While Harris and 
Kavanaugh (1993) agree with Piaget that "real events ... are often re-enacted in a 
distorted form during make-believe" (p.72), they view pretend playas an activity which 
is lifelong and imaginative, just like "the imagination that we all exercise when we 
entertain fictional possibilities" (Harris, 2000, p.27). 
Harris and Kavanaugh (1993) conducted a series of experiments to explore 
children's ability to comprehend pretense actions during shared pretense. Children were 
presented with a pretense scenario in which the experimenter populated two empty 
containers with make-believe cereal or tea. Then they asked the children to feed an 
animal with one of the make-believe substances, and they found that even children as 
young as 2-years had no difficulty doing so. Similarly, when the experimenter 
introduced a make-believe substitution in Experiment 2 (e.g., treated wooden blocks as 
bananas) children appropriately extrapolated that substitution onto new props (blocks) in 
order to feed an animal. Harris and Kavanaugh (1993) argued that this ability for identity 
extrapolation is important because it provides a basis for 'discovering fictional truths' 
rather than just 'inventing' them. Furthennore, children showed flexibility towards such 
make-believe identities by, for example, directing different pretend actions (stirring tea or 
brushing teeth) to the same prop (a stick) depending on the make-believe identity that 
was conferred on it by the ongoing pretense episode (breakfast time or bedtime) 
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(Experiments 3 and 4). Experiment 5 included familiar transfonnations embedded in 
unexpected causal sequences, for example, children watched a naughty teddy pouring 
make-believe tea over a pig. Then children were asked to 'dry the pig who is all wet' and 
they were handed a towel. The results showed that children could produce an appropriate 
remedial action as well as describe what had happened with appropriate nonliteral 
language (Experiments 6 and 7). Thus by using an empirical method, (rather than relying 
on observations as did Piaget) Harris and Kavanaugh (1993) revealed that young 2-year-
olds display considerable competence at understanding make-believe stipulations. This 
lead Harris (2000) to the conclusion that, in contrast to Piaget's suggestion, pretend play 
is not an early distortion of the real world but "an initial exploration of possible worlds 
... [leading to] ... a lifelong mental capacity to consider alternatives to reality" (p.28). 
A recent review of the pretense-reality literature, conducted by Bourchier and 
Davis (2002) supports the view that children possess a sophisticated body of knowledge 
in the realm of pretense. They discussed studies showing that 3-year-olds understand 
object substitution in pretense, that is 3-year-olds can reliably state what an object really 
is and what it was pretended to be. Flavell, Flavell and Green (1987), for example, found 
that young children correctly stated that, although the experimenter was pretending a 
sponge was a truck, it was really a sponge. Children's memory for objects that they have 
used in different pretense episodes was also reviewed (e.g. Gopnik & Slaughter, 1991; 
Amsel, Bobadilla, Coch, & Remy, 1996). Those studies revealed that 3-year-olds were 
able to recall the real and pretend identities of items that they have used in pretense: 
Gopnik and Slaughter (1991), for example, found that 3-year-olds correctly remembered 
that they had used a stick as a spoon even though they had also pretended that it was a 
magic wand. 
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More recently Ma and Lillard (2006) examined the ability of 2- and 3-year olds 
to make the pretend-real distinction but in the absence of content cues. Children watched 
video clips of two actors, one of whom was really eating and the other who was 
pretending to eat, but in neither case was information about the content of the action 
available. That is, the children could not see whether there was real food present or not 
in both clips. In front of the viewing screen, there were two containers on a table, one 
underneath each of the two actors. After viewing each clip, the child was asked: "Where 
are the real grapes (cheese, cake, or raisins)?" They had to retrieve the real food by 
choosing one of the containers (Experiment 1) or point to the container with the real food 
(Experiments 2 and 3). The findings suggested that by the age of2~ years, children start 
to interpret behavioural cues to pretense correctly; in the study they distinguished 
between real and pretend acts even when content information was not available. Even 
the youngest 2-year-olds, despite choosing the containers at random, showed some 
degree of discrimination among the pretend and real acts as judged by their spontaneous 
reactions: they engaged in more reaching towards the real food and showed a greater 
desire for eating in response to the real act than in response to viewing the pretend act. 
To summarise, researchers have been interested in children's understanding of 
pretense because it is a frequent behaviour that appears precociously in early childhood. 
Contrary to the limited Piagetian view (Piaget, 1962) in which pretense was researched as 
a symbolic behaviour in which one object is represented with something else, pretense is 
now seen as an important first step towards the development of an understanding that the 
world can be represented differently from the way in which it is really. Recent empirical 
evidence has revealed that, rather than pretense being a 'poor tool for the assimilation of 
reality', children possess a sophisticated mastery of knowledge in this area; they can 
apply their causal knowledge to make-believe stipulations to infer the outcome of a 
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pretense act (Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993); they can recall the real and pretend identities 
of objects that they have used in pretense (Flavell et aI., 1987; Gopnik & Slaughter, 1991) 
and they can identify real and pretend acts in the absence of content cues (Ma & Lillard, 
2006). 
1.3.2 Children's understanding of imaginary pretense 
A fuller understanding of pretense, however, also involves knowledge of its imaginary 
and/or hypothetical nature and this can be seen in Perner's (1991) illustration of the 
distinction between symbolic and imaginary pretense. To describe symbolic pretense, he 
gives the example of a General who pretends that the sticks in the sandbox are his 
soldiers. The second example, which describes imaginary pretense, is of a lazy employee 
who 'acts on Monday as-if it were Sunday'. Although Piaget conceded that children 
sometimes use pretend play to represent hypothetical or non-existent possibilities I current 
research has explored children's comprehension of imaginary pretense more fully. The 
findings in this area are hard to make sense of: some studies show that children possess a 
sophisticated understanding of imagination and reality and others show that children 
experience apparent confusion (Woolley, 1997). These findings will now be described 
with a focus on the explanations that have been put forward to account for inconsistencies 
among them. 
Research on children's understanding of imaginary or nonexistent pretense has 
primarily examined the extent to which they hold seemingly unrealistic or magical beliefs 
about the power of the imagination. As stipulated by Woolley and Phelps (1994), there 
are three sets of beliefs about the imagination to which adults subscribe and hence 
I For example, Piaget describes how Jacqueline aged 28 months, having been told that she could not play 
with the water intended for washing, stood beside the tub and pretended to pour water with an empty cup 
(1951, p.131). 
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children must learn. The first is in terms of the origins of the imagination: adults 
understand that the imagination arises internally and wilfully from the imaginer and 
without necessary origins in the real world. The second set of beliefs is in relation to the 
nature of imagined entities: adults realise that imagined entities differ in important ways 
from physical entities. Finally children need to learn about the extent to which 
imagination differs in its level of correspondence with the real world: adults do not 
expect that imagination purports to represent reality truthfully. 
One of the first studies to re-examine Piagetian notions of childhood realism in 
relation to the nature of the imagination was conducted by Wellman and Estes (1986). 
They investigated children's understanding of the nature of imagined entities to 
determine whether children realise that they differ from their correspondent real entities. 
Wellman and Estes (1986) proposed that three criteria are necessary to show an 
awareness of this aspect of the imagination, or mental-real distinction: first is 
behavioural-sensory evidence, i.e. knowledge of whether the entity can be seen, touched, 
or physically acted upon; second is public existence, i.e. whether other persons 
experience the entity; and the third is consistent existence, i.e. whether the entity 
consistently exists over time. 
The experiment by Wellman and Estes (1986) was one of the first to show that 
young children do not hold "the extreme ontological view that mental entities are 
essentially the same as their corresponding real objects" (p.911). In Experiment 1, 
Wellman and Estes (1986) showed 3-5-year-olds eight pairs of mental-real contrasts, e.g. 
a boy thinking about a cookie versus a boy who has a cookie. For each contrast children 
were asked questions such as whether the cookie could be seen (behavioural-sensory 
evidence), and whether the cookie could be eaten tomorrow (consistent existence) and 
Wellman and Estes (1986) found that the majority of children were consistently correct 
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by not attributing real status to mental entities. Children also had to sort the entities into 
categories of 'real' and 'not-real' and they were 88% correct overall (Experiment 2). 
These results led Wellman and Estes (1986) to conclude that children's performance at 
distinguishing reality from mentality was 'near perfect'. They also noted that some 
children spontaneously used the terms real and really, thus confirming that the mental-
real distinction is understood by young children when asked about it directly. 
Finally, Wellman and Estes (1986) asked children about nonexistent or 
impossible entities. The aim was to confirm that children did not just possess a negative 
conception of mental terms and truly understood the mental-real distinction. For 
example, children were asked to judge the reality status of a dog that rolls over (real) 
versus a dog that flies (nonexistent), and whether one can dream about these entities. 
Again, children consistently correctly indicated those entities that were 'real' and those 
that were 'not-real' as well as correctly stating that is it possible to dream about 
imaginary, not-real things. Wellman and Estes (1986) concluded that 3-year-olds have 
already acquired an important first step towards an understanding of the imagination-
reality relationship by being able to differentiate imagined entities from their real 
counterparts. 
In another experiment Woolley and Wellman (1993) looked at children's 
perceptions of the origins of pretense and the imagination and imagination-reality 
correspondence. They found that 34-year-old children understood that perception is not 
required for imagination but that perception is necessary for knowledge. The children 
also realised that knowledge represents reality more truthfully than does the imagination. 
Despite this, Woolley and Wellman (1993) also found that about half of the 3-year-old 
children mistakenly believed that reality would match what had been merely imagined by 
a story character. For example, a story character imagined that there was a red bear 
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inside an empty box and children indicated that the character would find one inside if it 
was opened. In a second experiment, Woolley and Wellman (1993) asked the children 
themselves to imagine that an object such as a pencil was inside an empty box. A similar 
number of children to the first experiment also claimed that they would find a 
corresponding real object inside the box. Woolley and Wellman (1993) concluded that 3-
year-olds have yet to develop an adult understanding of the nature of the correspondence 
between imagination and reality because they consistently responded as if imagined 
contents reflected the real contents of the box. 
An important concern with these types of studies, however, is that children's 
emotions may interfere with their competence at distinguishing between imagination and 
reality. Woolley and Wellman (1993) rule out this possibility, however, because in 
Experiment 2, mundane everyday items were used which would not have evoked an 
emotional response. The authors do note though that, with regard to methodology, a 
classic concern is whether the data only reflect children's understanding of certain words 
or expressions. This is an important acknowledgement and one that will be explored 
further in Chapter 2. 
To summarise, initial findings indicate that children understand important 
aspects about the origins of pretense and the imagination and the nature of imagined, or 
pretend entities. Evidence regarding their understanding of imagination- or pretense-
reality correspondence, however, lends support to Woolley's (1997) suggestion that 
children, in comparison to adults, live in a world in which pretense and reality are more 
entwined. In attempts to reconcile these findings, several researchers have designed 
different tasks in order to explore children's beliefs about the level of correspondence 
between imagination pretense and reality. A popular method involves observing 
children's approach to boxes with which they have populated imaginary/pretend entities. 
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The first experiment to utilise this design was conducted by Harris et al., (1991) in which 
their aim was to explore children's understanding of the pretend status of imaginary 
entities. 
Harris et aI., (1991) first tested 4- and 6-year-old children's understanding of the 
reality and visibility of a variety of different entities including ordinary objects (e.g. a 
cup), imaginary ordinary objects (e.g. an imaginary cup), and supernatural imagined 
entities (e.g. a witch that flies). Upon being asked whether each entity could be publicly 
seen and was real, the majority (between 86% - 90%) of responses were correct. Next, 
instead of asking children to imagine entities inside their head, children had to populate 
two boxes, one with an imaginary puppy and the other with an imaginary monster. 
Children had to decide which box they would want to put their finger in and decide 
whether they would prefer to use a stick instead of their finger. Next the children were 
asked about the reality status of the contents of each box and then they actually had to 
explore the box of their choice. Although the children largely insisted that the imaginary 
monster in one box was pretend, they did not choose to approach the monster box, but 
when they did, they preferred to use the stick and not their finger. In Experiment 4, 
children's behaviour towards the boxes was observed in the experimenter's absence 
through a camera. This was done to rule out the possibility that demand characteristics 
affected children's behaviour. Upon the experimenter's return, children were questioned 
and their replies revealed that they were uncertain about the reality of the box contents, 
which was in line with their behaviour. Harris et al., (1991) concluded that "Children 
systematically distinguish fantasy from reality, but are tempted to believe in the existence 
of what they have merely imagined" (p.10S). 
Several authors have criticised the study by Harris et al., (1991) on the grounds 
that children's behaviour towards the boxes may have been due to factors other than their 
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belief in the existence of the creature that they had just imagined. Golomb and Galasso 
(1995) suggest that other potential factors might include children's continued engagement 
in the pretense, a lack of alternative play activities available, or due to suspicions of 
trickery on the part of the experimenter. In a replication of Harris et aI., (1991) Golomb 
and Galasso (1995) similarly found that most children initially claimed that the monster 
was pretend. In contrast, the comments and behaviour of children who opened the boxes 
suggested that this was as a continuation or elaboration of the pretense theme and not the 
result of a cognitive breakdown between reality and pretense. 
Despite this, Golomb and Galasso's (1995) experiment has been criticised 
because the presentation of toys and clear termination of the pretense theme were 
confounded (Bourchier & Davis, 2000a). This means that it is uncertain as to which of 
these two factors accounts for their findings. Another problematic aspect of Golomb and 
Galasso's (1995) study was that the experimenter remained in the room with the child. 
As showed by Subbotsky (1994), the presence or absence of an adult can have a 
substantial effect on children's behaviour, with the presence of an adult often inhibiting 
unrealistic thinking. It is also feasible that fewer children opened the boxes for fear of 
being naughty (Bourchier & Davis, 2000a). 
Another limitation of the studies by both Harris and colleagues (1991) and 
Golomb and Galasso (1995) is that the entity that children were asked to imagine or 
pretend was in the box (a monster) is a negatively emotionally charged entity (Bourchier 
& Davis, 2000b). Experiments conducted by Rozin and colleagues (e.g. Rozin, Millman 
& Nemeroff, 1986; Rozin, Markwith & Ross, 1990) show that, even for adults, despite 
being fully aware of reality emotional reactions exert a strong influence over behaviour. 
In one experiment (Rozin, Millman & Nemeroff, 1986) adults witnessed two empty 
bottles being filled with tap water and then the adult had to give one a label saying 
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'sugar' and the other one a label saying 'cyanide'. Next, the adults were asked which 
bottle they would drink out of and strikingly, they preferred to drink from the bottle that 
they had labelled 'sugar'. Returning to the studies by Harris et aI., (1991) and Golomb 
and Galasso (1995) it is possible that children's responses were the result of an emotional 
reaction to the situation rather than a conceptual confusion about reality. Golomb and 
Galasso (1995) even note that children's behaviour indicated real fear in the monster 
condition, despite clearly stating that monsters were pretend. 
Leaving aside the possible influence of emotions on children's pretense-reality 
understanding, a factor examined by Woolley and Phelps (1994) was the effect of the 
situation. They hypothesised that children would show an understanding of the 
correspondence between imagination and reality when the situation encouraged a 
practical response. They utilised an extension of the box paradigm designed by Harris et 
aI., (1991) by adding two extra boxes making a total of four. One box contained a real 
item, a second box contained an imagined counterpart of the real item, the third box was 
empty, and the fourth box remained unopened. During the test session, after one box had 
been populated with a real sock and another with an imaginary sock, a confederate 
entered the room and requested a sock in terms of a real-world need. If the child offered 
a box, the confederate asked whether the child was sure that there was a sock inside and 
whether it was a real sock or a pretend sock. Almost all children gave the confederate the 
box containing the real sock and most children gave accurate answers to the questions. 
This supported their hypothesis that the practical situation enabled children to understand 
that imagination cannot create reality. The 3-year-olds, however, responded 
affirmatively to the question about whether there was really a sock in the box in which a 
sock had been imagined significantly more often than the older children. Thus, younger 
children were somewhat more uncertain about the relation between their imagination and 
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physical reality than older children, but Woolley and Phelps (1994) proposed that this 
depends critically on the child's perception of the practical or fantastical nature of the 
situation. 
Another possibility that has been investigated by Woolley (1997) concerns the 
effect of the type of entity on children's ability to think realistically. Woolley (1997) 
hypothesised that children may be more likely, for example, to believe that they can 
create a fairy or a monster with their imagination than they can create a cookie or a sock. 
In the experiment by Wellman and Estes (1986) in which the entity (a cookie) was an 
ordinary everyday object children understood that mental entities are not real. In 
contrast, in the experiment by Harris et al., (1991) in which some children incorrectly 
expressed a belief that imagination can create reality, the imagined entities were 
supernatural (monsters, ghosts, and witches). Bourchier and Davis (2002), however, 
point out that this explanation is unlikely because younger children also sometimes 
confuse ordinary imagined items such as a pair of socks (Woolley & Phelps, 1994). 
1.3.3 Summary 
Previous research has explored children's knowledge of the reality status of pretend and 
imaginary entities and the evidence regarding their understanding is mixed. On the one 
hand, Wellman and Estes (1986) have argued that children understand important 
differences between imagined entities and their real counterparts and Woolley and 
Wellman (1993) suggest that children also understand the nature of the origins of their 
imagination. When it comes to understanding the level of correspondence between 
imagination or pretense and reality, however, a rather different picture emerges. A 
number of studies (e.g. Harris et aI., 1991; Woolley & Phelps, 1994) suggest that some 
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children are confused about the reality status of real and supernatural entities that they 
have merely imagined. 
Woolley (1997) has argued that children's ability to understand the boundary 
between the real and the imagined may be affected by the type of entity while Woolley 
and Phelps (1994) proposed that the nature of the situation is important. In their view, 
differences in perfonnance across studies can be explained by specific factors concerning 
the choice of entity and experimental context. A rather different suggestion, however, has 
been made by Golomb and Galasso (1995) who argued that behaviour showing apparent 
pretense-reality confusion has been misinterpreted: children's behaviour is merely a 
continuation of the pretense set up by the experimenter and not the result of a cognitive 
breakdown between pretense and reality. None of these suggestions, however, 
sufficiently explain why some studies conclude that some children understand that 
imagination cannot create reality and others propose that children do not understand this. 
1.4 Theoretical explanations for inconsistencies in results 
As outlined above, various methodological explanations have been offered to account for 
the range of findings emerging from studies investigating children's understanding of 
imaginary pretense and reality. There are, however, two enduring theoretical accounts 
that have been the centre of much of the debate in this area. The first account evolved 
from the observation that the discrepancy among the findings seems to be the direct result 
of the dependent measure used, i.e. between children's verbal responses and their 
behavioural reactions. In the experiment by Harris et al., (1991) children's initial 
responses to questions revealed an apparent understanding that monsters are pretend, but 
their later behavioural reactions suggested that they believed otherwise. The second, and 
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more widely accepted account, comprises two complimentary hypotheses referred to as 
the Availability hypothesis and the Transmigration hypothesis (Harris et aI., 1991). The 
Availability hypothesis stipulates that imagining an outcome increases the perceived 
likelihood that it will occur. This explains that some children in the study by Harris et aI., 
(1991) responded as if they believed that their imagination created a 'real' entity inside 
the box because the idea was mentally available. Other children, i.e. those who were able 
to resist the effects of availability responded correctly, i.e. that there was no monster in 
the box. In contrast, the Transmigration hypothesis suggests that some children may be 
uncertain about the rules that govern the transformation or 'transmigration' of entities 
between reality and pretense. This would lead credulous children to hold the belief that 
reality can be affected directly by the imagination but causes other children to be 
sceptical about mind-world relations. The availability hypothesis and transmigration 
hypothesis, therefore, focus on individual differences among children to account for the 
inconsistencies in findings. 
1.4.1 The verballbehavioural account 
Returning to the first account, this proposes that the discrepancy between findings is 
caused by the differences between measures used, i.e. verbal and behavioural. This 
account originated from Subbotsky's (1985) suggestion that children's verbalisations and 
behaviour may reflect two distinct and inconsistent belief systems: verbalisations reflect 
everyday beliefs that differentiate between fantasy and reality while behaviour portrays a 
second set of beliefs that permits extraordinary transformations to occur. To test this 
idea, Subbotsky (1994) told children aged 4-6-years a story about a magic box that could 
transform pictures into objects when magic words were recited. Children were then 
asked whether this type of transformation could happen in reality and the majority of 
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them denied that it could. The experimenter then made an excuse and left the child alone 
in the room which contained a box similar to the one described in the story. Incredibly, 
90% of the children attempted a transformation using the same magic words as dictated 
in the story. Subbotsky (1994) therefore concluded that this revealed the existence of two 
inconsistent belief systems as demonstrated by children's scientific verbal responses and 
subsequent irrational actions. 
Bourchier and Davis (2002), however, argue that the verbal-behavioural 
explanation should be dismissed. They observed that in Harris et al., (1991) children 
initially labelled the imagined entities as pretend. During the post-task interview, 
however, some children also reported having wondered whether they might find the 
imagined entity inside the boxes. This suggests that the results were not a consequence 
of using verbal or behavioural measures because children were inconsistent in their 
verbal responses. In fact, Harris et al., (1991) acknowledge that it would be tempting, but 
wrong, to conclude that the results reflect a difference between verbal and behavioural 
responses. 
1.4.2 The Availability hypothesis and Transmigration hypotheses 
One of the explanations proposed by Harris et al., (1991) was that by imagining X, the 
subjective likelihood that X will happen increases, regardless of the type of imagined 
entity (Le. ordinary object such as a cup or a supernatural entity such as a monster). They 
state that there are two possible ways in which the subjective likelihood may be 
increased: the Availability hypothesis or the Transmigration hypothesis. The availability 
hypothesis is based on the 'availability heuristic' proposed by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1973) who argued that instances from large classes of events are easier to recall than 
those from smaller classes. For example, an adult who can easily bring to mind a plane 
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disaster is likely to rate the likelihood of a similar disaster as higher than someone who 
cannot bring to mind such an event. By extension, if the idea that an imagined entity is in 
a box is readily available, then this should increase the subjective likelihood of it 
happening. Depending on the appraisal process of assessing the likelihood, imagining a 
monster or a puppy inside a box may tempt some children to open the boxes as they did 
in Harris et ai's., (1991) experiment because the idea was mentally available. 
The other explanation advanced by Harris et aI., (1991) was the Transmigration 
hypothesis. This explains that children may be uncertain about the causal relations 
between mind and reality and the rules controlling the transformation or transmigration 
between the two realms. This hypothesis suggests that the children in the studies could 
distinguish real entities from mental entities but no paradox is involved because they 
simply did not understand mind-world relations sufficiently to know that an entity 
conceived in one world cannot migrate to the other. 
Johnson and Harris (1994, Experiment 3) conducted an experiment that 
provides evidence concerning these explanations. Using a similar design to Harris et al., 
(1991) they sought to establish whether there was a link between children's behaviour 
when left alone and their replies in a post-test interview. They presented 4- and 6- year 
olds with two boxes and the children were told to check that they were empty. After 
establishing this, children were then asked to imagine a pretend entity (a fairy or ice-
cream cone) inside one box while other box remained neutral. Then they were asked if 
they thought that there was really an X inside the box or whether they were just 
pretending. The majority of children (84%) responded accurately to this question, i.e. 
they realised that they were just pretending. Then the experimenter left the room for two 
minutes and, during this time, Johnson and Harris (1994) found that some children 
explored the boxes. Upon the return of the experimenter, children were questioned about 
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their behaviour. As a result of children's replies, they were classified as credulous or 
sceptical. Credulous children were more likely to open the pretend box, admitted 
wondering whether the entity was inside, and justified the possible presence of the entity 
by invoking magical causation. Sceptical children on the other hand, did not tend to open 
the boxes and they insisted that they were empty. Thus, similarly to Harris et aI., (1991), 
children's initial verbal responses indicated that they understood the imaginary status of 
the entity but the behaviour of credulous children suggested pretense-reality uncertainty. 
To explain these findings, Johnson and Harris (1994) first ruled out the 
Transmigration hypothesis on two grounds. The first was that children's justifications 
rarely implied that the imagination has generative power sufficient to transform 
imaginary objects into real ones; the second was that confusion about the power of the 
imagination was not widespread in their interview replies. Johnson and Harris (1994) 
provide what they judge to be a better explanation that rests on two hypothesises. The 
first is Subbotsky's (1985) assumption that children have two inconsistent belief systems. 
These allow young children to accept that extraordinary transformations might occur 
even if they are wary of admitting such beliefs aloud. The second is the Availability 
hypothesis: given that children have imagined an entity in the pretend box, this possibility 
is easily brought to mind and judged as more likely than it might otherwise be judged. 
Hence, children will be disposed to think that the imagined entity is in the pretend box 
and not the neutral box. Combining these two assumptions, once a possibility has been 
made available, it is either accepted or suppressed by the child's dominant belief system. 
These assumptions do not imply that children are confused about the power of 
the imagination. Instead, they imply that "the imagination provides a breeding ground 
for magical fantasies: these fantasies may be opposed by the child's common-sense 
principles, or bolstered by latent magical principles" (Johnson & Harris, 1994, p.47). By 
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implication, Johnson and Harris (1994) are claiming that the results cannot be explained 
in tenns of a simple dichotomy between children's verbal responses and their behaviour. 
Woolley (1997), however, argues that children's responses in post-task interviews might 
not reflect true imagination-reality confusion. This is because children may feel 
compelled to offer an explanation for their irrational behaviour and do so by relating to 
the pretense. She also argues for the possibility that behavioural measures capture 
emotional responses rather than cognitive understanding. This means that behaviours 
apparently representing fantasy-reality confusion have been misinterpreted as reflecting a 
conceptual misunderstanding when they are simply capturing an emotional reaction. 
Woolley (1997) remains convinced that verbal-behavioural discrepancies may still 
provide part of the explanation for contradictions in the results. 
Furthering this debate, Bourchier and Davis (2000a) conducted an experiment 
designed to test the increased cognitive availability hypothesis as an explanation for 
children's box opening behaviour. In the study by Bourchier and Davis (2000a) two 
methods were used to increase cognitive availability: a pretense task and a picture task. 
In the pretense task children had to populate the boxes with imaginary contents and in the 
picture task children had to place pictures of animals inside the boxes. In each task, the 
child pretended about or used a picture of three different entities: one was an animal that 
the child would 'really like to hold'; one was an animal that they would 'really not like to 
hold', and one was an animal that they 'would not mind if they held'. Next children were 
asked which boxes they would open, hypothetically and then their behaviour was 
observed. Also, they were asked about which boxes they would discard hypothetically, 
and then their discarding behaviour was observed. Finally, the experimenter departed 
after making an explicit end to the pretense and children's behaviour towards the boxes 
was observed. 
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Bourchier and Davis (2000a) found that children's behaviour in the picture and 
pretense tasks did not differ. This suggested that box opening behaviour was not a 
continuation of a pretense theme as proposed by Golomb and Galasso (1995) because 
children also opened the boxes after placing pictures inside them. Instead, the results 
supported the availability hypothesis because both imagining animals inside boxes and 
putting pictures of animals inside boxes increased the cognitive availability of the 
possibility that the entities might be inside the boxes. This then led to behaviour 
indicative of pretense-reality confusions. 
To examine why some, but not all children were susceptible to this confusion, 
Bourchier and Davis (2000a) drew upon the distinction made by Johnson and Harris 
(1994). Recall that Johnson and Harris (1994) argued that there are credulous children 
who are susceptible to pretense-reality confusion (resulting from the effects of 
availability) and sceptical children who are not. Bourchier and Davis (2000a) compared 
children's behaviour during the pretense and picture tasks on a within-subject basis with 
their behaviour in the absence of the experimenter. These results indicated that children's 
box opening behaviour in the absence of the experimenter was related to their response 
patterns in the presence of the experimenter: children who opened the boxes in the 
experimenter's absence approached the positive entities and avoided the negative entities. 
Finally, age differences in the number of children who opened the boxes when the 
experimenter left the room casts doubt on Johnson and Harris' distinction between 
credulous and sceptical children. This was because more 6-7-year-olds than 4-5-year-
olds opened the boxes in the absence of the experimenter, thus it seems counter-intuitive 
to suggest that older children were more credulous. Instead, Bourchier and Davis 
(2000a) proposed that these 'credulous' children may have been suspicious of the 
experimenter leaving the room and examined the boxes to see whether they were about to 
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be tricked. Regardless of the reason, it remains that the effects of increased cognitive 
availability might not be the sole cause of children's behaviour. 
1.4.3. Summary 
To conclude debates about children's understanding of the power of the imagination have 
centred on explaining their sometimes apparently irrational behaviour towards imaginary 
entities they themselves have created. One tempting explanation is that dependent 
measure used is responsible: when asked directly, children tend to state that imagined 
entities are pretend or 'not-real' but when their behaviour is observed towards boxes 
populated with imagined entities, it indicates an uncertainty. Both Subbotsky (1985) and 
Woolley (1997) are proponents of this view, however, Harris et al., (1991) argued that 
children's verbal responses post-test also portrayed a belief that what they had imagined 
may become real. Currently, the Availability hypothesis coupled with individual 
differences in credulity appears to offer the best explanation (Bourchier & Davis, 2000a). 
This account proposes that imagining a possibility increases the perceived subjective 
likelihood with which it is thought to occur and that individual differences in children's 
level of credulity explains why some children are susceptible to availability effects and 
others are not. This explanation, however, does not explain the finding obtained by 
Bourchier and Davis (2000a) that the majority of children still opened boxes before any 
possible box contents had been stipulated, thus minimising the potential for experiencing 
increased cognitive availability. The evidence, therefore, relating to children's success 
and failures at maintaining the distinction between pretense and reality does not fall 
neatly into 'a simple dichotomy' between verbal and behavioural dependent measures 
and nor can the available theoretical accounts independently predict or explain children's 
performance across the studies (Bourchier & Davis, 2002). 
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1.5 Children's understanding of the fantastical 
"Children know such a lot now. Soon they don't believe and every time a child says '] 
don't believe in fairies', there's a fairy somewhere that falls down dead." Peter Pan, by 
J. M. Barrie. 
Leaving aside for a moment the issues surrounding children's understanding of imaginary 
pretense another important guise of reality that children need to master is the fantastical. 
Research in this area has focused on the extent to which children understand the 
ontological nature of fantastical beings and fantastical events. As will be seen, similar 
issues that beset the research on children's understanding of imaginary pretense are also 
evident here. In particular, this includes the discrepancy between competencies attributed 
to children when different dependent measures are used. 
In some studies, children are portrayed as believing in the existence of fantasy 
beings, as commonly assessed through their performance on categorisation tasks in which 
they are required to sort characters or events as 'real' or 'pretend' (see, e.g. Morison & 
Gardner, 1978; Samuels & Taylor, 1994). More recently, however, studies have shown 
that children are more adept at making the fantasy-reality distinction than previously 
thought. As an example, in a study by Sharon and Woolley (2004) children differentiated 
fantastic and real entities on the basis of the properties to which they assigned to each 
type of entity. As discussed previously methodological differences among studies are 
critical to understanding why there are differences among the findings. 
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1.5.1 Children's understanding of the reality status offantasy characters 
The original method used to test children's understanding of ontological status was 
primarily categorical. An experiment conducted by Morison and Gardner (1978) 
examined the extent to which the fantasy-reality distinction is available to and used by 
children as a means of classification. They also sought to determine what characteristics 
of fantasy beings highlight their fantasy or reality status and encourage classification on 
that basis. In the first part of the study, children at Kindergarten age (preschoolers) to 
Grade 6 (11-12-year-olds) were shown pictures of fantasy characters that they had to pair 
with one of two alternatives, e.g. they were shown the Sesame Street character 'Big Bird' 
and asked to pair it either with another cartoon character (,Mickey Mouse') or a non-
fantasy figure from the same category (a real bird). The results showed that the number 
of fantasy pairings increased with age, although the non-fantasy pairings from the same 
category exerted a stronger attraction for all age groups except the 6th Graders. Fantasy 
pairings were also more likely when both fantasy figures were from popular culture than 
when one was from fairy tales. Furthermore, when the competing mode of response was 
categorical compared to functional, for example when 'witch' was presented with 'fairy' 
(categorical) and 'broom' (functional) children were more likely to pair 'witch-fairy' 
rather than 'witch-broom'. Finally, children's explanations for their classifications were 
sought and this showed that there was a significant increase with age in the number of 
'fantasy' responses. These were also more likely when the characters were from fairy 
tales than when they were from popular culture, for example, children explained that: 
"Both are fake characters ", "They're not-real" and "Because you don't see them 
roaming around everyday". 
In the second part of the study, children had simply to categorise each character 
as 'real' or 'pretend'. Morison and Gardner (1978) found that there was an improvement 
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with age in the number of characters classified correctly, but more mistakes were made 
by relegating fantasy characters to the realm of reality than by labelling real entities as 
pretend. 
The focus of a similar experiment by Prawat, Anderson and Hapkiewicz (1985) 
was on children's verbal judgements concerning the reality of pictures of monsters. 
Children aged 4-, 7-, and lO-years were shown various monster pictures and they had to 
indicate which monsters were 'real' and 'not-real' and justify their choice. There was 
substantial agreement among the children that the 'most real' monster was the one with 
the most human looking hands, feet, and facial features. The majority of children's 
explanations for their classifications focused on the visible features of. the monster, 
although some added an evaluative comment about the feature. The explanations also 
revealed, contrary to expectation that the younger children did not attend to the more 
global or affectively salient features of the monsters compared to the older children. This 
suggested to the authors that the younger children appeared to be as objective in their 
judgements as the older children. 
Other studies have relied on categorical measures to examine children's 
differentiation of real and fantasy events. An experiment by Taylor and Howell (1973) 
required children to determine whether various events could 'really happen' or not, such 
as a rabbit baking a cake versus a mother bird feeding its young. Three-year-olds had 
considerable difficulty differentiating real from fantastical events but the 5-year-olds 
reliably discriminated the pictures of events. Samuels and Taylor (1994) found similar 
results when they assessed the effect of emotion on children's ability to discriminate real 
and fantasy events: younger children claimed that fantasy events were as likely to occur 
in real life as in dreams, and when a real event was negatively emotionally charged, 
children were more likely to assign it to the realm of fantasy. 
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Children's fantasy-reality classifications were also explored in a more recent 
study by Harris, Pasquini, Duke, Asscher and Pons (2006). First they asked children 
aged between 4- and 8-years-old to asses how other people would reply if they were 
asked: "Are there really _ in the world?" The response options were 'all yes', 'all no' 
or 'some yes and some no'. Children had to consider four classes of entities: real (e.g. 
wolves and tigers), scientific (e.g. germs and oxygen), extraordinary (e.g. angels and 
ghosts), and impossible (e.g. flying pigs and barking cats). The majority of children 
responded by indicating that everyone would think that there are really real and scientific 
entities in the world but not impossible entities. For the extraordinary entities, however, 
there was a difference between the older and younger children: only the older children 
recognised that people disagree about their existence whereas the 4-5-year-olds tended to 
select the 'all no" category, indicating that they thought there would be no disagreement 
among respondents. 
In Experiment 3, Harris et al., (2006) explored 6-year-old children's judgements 
about extraordinary entities more closely. They divided this category of entities into 
credible beings, i.e. those whose existence is presupposed in testimony (such as God), 
and incredible beings, i.e. those who are rarely treated as existing in testimony (such as 
ghosts and mermaids). Children had to judge whether they themselves thought the entity 
was 'really in the world', as well as indicate their certainty rating and justify their 
response. They also had to judge how other people would judge the reality status of the 
entities and whether they themselves know what the entities look like. 
Harris et al., (2006) found that, in comparison to scientific entities, children 
were less likely to believe that credible extraordinary beings exist, were less confident in 
their judgement, and less likely to judge that other people believe in their existence, while 
claiming to know what they look like. For incredible beings, children confidently denied 
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their existence, said that other people do not believe in their existence, and also claimed 
to know what they look like. In the justification data children explained the existence of 
scientific and credible beings in a similar way, offering a generalisation involving some 
trait, property, or habit of the entity, for example: "Animals can have germs". In 
contrast, for incredible beings children referred to the absence of an encounter or 
mentioned a source of their belief when claiming that they do not exist (e.g. Mum told 
me). In conclusion, Harris et al., (2006) proposed that when children make ontological 
judgements they do so in light of the testimony they hear. They argued that children are 
sensitive to the pattern of discourse that surrounds different entities, realising by the age 
of 6 years that when the existence of something is asserted in testimony (e.g.: "] believe 
in God '') versus presupposed ("Don't touch that, it's got germs on it") then its existence 
is, more likely than not, equivocal. 
1.5.2 Children's understanding of the nature offantasy characters 
Sharon and Woolley (2004) have criticised traditional categorisation tasks for providing 
an overly simplistic view of children's understanding, which lends their responses "an 
appearance of ontological commitment not actually felt by them" (p.294). In their study 
they addressed this problem in two ways: first, they included a 'not sure' option in their 
categorisation task because they wanted children to be able to express uncertainty; the 
second way was inspired from research showing that a greater understanding of 
categories is evidenced in children when they are assessed via induction tasks (e.g. 
Gelman & Markman, 1987), which assess children's ability to make appropriate 
inferences. Sharon and Woolley (2004) therefore compared children's performance on a 
categorisation task with their performance on an induction task, designed to test their 
attribution of properties to real and fantasy entities. Finally, Sharon and Woolley (2004) 
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attempted to examine possible individual differences in children's judgements by 
assessing their general level of fantasy orientation (FO). This was because they 
considered that some children may be more inclined than others to engage with fantasy 
(high FO) and this could be relevant to their beliefs in fantastical beings. 
In the properties attribution task children were presented with 6 coloured 
drawings (2 real entities = Michael Jordan and a child; 2 specific event-related entities = 
Santa Claus and the Easter Bunny; and 2 generic fantastical entities = a fairy and a 
monster). Children were questioned as to whether various physical, biological, social and 
mental properties applied to them. For example they were asked whether the entity can 
travel the whole world in one night, whether they have parents, or whether they can have 
a pet. In the categorisation task children were required to sort the entities into three 
different trays: one tray was for 'real ones', one for 'pretend ones', and one for 'ones 
you're not sure about or you don't know'. Children sorted the 6 entities used in the 
properties task as well as a clown, a knight, Superman, a magician and Robin Hood. 
Sharon and Woolley (2004) found that the 4- and 5-year-olds granted more 
human-like properties (such as eating dinner with one's family and sleeping) to entities 
that they had classified as real than to entities that they had classified as pretend. In the 
categorisation task, however, only one third of children's classifications were correct. 
Children's attributions of properties, therefore, revealed a clearer differentiation between 
real and fantasy entities that was not demonstrated by their performance on the 
categorisation task. The results of the categorisation task were in line with those in 
previous studies but the picture was more complex. This was because the 'not sure' 
option was used 'extensively', accounting for 21 % of the assignments. On this basis 
Sharon and Woolley (2004) argued that there is an important element of uncertainty in 
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children's fantasy-reality jUdgements and that this is a different type of confusion than 
that involved in holding a confident belief in incorrect reality status. 
Finally, considering the effects of FO, children with a high FO were found to be 
more accurate at all ages than their peers with low FO. Sharon and Woolley (2004) 
propose that a possible reason for this is that children who spend more time engaging in 
fantasy are likely to accrue more knowledge about the possibilities and limitations of the 
imagination. 
Another aspect of fantasy characters that children need to understand concerns 
the level of correspondence between the realm of fantasy and the real world. This was 
examined in an experiment conducted by Lee, Cameron, Doucette and Talwar (2002). 
They presented 3-6-year-olds with either a story or a live staged event in which a 
protagonist made an implausible claim about a ghost that jumped out of a book and broke 
a glass. One hundred percent of the 3-year-olds and 55% of the 4-year-olds accepted the 
claim of the protagonist, i.e. that the ghost really committed the misdeed. These results 
seemed to support Harris et al's., (1991) suggestion that children may be unsure of the 
rules that govern transformations or 'transmigrations' between fantasy and reality. In 
conclusion Lee et aI., (2002) stated that young children's knowledge of fantasy-reality 
correspondence is still under consolidation, causing them to have 'wavering views' about 
whether a fantasy entity can enter the realm of reality. 
A recent experiment by Skolnick and Bloom (2006) took a closer look at 
children's conceptions of the fantasy world by investigating whether children treat all 
fictional characters as belonging to one single world (in which case they would all be real 
to one other) or whether they believe in multiple fantasy worlds, as adults do. Skolnick 
and Bloom (2006) asked 4-6-year-olds to judge the reality status of fantasy characters 
(e.g. Batman) and then judge whether someone from within the same world (e.g. Robin) 
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and someone from a different world (e.g. SpongeBob) thought that the characters were 
'real' or 'make-believe'. In response children correctly claimed that a character from one 
fictional world believes that characters from different fictional worlds are make-believe, 
although they also claimed this about characters from within the same fictional world. 
Children's incorrect responses on the latter question, however, may have been due to 
their difficulties with conceptual perspective taking, noted Skolnick and Bloom (2006). 
This may have led children to respond in terms of their own beliefs and not those from 
the perspective of the character. 
In a second study children were asked about which actions are appropriate 
between pairs of characters to provide a more accurate assessment of their understanding 
of the relationships between the characters. In this study, children correctly reported that 
characters from different fictional worlds could not see, touch or talk to each other but 
that characters from the same world could. Thus children do appear to hold an adult like 
belief in multiple fantasy worlds in which characters from within the same fictional world 
are real to each other but characters from different fictional worlds are not. 
1.5.3 Children's understanding of novel fantasy characters 
Other research has examined children's understanding of the reality status of entities that 
they have never heard of or encountered before. This has the methodological advantage 
of being able to control for children's prior experience. Two studies conducted by 
Woolley and colleagues (Woolley, Boerger, & Markman, 2004; Woolley & Van Reet, 
2006) explored what factors may affect children's reality judgements about novel entities. 
In the first study, Woolley, et al., (2004) invented a novel fantasy character called 'The 
Candy Witch' to explore what factors influenced 3- and 4-year-olds' belief in a novel 
fantasy character. The Candy Witch is a kind, friendly witch who visits children on the 
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night of Halloween and replaces sweets that they have collected by 'trick or treating' with 
a toy. One week before Halloween, the researchers visited children in school to introduce 
the Candy Witch by telling a story about her and making puppets of her. Some parents of 
the children also agreed to implement a 'visit' from the Candy Witch. After Halloween, 
children were asked to judge whether they thought that the Candy Witch was 'real' or 
'pretend.' In addition, they were required to state how certain they were from 'really 
sure', 'a little bit sure', to 'not so sure'. The ratings were scored on a scale of 0-6 with 0 
indicating that the child was 'really sure' that she was 'pretend' and 6 indicating that they 
were 'really sure' that she was 'real'. Woolleyet al., (2004) also tested children's belief 
in two other event-related fantasy figures, Santa Claus and the Easter Bunny, as well as 
assessing levels of fantasy orientation. Finally, children completed the properties 
attribution designed by Sharon and Woolley (2004) (See Section 1.5.2). This meant that 
children had to decide whether or not various physical, biological, social and 
psychological properties were possessed by the Candy Witch. 
The results showed that, regardless of whether children were visited by the 
Candy Witch, 66% claimed that she was 'real', 25% claimed that she was 'pretend' and 
9% were uncertain. These levels of belief were comparable to those obtained for Santa 
Claus and the Easter Bunny. Furthermore, for the Candy Witch, many children indicated 
that they were certain of their answer, leading Woolley et al., (2004) to claim that many 
children believed 'wholeheartedly' in her existence. Children with a high level of FO 
and older children who were visited had a stronger belief in the Candy Witch than 
children with a low FO and younger children who were visited. For the properties 
attribution task, children were more likely to view the Candy Witch in human terms in 
relation to her biological, social and psychological properties but not in her physical 
abilities. Younger children with a low FO, however, seemed unable to conceive of a 
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fantasy entity with non-human like properties. In a follow up assessment one year later, 
the factor that was most strongly related to belief in the Candy Witch was the number of 
other fantasy beings in which the child currently believed. 
In another study, Woolley and Van Reet (2006) examined the effect of context 
on children's ability to judge the reality status of a novel entity. They introduced children 
aged between 3- and 5-years-old to novel entities (e.g. a surnit, trag, kimp) in either 
fantastical, scientific or everyday contexts. Entities were introduced to the child by name 
and then the child was told something about the entity. In the fantasy context, for 
example, the surnit was presented alongside the information: "Dragons like to catch 
them, dragons collect surnits". In the scientific context they were told: "Scientists like to 
try to catch them" and in the everyday context they were told: "Children like to try to 
catch them". Overall, the results revealed that the younger children were more likely to 
judge the fantasy entities as 'real' than the older children but there was, as expected, an 
effect of context: when a novel entity was introduced in either the scientific or everyday 
conditions, children aged 4 years and older, but not the 3-year-olds, were more likely to 
judge that it was 'real' compared to when it was introduced in the fantasy context. 
Woolley and Van Reet (2006) concluded that children, like adults, have the capacity to 
evaluate critically new information and, in particular, they can consider contextual 
information when judging the reality status of a novel entity. 
1.5.4 Summary 
In summary, research into children's awareness of the fantasy-reality distinction presents 
a mixed picture of their understanding. Traditional categorisation studies (e.g. Morison 
& Gardner, 1978) showed that children tend to consign fantasy entities to the realm of 
reality, while more recent studies have revealed that children's categorical judgements 
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underestimate their level of competence. For example, children can distinguish between 
real and fantasy entities by their differential attribution of properties (Sharon & Woolley, 
2004; Skolnick & Bloom, 2006). However, despite success in making some kinds of 
fantasy-reality judgments, children remain unsure of the level of correspondence between 
the realms of fantasy and reality (Lee et aI., 2002). Differences among studies may be 
due, in part, to differences in the cognitive demands of different experimental procedures, 
notably the contrast between those that require an explicit categorisation judgement of 
fantasy or reality and those that measure implicit understanding via induction tasks (e.g. 
Sharon & Woolley, 2004). This research, therefore, reflects similar inconsistencies that 
were found in research on children's understanding of the imagination: children 
understand that real versus imaginary entities differ in their properties (Wellman & Estes, 
1986) but they are uncertain about the rules governing transmigrations of imaginary 
entities between imagination and reality (Harris et aI., 1991). 
1.5.5. Conclusions 
The literature presented in this chapter was discussed in an attempt to make sense of the 
contradictory findings relating to children's understanding of imagination-reality and 
fantasy-reality distinctions. Several possibilities have been presented by previous 
researchers but one that has been largely neglected is the wording of the questions used in 
experimental procedures: a common feature among all of the studies is their use of words 
including real. really and/or pretend in task commands. Children's understanding and 
interpretation of these words seems to be a possible factor concerning the conclusions 
that can be drawn from such studies, but this has received minimal research attention in 
this area to date. 
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Chapter 2 
The Language of ReallNot-Real Distinctions 
2.1 Language used in task commands 
Children's understanding of distinctions between pretense, imagination and fantasy, i.e. 
distinctions between 'real' and 'not-real' has been largely assessed using procedures 
containing commands or questions involving the words real, really, and/or pretend. In 
this chapter, this observation will be explored as a possible reason why results from 
different studies are sometimes contradictory. In Section 1.3.2 it was mentioned that 
Woolley and Wellman (1993) noted that a 'classic concern' with the results from this 
type of research is whether they only reflect children's understanding of certain words or 
expressions rather than the concepts involved. 
Consider the following examples of questions from research on children's 
understanding of reaVnot-real distinctions. In studies that have examined children's 
understanding of the nature of object-substitution pretense, children can be asked whether 
something was a 'real one' or a 'pretend one'. For example, in a pretense episode 
designed by Harris, Kavanaugh and Meredith (1994, Experiment 3), children were shown 
a scene in which cotton wool was used to represent milk and then children were asked: 
"What is this [cotton wool] really?" and whether the cotton wool was 'pretend' milk or 
'real'milk. Similarly, in Flavell et al., (1987) the experimenter pretended that a sponge 
was a truck and the child was asked what the experimenter was pretending it was and 
what it was 'really and truly'. In other studies of pretense, the question is often about 
whether somebody is really doing something (doing it 'for real') or just pretending to do 
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it. For example, in Rosen, Schwebel and Singer (1997), children were shown television 
episodes of 'Barney and Friends' that featured pretense acts and then they were asked to 
decide whether the acts 'really happened' or whether the characters were 'just 
pretending'. Furthennore, other studies have questioned children about their own 
pretense behaviour by asking them what they 'pretend to be' when they engage in 
pretense, or whether they have 'a pretend friend' (Taylor & Carlson, 1997). Some 
studies also request that children pretend to do things using the directive 'Pretend to ... ' 
(Woolley & Wellman, 1990; Taylor & Carlson, 1997). 
The word 'real' is frequently used in questions that test children's understanding 
of the nature of real and imaginary entities. In Harris et aI., (1991) children were asked 
whether a balloon that they were picturing inside their head was 'a real one?' Similarly, 
Woolley and Phelps (1994) asked children whether a sock that they had imagined inside a 
box was a 'real sock' or a 'pretend sock'. In follow-up questions in this type of research, 
the word really is also used. For instance, in Woolley and Phelps (1994) children were 
subsequently asked whether there was 'really' a sock in the box and in Harris et al., 
(1991) children were asked whether the item they had imagined inside a box was 'really 
there' or whether they were 'just pretending'. Almost identical questions were used in 
the studies by Golomb and Galasso (1995) and Bourchier and Davis (2000a & 2000b) 
who questioned children about the reality of the contents of boxes that children had 
popUlated with imaginary entities. 
In categorisation studies, the word real is used consistently but it is contrasted 
with a variety of alternatives including 'not-real' (Wellman & Estes, 1986), 'pretend' 
(Morison & Gardner, 1978; Sharon & Woolley, 2004; Woolleyet al., 2004), and 'make-
believe' (Skolnick & Bloom, 2006). The word 'real' is also found in questions using the 
phrase 'in real life' to assess children's understanding of the nature of fantasy and real 
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events. In Samuels and Taylor (1994), for example, children were asked whether a giant 
chasing a child and a girl riding a horse could happen 'in real life'. Children's 
understanding of the ontological status of fantasy entities has also been tested using the 
word really. In Wellman and Estes (1986), for instance, children were asked whether 
there are 'really dogs that fly' or 'really spoons that swim' and in Harris et al., (2006) 
children were asked: "Real/y, are there (e.g. flying pigs) in the world?" 
2.2 Ambiguity of language used in task commands 
The above examples reveal that children's knowledge of reality and its not-real guises is 
largely, but not exclusively, assessed through the use of questions that contain words 
such as 'real', 'really' and 'pretend'. Consideration of the different meanings implied by 
these words reveals that they are ambiguous. In the experiment by Harris, et al., (1994), 
for example, in which children were asked whether the cotton wool was 'real' or 
'pretend' milk, the meaning is not whether the cotton wool exists, but the extent to which 
it is believed to be an authentic or genuine representation of real milk. In contrast, 
categorisation tasks use the words 'real' and 'pretend' in a way intended to probe 
children's understanding of the existence of fantasy characters (e.g. Morison & Gardner, 
1978). The following example of an 8-year-old girl pondering a picture of Father 
Christmas further illustrates these two different uses: 
"He's not the real Santa Claus because he doesn't really show up in front of people, but 
he is real because he comes at night and in Christmas time and he gives me presents. " 
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The first use 'real' in this statement implies that she believes that the Father 
Christmas in question is not 'the real one'; i.e. he is not the genuine Father Christmas but 
somebody trying to imitate him. This is the same meaning in the above example of 
cotton wool in the study by Harris et al. The second use 'real', however, clearly indicates 
that she believes in the existence of Father Christmas. Although these two uses are 
distinct, they can be seen to be related because the initial comment of the girl, in which 
she dismisses the picture of Father Christmas as being 'the real one', would not be 
necessary if she did not believe in his existence. Therefore it could be argued that 
consideration of authenticity presupposes knowledge of existence. It is also interesting 
that the girl's initial consideration of the picture was not whether Father Christmas exists, 
but whether or not he is likely to be the real one. This is resonant of an observation made 
by Harris (2007) that, in testimony, it is unusual to assert the existence of something that 
one believes to exist. Thus if asked to decide if something is 'real' and it is held that it 
exists, an alternative interpretation is likely to be made. 
Turning now to the word 'really', it can also be used to express the notions of 
authenticity and existence. The contrast between whether someone is 'really' doing 
something or 'just pretending' to do so is a contrast involving authenticity. For example, 
one can pretend to drink from an empty cup but the action is not authentic because there 
is no liquid in it that can really be drunk. In contrast, questions such as: "Really, are 
there _ in the world" (used by Harris et al., 2006) and: "Is there really a _ in the 
box?" (Woolley & Phelps, 1994) concern whether or not something is believed to exist. 
It seems a reasonable possibility, therefore, that children may experience some 
degree of uncertainty about the meaning of words such as real, really and pretend when 
they are used in task commands. While this issue has not been investigated empirically, 
it has already been noted as a potential problem. In a review of children and adults' 
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'thinking about fantasy', Woolley (1997) notes that the word 'real' is multifaceted and 
hence ambiguous in nature. In a response to Woolley's review, Boyer (1997) agrees that, 
because there are a family of distinctions, it is not clear how the opposite of 'real' should 
be construed. He notes that it is often assumed that children's construal of the opposite 
of real is similar to fiction, so when a child says that something is not or cannot be real it 
has the same status as stories. Boyer (1997) also proposes that notions of reality in early 
childhood are linked to experience rather than ontological status, so the meaning of 'real' 
may be largely derived from 'experienced'. 
Thomas, Nye and Robinson (1994) have also noted that there are varied 
meanings of the word 'real' in the everyday discourse to which children are exposed. 
These include uses of real to mean 'not pretend', 'correct/truthful', or very intense/severe 
(slang). Thomas, Nye and Robinson (1994) argue that it seems most likely that "3- and 
4- year-olds do not have a clear understanding of what it {sic} meant by the term real" 
(p.l57). Woolley and Wellman (1990) also considered the word 'real' in terms of 
everyday usage. They noted how it can be used to distinguish between the natural and 
artificial, the original and a copy, or a perceptual experience and a dream. 
While different uses of these terms have rarely been considered in relation to 
children's comprehension of task commands, other authors have, nonetheless, 
acknowledged that possible limitations of their research stem from children's 
misunderstanding or confusion over the meanings of these words. Harris et al., (1991) 
note that the meaning of the response by children in their study who claimed that a 
monster/puppy that they had imagined inside a box was 'real' requires clarification. 
They also suggested that children's responses in the post-test interview could have meant 
either that their feelings of fear were 'real' or that there was a 'real' pretend creature 
inside. 
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Other studies have raised similar concerns about whether children's 
interpretation of real, really and pretend is problematic. In the experiment by Harris et 
al., (1994, Experiment 3) they found that the younger 2-year-olds perfonned poorly when 
asked to describe a make-believe event. They were also unable to answer the question: 
"What is it [pretense substance] really?" and responded, according to the authors, within 
the pretense frame as if the question was 'What is it?' Harris et al., (1994) proposed that 
one of the possible reasons for these difficulties was because the younger two-year-olds 
were "less alert to the implications of critical words such as 'real' or 'really'" (p.28) 
than the older children. 
Woolley et al., (2004) also note that a limitation of categorisation studies 
"concerns potential difficulties inferring what children mean when they say that 
something or someone is real" (p.466). They acknowledged that children may 
misinterpret commands to be regarding whether a partiCUlar entity depicted in a picture 
was 'real' or 'pretend' and they claim that this suggestion is supported by some of the 
spontaneous questions and comments given by children during their sorting task. 
Woolley et al., (2004) doubted, however, that children who assigned both real and 
fantasy entities to the category 'real' believed that both types of entities exist in the same 
sense. 
More recently, Ma and Lillard (2006) acknowledged that children under the age 
of 3-years may not comprehend the word pretend accurately. They stated that children's 
competence at deciphering pretense may be obscured by their insufficient understanding 
of a question like "Who is pretending?" In their experiment, therefore, they asked 
children to point to the 'real' food rather than the 'pretend' food. The younger 2-year-
olds, however failed this task, and Ma and Lillard (2006) subsequently argued that 
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perhaps this was "due to trouble in understanding the term real as meaning not pretend" 
(p.l774), rather than a failure to differentiate pretend actions from real ones. 
2.2.1 Summary 
Woolley and Wellman's (1993) concern that children's responses may only reflect 
children's understanding of certain words or expressions is an important one. An 
overview of the research reveals that there is a strong reliance on assessing children's 
understanding of realities and non-realities through questions that contain words 
including real, really and/or pretend. This is potentially problematic because the words 
have been used in this research in two distinct ways. One way is to question children 
about the authenticity of objects or actions carried out during a pretense episode and the 
other way is to question children about the existence of different entities. Some authors 
have highlighted the potential problem of this but the issue has not been examined 
systematically. 
2.3 E;amples of children's misunderstanding of task commands 
Two examples of studies in which children's interpretation of words used in test 
questions has been investigated empirically will serve to demonstrate the importance of 
the concerns raised in this chapter. The first example is from research investigating 
children's understanding of appearances and concerns the term looks like. The second is 
from the work of Karmiloff-Smith (1977) on children's understanding of the detenniner 
same. 
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2.3.1 "What does this look like?" 
There has been a surge of interest in the last few years in establishing whether language 
errors are the source of failure of 3-year-olds in appearance-reality tasks. In a standard 
appearance-reality task children are shown a deceptive object, such as a sponge that looks 
like a rock, and are asked: "What is this really?" and "What does this look like?" 
Children below the age of about 4V2-years-old tend not to succeed by saying that the 
object not only is a sponge but also looks like a sponge (Flavell, Flavell & Green, 1983). 
Initial studies suggested that despite training to clarify the meanings of these words, 
errors are "probably not due solely to some semantic confosion with the expressions 
'looks like' and 'really and truly'" (Taylor & Flavell, 1984, p.1719: see also Flavell et 
al., 1983; Flavell, Green, Wahl & Flavell, 1987; Flavell, Green & Flavell, 1990; Taylor & 
Hort, 1990). 
More recent studies, however, have examined this issue in more detail and 
found that discourse knowledge and verbal knowledge seem to be central to appearance-
reality errors (Deak, Ray & Brenneman, 2003; Hansen & Markman, 2005). Hansen and 
Markman (2005) explored the hypothesis that children's difficulty on appearance-reality 
tasks stemmed from their misunderstanding of the locution 'looks like'. They established 
that 'looks like' can refer to outward appearances ('Peter looks like Paul') but in fact 
more often refers to likely reality ('That looks like Jim'). They propose that in 
appearance-reality tasks, the reality is not already part of the common ground of the 
conversation, which leads children to think mistakenly that the appearance question is 
about the likely real identity of the object and not outward appearances: thus the question 
'What does it look like?' is interpreted as meaning 'What do you think this is?' 
Hansen and Markman (2005) analysed everyday conversations of children, as 
documented in the Child Language Data Exchange System (CHILDES, MacWhinney & 
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Snow, 1985) which contained the locution 'looks like'. They found that 12% of the 
utterances used 'looks like' to comment on the likely reality of an object and 15% of the 
utterances used 'looks like' to refer to outward appearances. This showed, therefore, that 
children were familiar with these two different uses of looks like. Hansen and Markman 
(2005) concluded that standard appearance-reality tasks mask children's understanding 
because of the discourse structure that surrounds the discussion of appearances. This 
experiment thus revealed that it is important to consider discourse-based explanations to 
account for findings in the literature and not to assume that children interpret commands 
as intended. 
2.3.2 "Is this the same one?" 
The second example of this phenomenon involves children's interpretation of the word 
'same' and this was investigated by Karmiloff-Smith (1977). The word 'same' has two 
functions. One is to refer to 'same kind', i.e. members of the same class that are alike 
with respect to some or all observable attributes (e.g. Jane is wearing the same dress as 
Mary). The other function is to refer to 'same one', i.e. the full identity of one enduring 
object (e.g. Jane is wearing the same dress as yesterday). In everyday speech, sentences 
such as 'give me a different one' can, and commonly do mean, 'give me another one that 
is of the same kind'. In this case the emphasis is on different identity but same kind 
(Donaldson & Wales, 1970). 
Karmiloff-Smith (1977) asked children to act out a series of sentences such as: 
"The girl pushes an X and then the boy pushes the same X" and "An X pushes the girl 
and then the same X pushes the boy". She found that up to the age of about 5-years, 
children interpreted 'the same X' to mean 'same kind' in the contexts where it actually 
meant 'same one'. Both the 3- and 4-year-olds acted out sentences of the type "The boy 
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pushed a cow and then the girl pushed the same cow" by touching two identical cows 
and they frequently refused to act if objects were not identical. Unlike the 3-year-olds, 
however, for the 4-year-olds, interpretations meaning 'same one' could be provoked in 
the post-test interview, albeit only after a lengthy period of deliberation. Thus, only if 
attributes of objects differed considerably did young children interpret 'the same X' to 
mean 'same one'. At the age of 5-years, 'same' was clearly interpreted as meaning 'same 
one' although in contexts in which Xs were identical or similar, many hesitations 
preceded this interpretation. 
2.3.3 Summary 
Two examples of research into lexical comprehension reveal that an accurate 
interpretation of experimental questions by children cannot be presumed. In the first 
example children were shown to interpret the question "What does X look like?" as 
referring to likely reality when it in fact referred to outward appearance in the context of 
appearance-reality experiments (Hansen & Markman, 2005). In the example in 
Karmiloff-Smith's (1977) study children were shown to interpret 'same' as meaning 
'same kind' rather than 'same one'. Hence, when children were asked to act out a 
sentence such as: "The girl pushes an X and then the boy pushes the same X" children 
under the age of 5-years did not choose the same, enduring object, but choose another 
one that was of the same kind. 
2.4 Children's interpretation of real, really and pretend 
Returning now to the potential problem of children's interpretation of real, really and 
pretend, anecdotal evidence suggests that children may be more likely to use these words 
55 
to consider authenticity than existence. The following examples of three conversations, 
number 1 and 3 provided in Garvey (1984) and number 2 in Preece (1987), provide 
interesting illustrations: the first conversation was between two 3-year-olds boys; the 
second was recorded during a car journey on the way to school between two 5-year-old 
children; and the third was between two young girls playing 'house'. 
Example 1 
A: Picks up a large stuffed toy snake and turns towards the other boy, waving snake at 
him. 
B: Help! (Shouts in mock/ear.) Don't! 
A: It's not a real snake. 
B: Well, don't. Stop. Well, stop playing snakes. 
A: I'm 'tending this is a snake. (Stops moving snake and looks at it.) By the way, it is a 
snake. 
B: Wait! Make believe, make believe that's my pet and he never bites me. 
A: 'Tend he'll bite me. (Turns the snake's head towards himself.) I said, 'No' (speaking 
to the snake). 
B: Snake! (Speaking to the snake). No! Don't bite my pal. 
A: (Moves the snake towards the back 0/ the large wooden car.) 'Tend it bited your 
licence plate. 'Tend it was just a little crack. 
B: Okay. (Watches as his partner moves the snake around.) 
56 
Example 2 
Heather: I'm gonna tell you what happened to me this moming ... I'm gonna tell you what 
happened to me, Bron. Urn, I was playin' on the monkey bars. A boy came along with a 
big, huge, giant spider in his hand (laughs). 
Bronwyn: Real? 
Heather: Yeah! No, it wasn't real, it was a play one, it was a coloured one, it was a big, 
black spider he had in his hand. And he was chasing me with it ... A big, black spider 
(giggles). 
Example 3 
Karen: They won't let me iron real clothes. I'll pretend I'm ironing clothes. 
Lisa: Yes they do. 
Karen: No, they don't. They really don't. They really won't allow me. 
Lisa: They allow me. 
In the first example, the first use of 'real' is clearly meant to reassure the other 
boy that the snake is not a live, or perhaps authentic, snake but just a toy one. Similarly, 
in Example 2, Heather explains to Bronwyn that the spider was not a real, or perhaps 
authentic, one but just a toy one. And again, in Example 3, Karen is clearly referring to 
the fact that she is not allowed to iron real. or proper clothes, maybe owing to her 
parents' fear that she will bum a hole in them. 
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In light of the literature discussed so far, the studies in this thesis fall into two 
parts: in the first part, children's use and interpretation of words including 'real' is 
examined; in the second part children's understanding of the ontological status of fantasy 
characters is assessed without the use of such words. However, in light of the specific 
examples discussed above, the first study was conducted to shed some light on how 
children may interpret such tenns by investigating their own uses of the tenns real, really 
and pretend in their spontaneous, everyday language. 
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Part 1 
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Chapter 3 
Study 1: Children's everyday uses of the words real. reallv and pretend 
3.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the tenns real, really and pretend have been widely used in 
experimental studies that test children's understanding of real/not-real distinctions. Little 
is known about children's everyday uses of these words, however, and this seems to be 
an important starting point for investigating whether children's interpretation of them can 
account for some of the discrepancies among the findings of those studies. The specific 
issue concerning Study I was whether children use these terms to express the notions of 
authenticity and existence. 
Several studies have reported that children use the word 'pretend' in their 
spontaneous speech for a variety of purposes including to refer to imaginary or substitute 
objects in tenns of their make-believe identity or to describe their own pretend games 
(Shatz, Wellman & Silber, 1983; Bretherton, O'Connell, Shore & Bates, 1984; Furrow, 
Moore, Davidge & Chiasson, 1992). Harris and Kavanaugh (1993) showed that 2-year-
olds could describe pretend transformations during a make-believe episode, such as when 
a naughty teddy poured milk from an empty carton over a horse's tail resulting in the tail 
becoming 'wet'. They concluded that 2-year-olds possess a sophisticated mastery of 
language in pretend contexts, not least to set pretense in motion by stipulating a pretend 
state or identity. Garvey and Kramer (1989) and Lloyd and Goodwin (1995) also found 
that children use the term pretend to make suggestions in their dramatic play and one 
common way was by stepping outside the play framework and stating explicitly: "Let's 
pretend ... . " Preschoolers, however, produced very few of these 'overt pretends' which 
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were more common in school-aged children. Dale and Fenson (1996), however, using 
the MacArthur Communicative Development Inventory reported that only 7% of 2-year-
old children use the word pretend in their everyday speech. 
Children's uses of the terms real and really were explored systematically in an 
experiment conducted by Woolley and Wellman (1990). Using the same methodological 
approach as Hansen and Markman (2005), they analysed conversations of 6 American-
English speaking children aged between 1;1 and 6;11 years as recorded in CHILDES 
(MacWhinney & Snow, 1985). Their aim was to establish when and how children 
distinguish realities from non-realities in their spontaneous conversation. They found 
that 33% of children's utterances containing real and really encompassed a reality 
contrast in which the child commented on the real or not-real nature of an object or event, 
such as "That's real money, but that's not; those are playing money". Three of the 
children produced such uses in their second year of life and all children did so well before 
their fourth birthday. Utterances that did not encompass a reality contrast were primarily 
those in which real and really were used as intensifiers as in "1 got real big sharp teeth" 
and " ... that bad hulk was really mean" (Woolley & Wellman, 1990, p.949). 
Utterances that contained a reality contrast were analysed to determine whether 
the contrast was 'explicit' or 'implicit'. One third of the utterances contained an explicit 
contrast in which the child mentioned both the reality and the non-reality, for example: 
"That ain't a real skunk; it's only in the book". The remaining two thirds of the 
utterances contained an implicit contrast in which the non-reality was implied but not 
explicitly stated, for example, a girl said to her mother "No, put real water in" after 
watching her mother pouring some imaginary water into a container (Woolley & 
Wellman, 1990, p.949). 
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Utterances containing a reality contrast were also analysed to determine the 
topic of the utterance. The most common topic was toys (23%), for example a girl 
described her doll by claiming "She doesn't stand up real". Pretense was the second 
most common topic (20%), followed by utterances that made category/identity 
judgements (19%), and those that distinguished pictures from their real depicted referents 
(9%). 
Woolley and Wellman's (1990) study was important because it showed that 
"These young children's use of the terms real and really to mark such sensible contrasts 
reveals that children's conception of the real or genuine aspects of objects is quite 
multifaceted and begins to appear at a very young age" (p.953). The main strength of 
their study was that it examined children's use of the terms 'real' and 'really' 
longitudinally. However, the results need to be viewed with caution in relation to the 
source of data. The duration and timing of the speech samples was sporadic and varied 
from child to child. Also transcripts from only six children were examined and so it is 
not clear how representative these findings are. Furthennore, Woolley and Wellman 
(1990) only focused on children's uses of these words in relation to appearance-reality, or 
authenticity, but they did not document existence uses. 
3.1.1 Methodological issues of collecting child speech samples 
There are a number of different ways in which samples of children's speech can be 
obtained. One common method is to search CHILDES (MacWhinneyand Snow, 1984) 
(see http://childes.psy.cmu.edul).CHILDES first served as a central repository for 
language acquisition data and evolved as a means for sharing and studying conversational 
interactions involving children. This is now part of a wider project called TalkBank, 
which generates tools to use on the internet to share multimedia on all forms of human 
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communication. Computerised searches of transcripts can be performed in CHILDES to 
determine, for example, the frequency with which children use certain words. This was 
the purpose for which Woolley and Wellman (1990) used CHILDES. 
While there is no doubt that CHILDES has facilitated research into child 
language acquisition, the problem with the transcripts is that the durations and timings of 
the speech samples are sporadic and there is large variation in the amount of data colleted 
from individual children. Also, the speech has been collected in various different 
situations, but primarily in ones that have been prearranged for the purposes of an 
experiment. This means that the samples may not be representative of the full range of 
uses that occur in ordinary, everyday situations. While this may not be an issue for some 
studies, it may be of concern where words that are used infrequently and in specific 
contexts are of interest. 
Another way of obtaining child speech samples is to ask caregivers or parents to 
keep a diary. This involves the adult recording the child's speech as and when requested 
by the researcher. This could be at set time points throughout the day or only when the 
child produces a specific word or form of utterance. The collection of diary data has 
served an important role in developmental psychology, for example in research on 
infants' memories (Nelson & Ross, 1980) and causal thinking in everyday activities 
(Callanan & Oakes, 1992). Parents and caregivers are valuable informants, especially for 
infrequent events that are unlikely to be observed in an experimental setting. Diary 
records have been shown to be reliable when compared with experimental measures, 
especially where they are accompanied by parental interviews (Harris & Chasin, 1999). 
For these reasons, the method employed in the current study was to use parental 
interviews accompanied by diary records. 
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3.2 Method 
Participants and data collection 
Mothers and female carers were approached through mother-and-toddler groups that met 
in Surrey. They were predominantly from white, working class backgrounds. Mothers 
were asked if they would answer some questions about their child's language and, in 
particular, use of the words real, really and pretend. After a preliminary discussion, 
some mothers were not interviewed either if English was not their first language, their 
child was too young to have used all three of the target words or they had concerns about 
their child's language development. An additional number of mothers were recruited 
through personal acquaintances. In total, 169 mothers were interviewed and some chose 
to talk about more than one child so the total number of children for which interview data 
was collected was 181. 
From the sample of the mothers who were interviewed 137 (81 %) also agreed to 
complete a diary for one week. After follow-up telephone calls, 90 of them were 
returned. Upon returning the diary, 19 of the mothers continued to keep a record for a 
further three weeks, after which time they all returned the diary. 
For the purposes of analysis the sample of children was divided into two age 
groups: a younger age group and an older age group. The younger age group consisted of 
80 children aged between 2- and 3-years (34 girls and 46 boys, mean age = 3;1, range = 
2; 1 - 3; 11) and the older age group contained 101 children aged between 4- and 7- years 
(53 girls and 48 boys, mean age = 5;5, range = 4;1 - 7;6). 
Procedure 
Interviews were carried out to obtain examples of uses of the target words and to recruit 
parents/caregivers to complete diary records. The parent/carer was informed that the 
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study was about how children use the words real, really and pretend in their everyday 
speech. She was then requested to describe contexts in which the child used these words 
and provide recent example utterances from those situations, first for the word pretend, 
then real, and finally really. These were recorded, together with the child's age and 
gender. Examples given by mothers were often very specific. Sometimes a word was 
used in a commonly occurring routine such as going to bed or playing a particular game. 
Other memorable examples occurred after the child had witnessed something/someone 
that was novel, perhaps on TV, in a story book, at a novel location such as Disneyland, or 
during an event such as Christmas. If required, mothers were prompted to provide 
additional information about the context of use. The same procedure was repeated with 
mothers who elected to talk about a second child within the specified age range. 
After the interview, mothers were thanked and then asked if they would like to 
participate in the next stage by keeping a written record of their child's uses of the words 
real, really and pretend as and when they hear them during the forthcoming week. If they 
agreed, they were provided with an information sheet, a blank diary form, an exemplar 
diary form, and a consent form to read and sign, and on which to provide their telephone 
number. The blank diary form comprised four columns: the first column was to record 
the date of the utterance containing one or more of the target words; the second was for 
the utterance itself; the third was to provide a description of the context including who 
was involved; and the fourth was for an interpretation of the child's utterance if deemed 
necessary because the meaning was not clear. There were boxes at the top of the sheet in 
which to record the child's date of birth and gender. 
If the diary had not been returned within three weeks, mothers were contacted 
by phone to determine whether they had completed it. Mothers who returned the diary 
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were thanked and asked if they would like to continue for one month. Those who agreed 
were sent additional sheets and prepaid envelopes. 
3.3 Results 
Coding of utterances 
Utterances obtained in the interview were scored in the same manner as utterances 
obtained from the diaries. Following Woolley and Wellman (1990) each utterance was 
analysed according to use, topic, and type of reality contrast (see Table 3.1). Use was 
coded as one of five categories. The first category, Authentic was for utterances that 
discussed whether or not something was the real or genuine version, as opposed to a 
substandard, imitation, or fake. Existence was used to code utterances that discussed 
whether something really existed or was present in reality, and was not imaginary. An 
Intensifier was used to classify utterances containing really in place of the tenns very or 
very much. The category Command was used to classify utterances that contained 
pretend being used to direct another to engage in pretense, such as "Pretend to ... " 
Finally, uses that did not fall into any of these categories were classed as Other. 
Each utterance was also classified according to one of 7 different topics: Action, 
Animal, Event, Fantasy, Human, Object, or Other. Utterances were also classified 
according to the type of reality contrast, either Implicit or Explicit. Recall from Woolley 
and Wellman (1990) that an implicit contrast was when an utterance in which the 
alternative to reality was implied but not overtly stated and an explicit contrast was when 
both the reality and the non-reality were stated in the utterance. Two coders 
independently coded, on average, 21 % of the utterances for each word according to use, 
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Table 3.1: Example utterances at each level of analysis. 
Utterance (and context information) Use Reality Topic 
Contrast 
Do you want a pretend egg? (Handed me a Authentic Implicit Object 
white brick while cooking me breakfast with 
her toy kitchen set) 
Is it a real horse or a rocking horse? (Going Authentic Explicit Animal 
'real' horse riding for the first time and he 
could not believe it was going to be a 'real' 
horse) 
Is there really dragons? (Reading a story book Existence Implicit Fantasy 
together about dragons) 
Monsters aren't real, they're just pretend Existence Explicit Fantasy 
(Going to bed at night he reassures himself that 
they are not under his bed) 
Pretend to be a rocket (Playing with his Dad) Command - -
I sit really still (Describing the way she sits for Intensifier - -
story time at nursery) 
I've had tummy ache in real life (Playing a Other - -
board game called 'Tummy Ache' and he told 
his friend this) 
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topic, and type of reality contrast. For type of use inter-rater agreement was 88%, for 
topic inter-rater agreement was 95%, and for reality contrasts it was 96%. 
Use and topic 
The total number of utterances collected for each word from each age group is shown in 
Table 3.2. The total number of utterances collected was 1311 with 492 from interviews 
(M= 2.9 utterances per child, SD = 1.1) and 819 from diaries (M= 6.7, SD = 7.8). No 
uses of real were reported for 30 of the 2-3-year-olds (38%) but, with that exception, 
every other mother reported that her child used all of the target words. An overview of 
the data shows that 65% of the utterances were concerned with whether something was 
authentic or not while only 11 % were concerned with existence. Intensifiers, Commands, 
and Other uses accounted for the remaining 24% of the utterances. The most common 
topics of the utterances were object (21 %), fantasy (18%), and action (17%), followed by 
event (12%), animal (9%), human (7%), and other (2%). Instances of the authentic uses 
were found in all topics but the existence use only occurred within the topics of fantasy, 
animal, and object. 
Reality contrasts 
The number of implicit and explicit reality contrasts for authentic and existence uses for 
each of the target words is shown in Table 3.3. On average, 80% of utterances contained 
an implicit contrast and 20% contained an explicit contrast. For the pwpose of statistical 
analysis the total set of utterances was treated as a corpus of independent observations 
following the tradition of analysis of child speech (see, e.g. Corrigan, 2004). The 
proportion of implicit and explicit contrasts produced by the two age groups was 
compared but the difference was not significant, 1} (1, N= 1021) = 2.69, n.s. 
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Table 3.2: Number (and percentages) of each of the words according to age group 
2-3-year-olds 4-7-year-olds 
Word and Use (N=80) (N=101) Total 
Authentic 132 (81) 191 (63) 323 (69) 
Existence 26 (16) 87 (29) 113 (24) 
Real Other 5 (3) 25 (8) 30 (7) 
Total 163 (100) 303(100) 466 (100) 
Mean 2.04 3.03 2.59 
Authentic 62 (37) 140 (58) 202 (50) 
Existence 3 (2) 11 (5) 14 (3) 
Intensifier 90 (54) 88 (37) 178 (44) 
Really 
Other 12 (7) 1 (.04) 13 (3) 
Total 167 (100) 240 (100) 407 (100) 
Mean 2.09 2.38 2.26 
Authentic 213 (80) 115 (67) 328 (75) 
Existence 10 (4) 6 (4) 16 (4) 
Pretend Command 44 (16) 50 (29) 94 (21) 
Total 267 (100) 171 (100) 438 (100) 
Mean 3.34 1.69 2.42 
Total 597 714 1311 
Overall Mean 7.47 7.1 7.27 
SD 7.15 6.13 6.9 
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Table 3.3: Number (and percentages) of implicit and explicit reality contrasts produced 
by each age group. 
2-3-year-olds 4-7-year-olds Total 
Implicit 344 (76) 460 (81) 804 (80) 
Explicit 107 (24) 110 (19) 217 (20) 
Total 451 (100) 570 (100) 1021 (100) 
Real 
As can be seen in Table 3.2, the term real was used most often to discuss authenticity. 
Overall, authentic uses occurred more than existence and other uses and there was a 
significant age difference in these proportions, x2(1, N = 466) = 10.79, p< .01; the 2-3-
year-olds produced more utterances containing the authentic use (81 %) than did the 4-7-
year-olds (63%) while the 4-7-year-olds produced more utterances that referred to 
existence (29%) than did the 2-3-year-olds (16%). Other uses were also produced more 
often by the older children than the younger children. 
Really 
The most frequent use of really was also in relation to authenticity (see Table 3.2). There 
was a significant difference in the proportion of uses referring to authenticity and 
existence by the 2-3-year-olds and 4-7-year-olds, ,t (2, N = 407) = 23.09, p < .01. The 
older children produced more utterances containing the authentic use than did the 
younger children (58% and 37%) but both age groups produced a very low number of 
references to existence (M = 4%). Intensifiers were very common, accounting for 44% of 
the total number of utterances containing really. It is likely that the actual percentage of 
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intensifiers was higher because many mothers indicated that their children produced so 
many uses of this kind that they could not record them all. Woolley and Wellman (1990) 
also found the percentage of intensifiers to be higher (66%). 
Pretend 
Overall, authentic uses of pretend were considerably more frequent than either existence 
uses or commands, accounting for 75% of the total (see Table 3.2). There was a 
significant difference in the proportion of uses by age, ~e(2, N= 438) = 10.11,p < .005; 
the 2-3-year-olds produced more authentic uses (80%) than the 4-7-year-olds (67%), and 
the 4-7-year-olds produced a greater proportion of commands (29%) than the 2-3-year-
olds (16%). 
Of interest was that a small number of utterances from the 2-3-year-olds within 
the authentic category used pretend as a 'disclaimer' (Lloyd & Goodwin, 1995). This 
was when the child sought to disclaim or excuse their previous action by referring to their 
intentions and behaviour as a pretense, for example, a boy who was continuing to play in 
his mother's car after being told not to said: "I'm only going to pretend to drive". 
Fantasy topic 
The topic of fantasy was examined individually to determine the extent to which 
children's uses of real, really and pretend referred to notions of existence and 
authenticity. Inspection of Table 3.4 shows that, overall, the two groups of children 
produced a similar number of utterances concerning the existence of fantasy characters 
(53%), for example: "There aren't really pirates" and their authenticity (47%), for 
example: "He's not a real pirate. " The proportion of authentic and existence uses within 
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the topic of fantasy did not differ for the two age groups for each of the three words using 
Chi Square. 
Table 3.4: Number (and percentages) of authenticity and existence uses for each of the 
target words within the topic of fantasy. 
Word and use 2-3-year-olds 4-7-year-olds Total 
Authentic 12 (48) 44 (42) 56 (43) 
Real 
Existence 13 (52) 62 (58) 75 (57) 
Authentic 6 (86) 10 (60) 16 (66) 
Really 
Existence 1 (14) 7 (40) 8 (33) 
Authentic 8 (50) 6 (46) 14 (48) 
Pretend 
Existence 8 (50) 7 (54) 15 (52) 
Authentic 26 (54) 60 (44) 86 (47) 
Total 
Existence 22 (46) 76 (56) 98 (53) 
3.4 Discussion 
The terms real, really, and pretend have been used in previous research to question 
children's understanding of the distinctions between pretense-reality and fantasy-reality. 
These terms have been used in two main ways: one way questions children's 
understanding of the authenticity of pretense objects or actions and the other questions 
children's understanding of the existence of fantasy characters and events. The current 
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study revealed that children's everyday uses of real, really, and pretend do reflect the 
notions of authenticity and existence, thus mirroring the ways in which they have been 
used in previous research. The most notable finding was that both the 2-3-year-olds and 
the 4-7 -year-olds used the words most often to consider authenticity but rarely used them 
to discuss existence. Within the topic of fantasy, however, the results were particularly 
interesting. Rather than children simply using the terms to refer to the (non)existence of 
fantasy characters and events, children also considered the authenticity of them, as 
illustrated in the following utterance: "You're not a real pirate, you're just pretending". 
Before considering the implications of these results for testing children's understanding 
of real/not-real distinctions, the discussion will focus on these results in light of what is 
already known about children's uses of these words. 
In relation to pretend, the study reported by Dale and Fenson (1996) found that 
7% of 2-year-olds used the word in their everyday speech but this was in contrast to the 
current study that found that all of the younger children did so. Methodological 
differences between the two studies may account for this discrepancy: the current study 
did not rely on parental recall at interview alone, but also asked parents to record specific 
uses of the target words. This method has high ecological validity and is particularly 
useful for gathering data on a form that is newly emerging in the child's lexicon and is 
likely to occur infrequently. 
There was an interesting developmental change in the use of the word pretend 
with the older children making more use of commands to another person to engage in 
pretense than the younger children. This supports the findings of Garvey and Kramer 
(1989) and Lloyd and Goodwin (1995) who found that commands such as "Let's 
pretend" were more common in older children. This finding also corresponds to Piaget's 
observation that pretense becomes more orderly between the ages of 4-7 years (Piaget, 
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1954). Piaget argued that this arises, in part, from the need for participants to negotiate 
with each other to achieve a shared understanding of the play situation. 
In relation to the terms real and really the current study supports Woolley and 
Wellman's (1990) conclusion that, by the age of three years, children comment on the 
authentic or genuine aspects of objects. This conclusion was extended by showing that 
children use the terms real and really, but also pretend, to comment not just on objects, 
but actions, events, people, and animals. Both the current study and Woolley and 
Wellman's (1990) study also found that the majority of utterances contained an implicit, 
rather than an explicit reality contrast. With regard to the pattern of utterances that 
contained an explicit contrast, however, the current study found that the younger children 
made slightly more than the older children. This decrease in explicitness shown by the 
older children suggests a lesser need to clarify the alternative implied in the utterance, 
which may reflect their increasing knowledge within these domains (Sharon & Woolley, 
2004). Another similarity between the two studies was that children frequently used 
really to function as an intensifier, although in Woolley and Wellman's study, the 
American-English speaking children also used real in this way while the British-English 
speaking children in the current study did not. 
In Woolley and Wellman's (1990) study the most common topic within the 
utterances was toys whereas in the present study, toys were included within the more 
general topic of objects. This was because children often referred to non-toy objects that 
they were using as toys, for example, a boy was playing with a garden hosepipe and, 
when his mother told him to stop playing 'shooting' with it, he commented: "/t's not a 
real gun, it's really a hose pipe." Almost certainly, this difference between the two 
studies stems from the samples that were collected. Much of the CHILDES data has been 
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collected during toy play whereas, in the present study using interviews and diary 
records, children's uses were sampled over a wide range of contexts. 
In summary, children's utterances containing the words real, really and/or 
pretend reflected their interest in establishing what is real and what is pretend in their 
environment. Whether it was a younger child who described a piece of toy food as 
pretend or an older child who wondered whether Spiderman exists, all children made 
comments that revealed their interest in seeking out realities from their guises in the 
world around them. However, what remains of interest is the accuracy of children's 
observations of what they judged as 'real' or 'not-real' and the reasoning behind those 
decisions. 
The studies presented in the proceeding three chapters were, therefore, 
conducted to investigate the accuracy of children's real/not-real decisions and to explore 
what such judgements mean by seeking children's justifications for them. The 
overarching aim was to shed light on children's interpretation of these terms as used in 
empirical investigations of their understanding of real/not-real distinctions. In Study 2, 
children made real/not-real judgements for pictures of objects that were selected from the 
diary data such as a real and toy car. In Studies 3 and 4 children made real/not-real 
judgements in relation to fantasy characters, such Bob the Builder, and in Study 4 
children made those judgements alongside equivalent real characters, for example Bob 
the Builder and a real builder. 
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Chapter 4 
Study 2: Children's real/not-real judgements and justifications about 
real and toy objects 
4. J Introduction 
Analysis of children's spontan~us utterances involving the words real, really and 
pretend revealed that the majority of uses entailed consideration of something in terms of 
its authenticity while fewer uses considered things in tenns of their existence. On the 
basis of this finding the following three studies (comprising Part 1) explored children's 
interpretation of the terms real and not-real. This was done by seeking children's 
judgements concerning the 'real' or 'not-real' status of a variety of items selected from 
among those that were discussed in Study 1. The most important part of this 
investigation, however, was to discover what factors are considered when judging 
something in terms of its real or not-real status by requesting children to justify such 
judgements. Another aim was to establish a developmental picture of children's 
interpretation of tenns such as real and not-real so that their responses on experimental 
tasks can be better understood. 
A large proportion of procedures used in previous research, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, involved children making reality status judgements for objects and characters. 
Among these items were real and imaginary cookies (Wellman & Estes, 1986), real and 
pretend socks (Phelps & Woolley, 1994), fantastical characters such as monsters, ghosts 
and witches (Harris et al., 1991), popular cartoon characters such as Big Bird and Mickey 
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Mouse (Morison & Gardner, 1978) and also fantastical events (Taylor & Howell, 1973). 
In these studies, although children had to judge the reality status of such items in some 
way, they were not asked to explain their judgements, thus it was not clear what children 
meant when they judged, for example that Mickey Mouse was 'real'. 
In a study conducted by Prawat, Anderson & Hapkiewicz (1989) this was not 
the case: in their study, reaVnot-real judgements and justifications were sought from 
preschoolers, second graders, fifth graders, and graduate students. They were asked, in 
general, how they can tell if something is 'real' or 'not-real' as well as why they thought 
that dolls, cartoons, clouds, and dreams were 'real' or 'not-real'. These justifications 
were coded into three overarching categories, which are presented with a brief 
description and accompanied by example responses in Table 4.1. 
In relation to the accuracy of children's judgements for dolls, cartoons, clouds, 
and dreams, Prawat et aI., (1989) found that there was a significant improvement with 
age for all the items except clouds, which all participants judged correctly as 'real'. In 
relation to dolls, children were more inclined to judge them as 'not-real' while adults 
correctly (according to the researchers) judged them as 'real'. A similar pattern was 
evident for cartoons with children tending to judge them as 'not-real' and adults as 'real', 
although a quarter of adults chose the 'can't tell' option. Dreams elicited the greatest 
uncertainty regarding their reality status: the majority of preschoolers and second graders 
judged them as 'not-real' and half of the fifth graders also thought this but 45% also 
chose the 'can't tell' option and 5% judged them as 'real'. Adults, on the other hand, 
largely said either that dreams were 'real' or chose the 'can't tell' option. 
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Table 4.1: Coding categories used by Prawat et al., (1989) for the justifications given by 
participants following their real!not-real judgements 
Category Description Example 
1) Personal 
Prior experience including I see them everyday; You can 
interactional or perceptual feel it. 
Experience 
knowledge 
2a) Specific qualities and attributes They don't have bones and 
of animals or humans including blood; Animals aren't purple. 
physical features, appearances, or 
structures 
2b) General qualities or attributes of It's alive; 'Cause they move 
objects including life, movement, around; People just draw them 
origins! material substance, location, [cartoons]; They [clouds] are up 
probability of event occurring, in the sky; When something is 
2) Qualities 
tangibility! physical existence! real it can happen to anybody or 
pennanence, outcome! effect anything; They [cartoons] don't 
and Attributes 
associated with object or event disintegrate, like if you take 
them off the T.V; It's a physical 
object; They ]clouds] bring the 
rain down. 
2c) Abstract qualities of objects You see them and everyone sees 
including verifiability (the process them so they can't be imagining 
of establishing proof of existence), them; Something is real if it can 
believability! meaningfulness! be reproduced; You are sure of 
subjective ways of knowing something; It has meaning. 
Re-Iabelling and simple They're just toys; They are just 
3) Other 
restatements imagination; It's fake; 'Cause 
Approaches 
they're cartoons. 
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The next part of the analysis concerned what criteria children in each age group 
gave for whether things generally are 'real' or 'not-real', as well as specifically for dolls 
and dreams (cartoons and clouds were not discussed separately by the authors). 
Developmental changes in the justifications were clearly evident. Preschoolers mainly 
relied on prior experiences (15%) with the remainder responses being distributed fairly 
evenly across the different categories. This was the general case as well as being true for 
dolls, for which a typical response was: "No, 'cause you play with them". In the case of 
dreams, preschoolers either recognised that dreams are internal experiences or "dodged 
the issue by relabelling, (e.g., "They're imagination'J" (p.368). 
Second graders frequently gave justifications relating to human and animal 
behaviour (22%) and personal perceptual experiences (20%) to verify the reality status of 
an object or event. They also gave restatements (15%) (e.g. "They're/ake. ''). In relation 
to dolls they primarily gave criteria that fell into the animal and human functioning 
categories while for dreams, similarly to the preschoolers, they recognised that they were 
internal experiences and gave restatements. In addition, the second graders relied heavily 
on analysis of dream content when judging their reality status, so although they 
recognised that dreams are internal, the content of the dreams took precedence. 
Furthermore, they recognised that dream content is usually 'made-up' but they also 
sometimes referred to the notion that dreams can be about events that have already 
happened and even that they provide a window into the future. 
The fifth graders, as did the second graders, relied on direct perceptual 
experience to explain dreams (22%) but also gave restatements (12%) to justify their 
judgements. However, they also resembled adults in their reliance on criteria relating to 
tangibility, physical existence, and permanence (26%). A similar pattern of criteria for 
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dolls was evident. Unlike the adult sample, however, the fifth graders seldom used the 
two most common justifications conjointly. 
Prawat et al., (1989) concluded that direct first-hand expenence was an 
important feature when explaining how the reality of something can be determined, 
although, with age, the type of first hand information that was given was qualitatively 
different. Preschoolers tended to offer personalised information, such as HI watch them" 
or HI play with them, " while older children gave similar information but in the third 
person, such as "11. can be seen" (p.369). Adults tended to search for a means to 
'objectify' their subjective first-hand experience, such as "[dreams] are real, they 
produce real responses in you ... you wake up in a cold sweat ... there is proof of 
existence ". 
The results ofPrawat et aI's., (1989) study thus revealed some of the factors that 
children and adults consider when being asked to decide whether something is 'real' or 
'not-real'. However, a limitation of this study is that we do not know how children 
respond to individual items or characters, which may be quite distinct from their general 
reasoning about reality. The following series of studies (Studies 2-4) employed Prawat et 
al's., (1989) framework to examine both the accuracy of children's real/not-real 
judgements and the criteria upon which they draw to qualify those judgements. This was 
done for variety of specific items selected on the basis that they were commonly 
discussed by children in their everyday speech involving the words real, really and 
pretend (see Study I). 
In the current study (Study 2), three groups of children (preschoolers, 6-7-year-
oIds, 9-10-year-oIds) and one group of adults were asked to categorise real and toy items 
and real people and children dressing-up as those people, into categories of 'real' and 
'not-real' and to qualify their judgement. It was expected, on the basis ofPrawat et aI's., 
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findings, that children would, at least in part, refer to prior experience with the item. In 
addition, it was predicted that children's justifications would relate to the authenticity of 
the items, given that their existence would be arguably be presupposed because of their 
familiar everyday nature to the children. This age range was chosen in order to show a 
cross-sectional developmental progression of children's reasoning about real/not-real 
status and this age range also reflects that used by Prawat et al., (1989). The category 
labels 'real' and 'not-real' rather than 'real' and 'pretend' were employed because 'not-
real' has been used in previous studies to contrast with 'real' (e.g. Wellman & Estes, 
1986; Prawat et al., 1989) and because children's interpretation of 'real', not pretend, was 
of specific interest. 
4.2 Method 
Participants 
One hundred and twenty children were tested and they were divided into three age 
groups. There were forty preschoolers (mean age = 3;11, range = 3;0-4;9), forty 6-7-
year-oIds (mean age = 6;10, range = 6;0-7;10), and forty 9-10-year-olds (mean age = 
9;11, range = 9;1-10;10). In addition, twenty adults were tested (mean age = 36 years, 
range = 18-60). There were equal numbers of boys and girls in each age group. Children 
were recruited from nurseries and schools serving predominantly white working-class 
families in Surrey, UK and adults were recruited from a range of occupations within a 
University and were acquainted with the researcher. 
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Stimuli and task 
The natural language data collected in Study 1 revealed that children frequently discussed 
real and not-real aspects of everyday objects including toy food, toy vehicles, toy 
animals, as well as humans, and in particular the status of people who are dressed-up. 
The current study used two items from each of these four categories and each item was 
presented with its real counterpart, for example, a toy banana was presented with a real 
banana, making eight pairs of items in total (see Appendix 4.1 for pictures of the stimuli). 
Items were divided into two sets: Set 1 consisted of a banana, a car, a cat, and a fireman; 
and Set 2 contained a slice of bread, a passenger train, a dog, and a doctor. In the case of 
the doctor and the fireman, the 'not-real' item was a picture of a child in dressing-up 
clothes. Within each set, items were presented in the order of food, vehicle, animal and 
dressing-up because this was in line with their developmental order of appearance in 
Study 1.2 The presentation order of the sets was counterbalanced so that half of the 
children received Set 1 first followed by Set 2 and half received the reverse order.3 
Procedure 
Children were tested at nursery/school and adults were tested at work. The first pair of 
items was introduced by saying: "Here are two _ (bananas)". One of the items was 
pointed to and the child was asked: "Do you think this one is real or not-real? " and then 
the question was repeated for the other item. After the child had responded the pair of 
2 The first item (bread or banana) served as a screening item. If a child failed to give a correct reaVnot-real 
judgement for this item they were not tested further. However all children correctly identified at least one 
item as 'real' or 'not-real' and so no child was excluded. 
3 In pilot testing children were also required to make a certainty judgement rating regarding their reaVnot-
real classification on a 3 choice scale from 'very sure', 'a little bit sure' to 'not sure' (following Woolley et 
aI., 2004). The children, however, did not make use of the full range of the scale and tended either to 
perseverate or they did not respond. Furthermore, some children said 'really real' when pointing to the 
'very sure' option or 'not-real' when referring to the 'not sure' option, thus indicating confusion over the 
meaning of the scales. In the final procedure, therefore, the certainty scale was not used. 
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items was removed. In the same way, the vehicle, animal, and dressing-up items were 
presented in turn. Once children had made their judgments for all four items in a set, the 
items were reintroduced, in turn. For each pair of items, children were reminded of their 
judgements and then asked for each item (in a random order): "Why did you think this 
one was real/not-real?" This procedure was repeated for items in the other set. 
4.3 Results 
Scoring 
A toy/dressing-up item was considered correct if it was judged as 'not-real' and 
corresponding real items were considered correct if they were judged as 'real'. Correct 
answers received a score of 1 and incorrect answers received a score ofO. The maximum 
score for each child was therefore 16 since there were two sets, each containing 4 real 
items and 4 not-real items. 
Peryfonnanceonthejudgementtask 
Scores for the four age groups on each of the two sets of the real/not-real judgement task 
are shown in Table 4.2. Preliminary analysis using independent t tests revealed no effect 
of task order for Set 1, t (138) = -1.07, n.s. (Set 1 firstM= 7.51, SD = 1.21; Set 1 second 
M = 7.70, SD = 0.80) or Set 2, t (138) = -1.33, n.s. (Set 2 first M = 7.54, SD = 1.00; Set 2 
second M = 7.74, SD = 0.76) so scores within each set were collapsed. Table 4.2 
indicates that the preschoolers scored lower than the other age groups in each set and a 4 
(age) X 2 (set) ANDV A confirmed the main effect of age on accuracy, F (3, 136) = 
24.04, p < .001. Post hoc testing (Games-Howell) revealed that the preschoolers scored 
significantly lower (M = 13.63, SD = 2.60) than the 6-7-year-olds, 9-1O-year-olds, and 
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adults (M = 15.90, SD = 0.52, ps < .001). There was no effect on accuracy of set, F (1, 
136) = 0.22, n.s., and no interaction between age and set, F (3, 136) = 0.27, n.s. 
Table 4.2: Mean scores (and standard deviations) according to age group 
SetA SetB Total 
Age group (max. 8) (max. 8) (max. 16) 
3-4-year-olds n=40 6.75 (1.60) 6.88 (1.34) 13.63 (2.60) 
6-7-year-olds n=40 8.00 (0.0) 8.00 (0.0) 16.0 (0) 
9-10-year-olds n = 40 8.00 (0.0) 8.00 (0.0) 16.0 (0) 
Adults n=20 7.75 (0.55) 7.75 (0.55) 15.50 (1.10) 
Total 7.61 (1.03) 7.64 (0.89) 15.25 (1.78) 
Justifications according to age 
The purpose of the next stage of the analysis was to reveal what factors were given to 
qualify the real/not-real judgements. Judgements were coded as belonging to one of eight 
categories (see Table 4.3), irrespective of the accuracy of the judgement. To assess 
coding reliability, 25% of the justifications were rated by an independent coder and inter-
rater reliability was 86%. 
Because the number of justifications provided by each participant increased 
significantly as a function of age, F (3, 136) = 45.05,p < .001 (preschoolers M= 1.31, SD 
= 1.69, 6-7-year-olds M = 1.68, SD = 1.85, 9-10-year-olds M = 2.05, SD = 1.99, adults M 
= 2.34, SD = 2.37. p < .001) each single justification was expressed as a percentage of the 
total number of justifications given by that participant. 
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Table 4.3: Coding categories for the justifications with definitions and example 
responses. 
Justification Description Example 
Specific A particular feature of the It's yellow; it's got a tail; he's 
Attribute item wearing wellies. 
Prior Personal knowledge or I've seen those cars before; it feels 
Knowledge experience of the item real; dogs don't have wheels; he's 
too little to be a fireman. 
Authenticity Reference to a reall It's got proper skin; it has realistic 
genuinel authentic or crusts; it's got real smoke coming 
unreal feature of the item out; it's got pretend fur. 
Classifying Referring to a category to It's a toy; he's a child; it's a puzzle; 
which the item belongs it's a pet. 
Composition What the item is made It's made from flour; it's plastic; 
from it's a wooden one. 
Purpose What the item is used for You can eat it; you play with it; it's 
or what it does for driving in; he listens to your 
tummy. 
Other This commonly included He's in the hospital; it can move on 
references to where the it's own; it's alive and it breathes 
item is situated and and sleeps 
whether it is alive 
Uninfonnative Response is not I don't know; 'cos it is real. 
meaningful 
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Figure 4.1 shows the mean numbers of responses produced by each age group in 
each of the eight categories. It can be seen that the most common justification was 
specific attribute (M = 35.03%, SD = 16.29%), which was when a particular aspect of the 
item was described. A one-way OVA with four levels (age: preschoolers, 6-7-year-
olds, 9-10-year-olds, and adult ) wa conducted to compare the frequency with which this 
justification was given according to age. This revealed a main effect of age, F (3 , 136) = 
13 .69, P < .001. Post hoc testing (Tukey) showed that the 6-7-year-olds and 9-1O-year-
olds gave this justification significantly more (M = 40.81 , SD = 11.42) than the 
preschoolers (M = 30.33, SD = 21.54, P < .001) and the adults (M = 21.32, SD = 7.5, P < 
.001). 
Figure 4.1: Mean number of justifications In each category according to age group 
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The second most common justification was prior knowledge (M = 13.36%, SD 
= 10.25), which was when knowledge or experience of the item justified their decision, 
such as: "It's in the shape of bread" and "I've seen cats before". This justification 
occurred increasingly with age and a one-way ANOV A showed a main effect of age, F 
(3,136) = 9.5I,p < .001. Post hoc testing (Tukey) indicated that the 9-1O-year-olds and 
adults (M = 18.35, SD = 8.76) provided significantly more prior knowledge justifications 
than the preschoolers (M = 8.02, SD = 10.25, p < .001). In addition, the adults (M = 
20.06, SD = 7.78) gave this justification significantly more than the 6-7-year-olds (M = 
12.07, SD = 1O.25,p < .001). 
Classifying accounted for 11.94% (SD = 8.10) of the justifications on average 
and included those such as: "Because it's a toy puzzle". This justification was not given 
differentially by age, F (3, 136) = 0.17, n.s. 
The fourth category was authenticity (M = 10.68%, SD = 7.23). A one-way 
ANOVA revealed a main effect of age, F (3, 136) = 13.69, P < .001, and post hoc testing 
(Tukey) indicated that the 6-7-year-olds and 9-10-year-olds gave authenticity 
justifications, such as: "It's got a proper skin on" significantly more often (M = 13.62, 
SD = 6.13) than both the preschoolers (M = 6.25, SD = 7.86) and the adults (M = 7.80, SD 
= 3.67),ps < .001. 
Consideration of the composition of the item accounted for, on average, 10.38% 
(SD = 8.74) of the justifications. Composition of the item was considered increasingly 
with age and a one-way ANOV A confirmed the main effect of age, F (3, 136) = 34.70, P 
< .001. Post hoc testing (Games-Howell) revealed that the adults gave significantly more 
composition justifications (M = 20.34, SD = 4.76) than all other age groups (preschoolers 
M= 2.69, SD = 7.13, 6-7-year-olds M= 10.59, SD = 6.67, 9-10-year-olds M= 12.89, SD 
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= 6.92, ps < .001). In addition, the 6-7-year-olds and 9-1O-year-olds both produced 
significantly more composition justifications than the preschoolers (p < .001). 
The sixth category encompassed descriptions of the purpose of the item (M = 
7.98%, SD = 11.50), such as: "It's for eating" and "You can drive in it". The 
preschoolers produced purpose justifications more than the other age groups and a one-
way ANOVA confirmed that there was a significant main effect of age, F (3, 136) = 
11.12, P < .001. Post hoc testing (Games-Howell) revealed that the preschoolers gave 
this justification significantly more often (M = 15.59, SD = 16.85) than the other age 
groups (M= 5.25, SD = 6.34,p < .001). 
Uninformative responses accounted for 6.77% of the responses on average (SD 
= 18.78) and these were largely produced by the preschoolers. A one-way ANOV A 
revealed a main effect of age, F (3, 136) = 21.02, p < .001, and post hoc testing (Games-
Howell) confirmed that the preschoolers gave significantly more uninformative responses 
(M= 23.42, SD = 29.28) than the other age groups (M= 0.09, SD = 0.67,ps < .001). 
Finally, use of the category other was infrequent (M = 3.86%, SD = 5.41), so it 
was not analysed statistically. However, Figure 4.1 shows that more of these 
justifications were produced by adults (M = 10.67, SD = 6.73) than the children (M = 
2.72, SD = 4.39). 
4.4 Discussion 
This study was designed to explore what factors are considered when judging the 'real' or 
'not-real' status of items which are encountered by children in their everyday lives and 
which naturally invoke consideration of their reality status, e.g. toys and people dressing 
up. The motivation behind this study was to examine the accuracy of children's reaI/not-
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real judgements for such items as well as to examine what these judgements mean by 
eliciting the decisions behind them. These justifications were analysed into categories 
according to what factors were given. Developmental differences clearly emerged with 
respect to the sorts of judgements provided and the discussion begins with consideration 
of these. 
Almost one quarter of the justifications provided by the preschoolers were 
uninformative (despite judgements being correct 85% of the time). The remainder of 
their justifications were allocated to the category specific attribute because they provided 
an observable fact about the item (often ascertainable from the picture), such as its size or 
colour. Preschoolers also considered the purpose of the item to justify its real/not-real 
status (e.g. "It's for playing With'') and this was the case significantly more than any 
other age group. The other justification that the preschoolers often gave served to 
classify the object, such as by referring to it as a toy or 'pretend' one. Notably, this 
justification was used just as often by the other age groups and, perhaps surprisingly, 
there was not a noticeable qualitative change either, with reference to 'toys' being the 
main form of classification. 
The patterns of justification provided by the 6-7-year-olds and 9-10-year-olds 
overall were fairly similar to each other. Their justifications were fairly evenly 
distributed across all of the categories, but, similarly to the preschoolers, the most 
common form of justification was to describe specific attributes of the items. 
The most notable differences among the age groups in terms of the justifications 
provided were between the children and the adults. Although specific attribute 
justifications were given frequently by the adults, as by the children, the adults usually 
gave them with other justifications based on prior knowledge/experience and 
composition, for example, a typical adult explanation was "My son loves bananas and he 
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had one for brea/ifast this morning, um, it's not made of plastic like the other one ... and 
'" it's yellow". The composition of the item was described significantly more often by 
the adults than the children but authenticity of the items was less of a concern for the 
adults. 
The justifications provided in this study were different from those obtained by 
Prawat et aI., (1989). The main criterion that was used by participants in their study was 
prior or personal experience while in the current study it was specific attribute. One 
possible reason for this could be due to the types of items for which participants were 
required to make judgements. In the Prawat et al., study, participants listed general 
criteria that would be important for detennining whether something is real or not-real in 
addition to providing criteria for categories of items including dolls, cartoons, clouds and 
dreams. In contrast, the current study used a narrow range of specific items with which 
children are very familiar because they were common in children's everyday speech 
using the words real, really and pretend. In addition, pictures and objects were shown to 
the children of these items in the current study while, in the study by Prawat et al., (1989) 
the items were named. 
These differences may have increased the frequency with which specific 
attribute justifications were produced in the current study, perhaps because pictures and 
objects made the appearance and properties of each item more salient in comparison to 
being named. It was surprising that even adults frequently gave specific attribute 
justifications because these do not seem to provide a reliable means of differentiating real 
items from the toy ones, at least in this studY; for example explaining that the banana was 
real because it was yellow did not distinguish it from the toy banana which was also 
yellow. 
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There are two possible interpretations for the high frequency with which 
specific attribute justifications were given. First, the specific attribute may be referring 
to a property of the item that is irrelevant for differentiating it from its real/not-real 
counterpart. Alternatively, it may be referring to a relevant property but the justification 
is underspecified. For example, explaining that 'It's yellow' could mean 'It's the proper 
yellow colour of real bananas'. To differentiate between these two interpretations further 
questioning of children would be required. 
Recall that it was also expected that children's and adults' reasoning would 
relate to the notion of authenticity rather than existence. This expectation was largely 
supported by the findings that there were no references to the ontological status of the 
items and there were references to the notions of authenticity. However, a broad range of 
other factors were also considered. Authenticity justifications were mostly given by the 
6-7-year-oIds and 9-10-year-oIds and not the preschoolers. This was perhaps because in 
this category an explicit evaluative comment about a feature of the item using words such 
as 'real', 'pretend', or 'realistic' were required. This type of explicit comment was rarely 
produced by preschoolers in Study 1. This, therefore, supports the notion that specific 
attribute explanations were possible underspecified references to authenticity. Finally, 
the adults also reasoned about authenticity significantly less often than the 6-7-year-olds 
and 9-1O-year-olds, perhaps indicating that this criterion is not the most infonnative way 
to discern a toy item from a real one: composition was particularly common in the adults. 
Despite some differences in methodology between the current study and the 
study by Prawat et al., (1989) prior know/edge/experience justifications (e.g. "Because 
1 've seen one before") were prominent in both. This suggests that this type of 
justification is a pervasive one which is used to reason about the reality of a variety of 
classes of items including toys. It would be interesting research to detennine whether 
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this justification alone would be sufficient to convince another, non cognizant person of 
the reality status of an object, because it relies on belief in testimony of the informant. 
In conclusion, in the current study children's reasoning about the real/not-real 
status of everyday toy objects was examined. An equally important area of their 
everyday experience that was neglected, however, relates to the class of entities generally 
referred to as 'fantasy characters'. In the data in Study I, children discussed fantasy 
using the words real, really and pretend in about 20% of the utterances, which was one of 
the largest topics second to 'objects.' By focusing on the topic of fantasy in the next 
study (Study 3) some light will be shed on children's reasoning behind making fantasy-
reality judgements. Ultimately the results will contribute towards developing a fuller 
account of children's interpretation of words such as real in experimental tasks. 
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Chapter 5 
Study 3: Children's real/not-real judgements and justifications about 
fantasy characters 
5.11ntroduction 
In the previous study, children's real/not-real judgements and justifications for those 
judgements were sought for real and toy objects. A broad range of justifications were 
provided including specific attribute, describing prior knowledge/experience, classifying 
the item, describing the composition of the item, commenting on the authenticity of 
features of the item, and explaining the purpose or function of the item. The current 
study employed this framework to investigate children's justifications for their real/not-
real judgements in relation to fantasy characters. 
As noted in Chapter 1, a number of studies have documented children's ability 
to identify the real/not-real status of a variety of fantasy characters. Those studies have 
concluded that preschoolers are confused about the reality status of fantasy characters 
because of their tendency to categorise them incorrectly as 'real' (Morison & Gardner, 
1978; Samuels & Taylor, 1994; Sharon & Woolley, 2004). A limitation of those studies, 
however, is that they have neglected to take into account children's explanations for their 
judgements, thus it is not clear what children mean by their classifications. As described 
in Chapter 2 and found in Studies 1 and 2, children may consider real/not-real status in 
terms of authenticity of features of an item or character or they may consider them in 
terms of whether or not they exist. 
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In the study by Prawat et al., (1989) (described in Section 4.1) children and 
adults had to justify why they thought that, among other items, the category of cartoon 
characters was 'real' or 'not-real'. This study revealed that preschoolers largely claimed 
that cartoon characters were 'real' while the 9-1O-year-olds and adults claimed that they 
were 'not-real'. Unfortunately, the results for the justifications for cartoon characters 
were not provided separately by the authors who instead focused on justifications for 
'dolls' and 'dreams'. 
A limitation of Prawat et al's., (1989) study is that it appears to have low 
validity. This is because in their everyday talk about fantasy (Study I) children do not 
often consider fantasy characters and cartoons as categories of entities but they consider 
specific individuals from these categories, such as the Tooth Fairy or Bob the Builder. 
Also, in experimental tests children are faced with specific instances of fantasy 
characters, not the category in general. Thus it is possible that, when asked to justify why 
'cartoon characters' are 'real' or 'not-real', children consider a specific example, not the 
general case. Therefore, in the current study children's justifications for their real/not-
real judgements for specific fantasy and cartoon characters were sought. It was expected, 
in light of the findings from Study 1, that children would consider factors regarding both 
the authenticity of the characters and their (non) existence. In the current study children 
may, for example, consider the authenticity of Bob the Builder, noting, for example that 
"He hasn't got real skin, it's just made up of plastic". Alternatively they may consider 
the fictional status of Bob the Builder by claiming that "There's no such person as him". 
5.2 Method 
Participants 
The participants were those that had taken part in Study 2 (see Section 4.2). 
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Stimuli and task 
The characters were chosen in light of the language data from Study 1. In that data, 
children commonly discussed real, and not-real aspects of cartoon characters, such as Bob 
the Builder and fantasy characters such as 'Father Christmas' (see Appendix 5.1 for 
pictures of the characters). Four characters from each of these two types were selected on 
the basis of their frequent mention in the data in Study 1. Then the characters were 
divided into two sets so that each set comprised two cartoon characters and two fantasy 
characters: Set 1 consisted of Bob the Builder, Scooby 000, monsters, and Father 
Christmas, and Set 2 comprised Winnie the Pooh, Shrek, ghosts, and fairies4• Within 
each set, characters were presented in this order in line with their chronological order of 
appearance in the data collected in Study 1. All characters were presented as pictures 
with the exception of monsters and ghosts because a suitable uniform, non-cartoon 
depiction of these characters was not available. Instead, they were introduced to the child 
by saying: "What about monsters/ghosts? " 
Procedure 
Children were tested at nursery/school and adults were tested at work. Before formal 
testing began children were shown each picture in a random order to check they 
recognised the name for each one. All children were familiar with all of the characters. 
The first picture was introduced with the question: "Do you think __ is real or not-
real?" and after they had responded it was removed. In the same way the other 
characters from the first set were presented in tum. Once the judgments for each of the 
four characters in a set were made, they were reintroduced, in turn by reminding the child 
4 In pilot testing The Tooth Fairy was used but the preschoolers were not familiar with this character so it 
was replaced by the general category of 'fairies' . 
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of their judgement and asking them: "Why did you think was real/not-real?" This 
procedure was repeated for characters in the other set. The presentation order of the sets 
was counterbalanced so that half of the children received Set 1 first followed by Set 2 and 
half received the reverse order. 
5.3 Results 
Scoring 
A response was awarded a score of 1 if a child labelled a character as 'not-real' and a 
response of 'real' received a score of O. The maximum score for each child was 8 since 
there were two sets, each containing 4 characters. 
Performance on the judgement task 
Scores for the four age groups on each of the two sets of the reaVnot-real judgement task 
are shown in Table 5.1. Preliminary analysis using independent t tests revealed no effect 
of task order for Set 1, t (138) = 0.49, n.s. (Set 1 first M = 2.97, SD = 1.14; Set 1 second 
M= 2.87, SD = 1.25) or Set 2, t (138) = -0.22, n.s. (Set 2 first M= 3.17, SD = 1.13; Set 2 
second M = 3.21, SD = 1.21), so scores within each set were collapsed. Table 5.1 shows 
that judgements of 'not-real' increased with age and that scores in Set 2 tended to be 
higher than scores in Set 1. A 4 (age) X 2 (set) ANOVA confirmed the main effect of 
age on judgements, F (3, 136) = 51.88, P < .001, and post hoc testing (Games-Howell) 
revealed that scores increased significantly between the preschoolers and 6-7-year-olds, 
and the 6-7-year-olds and 9-10-year-olds (ps < .001), but not between 9-10-year-olds and 
adults. 
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Table 5.1: Mean scores (and standard deviations) according to age group 
Set 1 Set 2 Total 
Age Group (max. 4) (max. 4) (max. 8) 
3-4-year-olds n=40 1.6 (1.37) 2.00 (1.45) 3.60 (2.68) (45%) 
6-7-year-olds n=40 3.10 (0.30) 3.50 (0.64) 6.60 (0.67) (83%) 
9-10-year-olds n = 40 3.60 (0.55) 3.75 (0.44) 7.35 (0.74) (92%) 
Adults n=20 3.85 (0.37) 3.85 (3.67) 7.70 (0.66) (96%) 
Total 2.92 (1.19) 3.19 (1.17) 6.11 (2.24) (76%) 
The effect of set was also confinned, F (1, 13t» = 13.58, p < .001, with scores 
in Set 1 being lower than scores in Set 2. As there was no interaction between age and 
set, F (3, 136) = 2.12, n.s. analyses were conducted to assess the effect of character in 
each set (see Table 5.2). A repeated measures ANOVA on scores in Set 1 revealed that 
there was a significant effect of character (Greenhouse-Geisser), F (1.90, 263.82) = 
70.82, P < .001, and pairwise comparisons indicated that scores for Father Christmas 
were significantly lower than scores for the other three characters (ps < .001). In other 
words, Father Christmas was judged as 'real' significantly more than the other characters. 
A repeated measures ANDV A on scores in Set 2 also revealed a significant effect of 
character (Greenhouse-Geisser), F (2.15, 298.61) = 17.96, P < .001, and pairwise 
comparisons indicated that scores for Fairies were significantly lower than scores for the 
other three characters (ps < .001), thus fairies were also judged as 'real' significantly 
more often than the other characters. 
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Table 5.2: Mean scores (and standard deviations) according to character 
Character Mean (1 = correct 
Set o = incorrect) 
Set 1 Bob the Builder 0.86 (0.34) 
Scoobie Doo 0.82 (0.38) 
Monster 0.84 (0.37) 
Father Christmas 0.40 (0.49) 
Set 2 Winnie the Pooh 0.87 (0.34) 
Shrek 0.80 (0.40) 
Ghosts 0.87 (0.34) 
Fairies 0.64 (0.48) 
Justifications according to age 
The purpose of the next stage of the analysis was to reveal what factors were given to 
qualify the real/not-real judgements. Judgements were coded as belonging to one of ten 
categories (see Table 5.3), irrespective of the judgement made. To assess coding 
reliability, 25% of the justifications were rated by an independent coder and inter-rater 
reliability was 82%. 
Because the number of justifications increased significantly as a function of age, 
F(3, 136) = 27.84,p < .001 (preschoolersM= 1.23, SD = 0.28; 6-7-year-oldsM= 1.37, 
SD = 0.23; 9-1O-year-olds M= 1.78, SD = 0.45; adults M= 1.98, SD = 0.57, p < .001), 
each single justification was expressed as a percentage of the total number of 
justifications given by that participant. 
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Figure 5.1 shows the mean number of responses produced by each age group in 
each of the ten categories. It can be seen that the largest proportion of responses were 
composition/origins (M = 13.44%, SD = 13.01%), that is, consideration of how a 
character was made or where it came from. Production of this response steadily 
increased with age and a one-way ANOV A confinued the main effect of age, F (3, 136) 
= 72.l2,p < .001. Post hoc testing (Games-Howell) revealed that the 9-10-year-olds and 
adults gave significantly more composition/origins justifications (M = 25.75, SD = 9.87) 
.than both the 6-7-year-olds (M = 8.54, SD = 9.35) and preschoolers (M = 1.65, SD = 
3.98),ps < .001. 
The second most common justification, including responses such as "No-one's 
ever seen them, " was verifiability (M = 12.46, SD = 11.86). This justification was used 
increasingly with age and a one-way ANOV A confirmed the main effect of age, F (3, 
136) = 28.80, p < .001. Post hoc testing (Games-Howell) revealed that the 9-10-year-
olds and 6-7-year-olds both gave significantly more (M = 15.43, SD = 11.97) than the 
preschoolers (M = 1.70, SD = 4.73), ps < .001, and the adults gave significantly more 
verifiability justifications (M = 22.3, SD = 5.5, P < .001) compared to the other age 
groups. 
The category specific attribute was the third most common justification (M = 
10.62, SD = 17.36) and this was when a feature of the item was described. Use of this 
justification decreased with age and a one-way ANOV A confinued the main effect of 
age, F (3, 136) = 23.08, p < .001. Post hoc testing (Games-Howell) revealed that the 
adults gave this justification significantly less (M = 0.73, SD = 2.36) than both the 9-10-
year-olds and 6-7-year-olds (M = 5.25, SD = 7.26), and the preschoolers (M = 26.24, SD 
= 24.61), ps < .001, and the 9-10-year-olds and 6-7-year-olds gave this justification 
significantly less than the preschoolers (p < .001). 
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Justification Description Example 
Composition! What the character is made of He's made out of play doh; people 
Origin or where it comes from just draw them; it's animation; 
someone just made it up. 
Verifiability Establishing evidence No one's ever seen them; you 
regarding the existence of the wouldn't meet him in the street. 
character 
Existence Unsupported statement of There's no such thing; they don't 
Statement belief or unbelief in the exist; I don't believe in them. 
character 
Authenticity Reference to a real or unreal He hasn't got a real face; he's got a 
feature of the character real beard; he's not a proper bear. 
Location Places in which the character He's on TV; he's not on our planet; 
lives or is found he's only in the film. 
Prior Personal or previous Cats can't talk; I've seen him at 
Knowledge knowledge or experience of Disney; I saw Mum hiding my 
the character presents. 
Specific A particular feature of the He's green; he's wearing a belt; 
Attribute character he's got a tail; they're scary. 
Classifying Referring to the character with It's just a cartoon character; he's an 
another name ogre; it's a teddy bear. 
Outcome Events or outcomes caused by He brings presents; they leave 
the character things for you. 
Uninformative Response was not meaningful I don't know; 'cos it is real. 
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Figure 5.1: Mean number of justifications in each category according to age group 
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The prior knowledge/experience category, which included justifications such as 
"He came to my school," accounted for 10.34% (SD = 12.78) of the responses. Use of 
this justification decreased with age and a one-way ANOV A confirmed the main effect of 
age, F (3 , 136) = 5.48, P < .001. Post hoc testing (Games-Howell) revealed that the 
adults gave prior knowledge justifications significantly less (M = 3.75, SD = 4.20) than 
both the 6-7-year-olds and 9-10-year-olds (M = 9.05, SD = 11.63, P < .005) and 
preschoolers (M = 16.07, SD = 14.96, P < .001), and the 6-7-year-olds and 9-10-year-olds 
also gave significantly fewer than the preschoolers (p < .01). 
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The fifth most common justification was location (M = 9.89, SD = 12.81) and 
included responses such as "He's only on T. V. " A one-way ANOV A confirmed the main 
effect of age, F (3, 136) = 5.48, p < .005. Post hoc testing (Games-Howell) revealed that 
the 6-7-year-olds gave location justifications significantly more (M = IS.S3, SD = IS.64) 
than the 9-1O-year-olds and adults (M = 6.4S, SD = 6.S9, p < .01) and there was no 
difference in the frequency of use between the 6-7-year-olds and preschoolers (M = 9.66, 
SD = IS.20,p > .OS). 
Justifications such as "He's got a real beard ", i.e. those that considered the 
authenticity of the character, accounted for 9.83% (SD = 10.1S) of the responses. Use of 
this justification tended to increase with age and a one-way ANOVA confirmed the main 
effect of age, F (3, 136) = 9.6S, p < .001. Post hoc testing (Games-Howell) indicated that 
the 6-7-year-olds, 9-1O-year-olds and adults gave this justification significantly more (M 
= 12.37, SD = 9.98) than the preschoolers (M = 3.69, SD = 8.67,ps < .001). 
The category existence statement accounted for 9.62% (SD = 10.76) of the 
justifications and included responses such as "Because there's no such thing as them ". 
This justification also tended to increase with age and a one-way ANOV A confirmed the 
main effect of age, F (3, 136) = 21.38, p < .001. Post hoc testing (Games-Howell) 
showed that both the 9-10-year-olds and adults (M = IS.41, SD = 10.49) gave this 
justification significantly more than both the preschoolers (M = 1.40, SD = S.56, p < 
.001) and 6-7-year-olds (M= 8.57, SD = 8.59,p < .01). The 6-7-year-olds also gave this 
justification significantly more than the preschoolers (p < .001). 
Responses such as "It's a cartoon" and "It's an ogre ", i.e. those that classified 
the character accounted for 7.41% (SD = 8.9) of the total number of justifications. This 
justification was used increasingly with age and a one-way ANOV A confirmed the main 
effect of age, F (3, 136) = 9.8l,p < .001. Post hoc testing (GameS-Howell) indicated that 
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the 6-7 -year-olds, 9-10-year-olds, and adults gave this justification significantly more 
often (M= 9.81, SD = 10.58) than the preschoolers (M= 1.92, SD =4.15,ps < .005). 
Finally, justifications that considered outcomes or events associated with the 
character were infrequent (M = 4.32, SD = 6.17) and because of this they were not 
analysed statistically. Figure 5.1 shows that these justifications were given more often by 
the preschoolers and 6-7-year-olds (M = 6.69, SD = 7.54) than the 9-10-year-olds and 
adults (M = 0.95, SD = 3.51). The same, but more exaggerated pattern was found for 
uninformative responses, which accounted for 12.05% (SD = 22.89) of the justifications. 
That preschoolers (M = 32.45, SD = 30.31) and 6-7-year-olds (M = 9.27, SD = 17.51) 
gave more uninformative justifications than the 9-10-year-olds and adults (M = 0.35, SD 
= 1.67). 
5.4 Discussion 
This study examined children's justifications for their real/not-real judgements about 
fantasy characters. The justifications were analysed according to what criteria were 
considered and some clear developmental changes emerged. Preschoolers tended to 
judge fantasy characters as 'real' (55%) and the largest proportion of their justifications 
were uninformative. The remainder simply described specific attributes of the fantasy 
character (often inferred from the pictures), or described prior experience or knowledge. 
The preschoolers gave both specific attribute and prior experience justifications 
significantly more than the other age groups. Preschoolers also sometimes described 
outcomes associated with the fantasy characters, for example "He (Father Christmas) 
brings you presents" and they described the location in which they had previously seen 
some of the fantasy characters, i.e. on the television. 
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The 6-7-year-olds, conversely, tended to judge that the fantasy characters were 
'not-real' (83%), but this was significantly less than the 9-10-year-olds and adults. The 
6-7-year-olds produced fewer uninformative responses than the preschoolers and they 
gave a larger range of justifications. The most common were verifiability and location, 
whereby they typically described whether anyone has ever seen the fantasy character 
and/or commented that fantasy characters are only found on TV as opposed to being in 
the street. In particular, the 6-7-year-olds offered location justifications significantly 
more often than the other age groups. This seems to suggest that for children around the 
ages of 6-7 years, the televised nature of fantasy characters is a particularly salient 
feature. The remainder of the justifications provided by children from this age group 
were fairly well distributed across the other categories, indicating that they considered a 
broad range of factors to justify their real/not-real judgements. 
The 9-1 O-year-olds judged fantasy characters as 'not-real' 90% of the time. The 
most common justification was composition/origins, and this was produced significantly 
more by the 9-10-year-old children than the two younger age groups. Typical responses 
within this category included reference to the imagined nature of fantasy characters or to 
their animated, computerised, or drawn nature. Similarly to the 6-7-year-olds, the 9-10-
year-olds also gave verifiability justifications, but the 9-10-year-olds also commonly 
discussed the authenticity of fantasy characters and gave existence statements. 
For the adults 97% of their judgements were that fantasy characters were 'not-
real' . There was little difference, however, in terms of the justifications provided by the 
adults compared to the 9-1 O-year-olds: both groups considered the composition/origins of 
the characters, discussed the authenticity of the fantasy characters, and gave existence 
statements. Regarding verifiability justifications, however, the adults produced this 
justification significantly more often than the children. Despite this difference these 
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results suggest that 9-10-year-olds have a fairly adult like understanding of the factors 
that contribute to the real/not-real status of fantasy characters, even if they occasionally 
conclude from this information that a fantasy character is 'real'. 
Overall, these results suggest that preschoolers tend to judge fantasy characters 
as 'real' and they have difficulty providing an informative reason: they typically provide 
an uninfonnative response or describe a specific attribute of the character based on 
appearance. Children between the ages of 6-7 years tend to judge fantasy characters as 
'not-real' but about 20% judge that they are 'real'. Their justifications suggested 
awareness of the status of existence of the character and this tended to centre on whether 
the character is visible or not. Other typical considerations centred on the fact that 
fantasy characters tend only to be found on the TV. By the ages of 9-10 children largely 
judged that the fantasy characters were 'not-real' and they explained why in a similar 
way to the adults. Notably they provided verifiable evidence for their judgements and 
they understood that fantasy characters have fictitious origins, even though this 
occasionally followed a judgement that some characters were 'real'. Nine-ten-year-olds 
and adults also reasoned about the existence of fantasy characters with explicit statements 
including "There's no such thing" or "They don't exist". 
In the introduction it was suggested that children would consider both the 
authenticity and existence of fantasy characters in their reasoning. From the justifications 
that were provided it is difficult to judge the extent to which this was the case because a 
wide range of other factors were also given. However, a comparison of the number of 
existence statements5 with authenticity revealed that there was no difference (9.62% vs 
9.83% respectively). In terms of the developmental pattern of existence statements and 
S Existence statements were judged as the best indicator of 'existence' because they encompassed direct and 
explicit references using tenns for existence. 
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authenticity justifications, they were both given increasingly with age. Regarding 
authenticity, the 6-7-year-olds, 9-1O-year-olds, and adults produced this justification 
significantly more often than the preschoolers. (This reflects the results from the 
previous study in which preschoolers rarely gave this justification.) On the other hand, 
more Existence statements were provided by the 9-10-year-olds and adults then the 6-7-
year-olds and preschoolers. One possible reason for this is because such justifications 
were explicit statements; also these were rarely produced by younger children in Study 1. 
Overall, both the notions of authenticity and existence were considered when children 
and adults were asked to justify their real/not-real judgements for fantasy characters, but 
these were just two of many other factors considered. 
The justifications that were produced in this study were, again, quite different 
from those obtained by Prawat et al., (1989). The main criterion used in their study was 
direct personal knowledge while the equivalent justification in the current study (prior 
knowledge/experience) was, overall, only the fourth most common justification. In the 
current study, more importance was given to factors including the composition/origins of 
the character and establishing evidence regarding their existence (verifiability). Possible 
reasons for the differences between the two studies were outlined in Section 4.4 and will 
not be repeated here. 
A potential limitation of the current study lies in a facet of the procedure which 
differed from that used in Study 2: recall from Section 4.3 that children were shown both 
the real and not-real item simultaneously, thus they were making an implicit comparative 
judgement. In contrast, in the current study the fantasy characters were not presented 
with a 'real' equivalent. This meant that children were not asked to make an implicitly 
comparative judgment in Study 3. It also meant that the correct judgement was always 
'not-real'. This may have confused the children because they were given a choice of two 
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responses (real and not-real) and this could have resulted in children judging some 
characters as 'real' simply because they felt under pressure to choose the 'real' option 
some of the time. Presenting the fantasy characters unaccompanied may also have made 
it more difficult for children to provide a justification because they did not have another 
'real' character with which to draw a comparison. 
The use of fantasy characters alone may also not have been the most 
ecologically valid method to assess understanding because we experience fantasy 
characters in contexts in which real people are included (as was evident in the diary data, 
Study 1). Examples include television programmes such as 'Blues Clues' in which 
cartoon animation is presented with real adult presenters, and story collections such as the 
Oxford Tree Reading Scheme in which 'ordinary' school aged children including 'Biff' 
and 'Chip' go on fantastical adventures with the aid of a magic key. Even in shopping 
centres and theme parks children encounter people dressed-up as fantasy characters in 
real situations. With this concern in mind, in Study 4 children were presented with the 
fantasy characters used in the current study presented simultaneously with equivalent real 
characters. For example, Bob the builder was presented alongside a real builder, and 
Winnie the Pooh was presented alongside a real bear. 
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Chapter 6 
Study 4: Children's real/not-real judgements and justifications of real 
and fantasy characters 
6.1 Introduction 
The study presented in this chapter was designed to explore children's understanding of 
the reality status of cartoon characters as well as real characters. This was done in a way 
directly comparable to the methodology employed in Study 2 using real and toy objects 
so that, instead of making real/not-real judgements and justifications in relation to fantasy 
characters presented individually, the fantasy characters were paired with real characters, 
for example Bob the Builder was presented alongside a real builder. It was expected that 
children's judgements that fantasy characters are 'not-real' would increase because the 
expected answers were 'real' (for the real characters) and 'not-real' (for the fantasy 
characters). In addition, it was expected that the justifications children provided would 
differ from Study 3 in terms both of the nature of references to existence and authenticity. 
6.2 Method 
Participants 
Twenty preschoolers (mean age 4;1, range = 3;3-4;9) and 20 6-7-year-olds (mean age 
6;11, range = 6;2-7;10) participated. There were equal numbers of boys and girls in each 
group. Children were recruited from nurseries and schools in Surrey, UK, serving 
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predominantly white and working-class families. Twenty adults were also tested and 
were recruited from a University in Surrey (mean age 32 years, range = 18-42). 
Stimuli and task 
The characters were the same as those used in the previous study, but 'monsters' and 
'ghosts' were removed because there was a lack of a suitable equivalent 'real' character. 
In addition to the previous study, each fantasy character was presented alongside a 
picture of an appropriate real character, for example Bob the builder was presented with a 
real adult male builder (see Appendix 6.1 for pictures of the characters). As before, 
characters were presented in two sets: Set 1 comprised Bob the builder and a builder, 
Scooby Doo and a dog, and Father Christmas and a postman; Set 2 contained Winnie the 
Pooh and a bear, Shrek and a surgeon wearing green surgical scrubs, and fairies and 
ballerinas. Within each set, the characters were presented in these orders as was in line 
with the order of appearance in natural speech data collected in Study 1. The presentation 
order of the sets was counterbalanced so that half of the children received Set 1 first 
followed by Set 2 and half received the reverse order. 
Procedure 
Children were tested individually at nursery/school. The first pair of items was 
introduced by saying: "This is Bob the Builder and this is a builder". One of the 
characters was pointed to and the child was asked: "Do you think __ is real or not-
real?" Then the same question was asked for the other character and, after the child had 
responded, both characters were removed. The other pairs of characters were presented 
in the same way. Once children had made their judgments for all 3 pairs in one set, the 
pairs of characters were reintroduced, in turn. For each character in the pair children 
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were reminded of their judgement and then asked: "Why did you think __ was real or 
not-real? " This procedure was repeated for characters in the other set. The same 
procedure was carried out for the adults who were tested either at work or home as 
convenient. 
6.3 Results 
Scoring 
One point was allocated if a fantasy character was judged as 'not-real' and one point was 
awarded if a real character was judged as 'real'. The maximum score for each child was 
therefore 12 since there were 2 sets containing six fantasy characters and six real 
characters. 
Performance on the judgement task 
Scores for the three age groups on each of the two sets of the real/not-real judgement task 
are shown in Table 6.1. Preliminary analysis using independent t tests revealed no effect 
of task order for Set 1, t (58) = -1.11, n.s. (Set 1 first M = 4.83, SD = 1.29; Set 1 second 
M = 4.87, SD = 1.17) or Set 2, t (58) = 0.00, n.s. (Set 2 first M = 5.20, SD = 1.56; Set 2 
second M = 5.20, SD = 1.45), so scores within each set were collapsed. Table 6.1 
indicates that scores increased with age and a 3 (age) X 2 (set) ANOV A confirmed the 
main effect of age on scores, F (2, 57) = 35.05, P < .001. Post hoc testing (Games-
Howell) revealed that there was a significant increase in scores between each of the three 
age groups (ps < .005). 
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Table 6.1: Mean scores (and standard deviations) according to age group 
Age group Set 1 Set 2 Total 
(max. 6) (max. 6) (max. 12) 
3-4-year-olds n = 20 3.60 (1.27) 3.70 (1.81) 7.30 (3.05) (60%) 
6-7-year-olds n = 20 5.25 (0.44) 5.90 (0.31) 11.15 (0.59) (93%) 
Adults n=20 5.70 (0.47 6.00 (0.00) 11. 70 (0.47) (97%) 
Mean 4.85 (1.21) 5.200.49) 10.05 (2.66) (84%) 
There was also an effect of set, F (2, 57) = 22.59, p < .001. To examine this 
effect repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted for each set (see Table 6.2). These 
revealed that there was no effect of character in Set 2, F (2,57) = 1.91, n.s. but there was 
an effect of character in Set 1, F (2, 57) = 23.58, p < .001: pairwise comparisons 
indicated that scores for the Father Christmas and Postman pair were significantly lower 
than scores for the other 2 pairs of characters (ps < .001). 
In addition, the interaction between age and set was significant, F (2,57) = 4.76, 
p < .01. To investigate this interaction, separate paired t tests were perfonned on each 
age group. For the preschoolers there was no effect of set on scores, t (19) = -0.62, n.s, 
but there were significant effects for both the 6-7-year-olds, t (19) = -5.94,p < .001, and 
adults, t (19) = -2.85,p < .01. Both these age groups scored significantly higher in Set 2 
than Set 1. 
Comparison of performance on the judgement task between the current study and Study 3 
The next analysis sought to determine whether the change of context made by the 
addition of real characters increased the extent to which children judged fantasy 
characters as 'not-real'. Perfonnance was compared for the preschoolers, 6-7- year-olds, 
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Table 6.2: Mean scores (and standard deviations) according to character 
Character Mean 
Set (max. 2) 
Set 1 Bob the Builder and a builder 1.75 (0.51) 
Scoobie Doo and a dog 1.77 (0.50) 
Father Christmas and a postman 1.33 (0.54) 
Set 2 Winnie the Pooh and a bear 1.77 (0.50) 
Shrek and a Doctor 1.75 (0.S4) 
Fairies and ballerinas 1.68 (0.S7) 
and adults by converting the scores into percentages because the maximum score in 
Study 3 was 8 and in the current study it was 12 (see end columns of Tables 5.1 and 6.1). 
There was only a significant effect of context for the 6-7-year-olds, t (S8) = -S.93, p < 
.001, with their scores being higher in the current study (M = 93.10%, SD = 4.91) than 
the previous study (M = 82.80%, SD = 8.51). Scores for the preschoolers and adults did 
not differ between the two studies. 
Justifications according to age 
Analysis of the justifications was carried out to explore what factors were considered for 
the real/not-real judgements. Judgements were coded into one of 9 categories (see Table 
6.3), irrespective of the judgement made. To assess coding reliability, 2S% of the 
justifications were rated by an independent coder and inter-rater reliability was 83%. 
Because the number of justifications increased significantly as a function of age, 
F (2,57) = 51.27,p < .001 (preschoolers M= 13.3S, SD = 1.39, 6-7-year-olds M= 18.7S, 
112 
SD = 3.26, adults M = 22.55, SD = 3.51), justifications from each participant were 
expressed as a percentage of the total number of justifications given by that participant. 
Figure 6.1 shows the mean number of times each justification was given 
according to age group. This figure shows that the category specific attribute accounted 
for the largest proportion of justifications (M = 27.60%, SD = 26.41), which included 
comments such as "He's got tools on his belt" and "He's smiling". Use of this 
justification decreased with age and a one-way ANOV A with three levels (preschoolers, 
6-7-year-olds, adults) confinned the main effect of age, F (2,57) = 10.69,p < .001. Post 
hoc testing (Games-Howell) indicated that the adults gave this justification significantly 
less (M = 9.79, SD = 8.50) than the preschoolers and 6-7-year-olds (M = 36.44, SD = 
30.53,p < .001). 
Justifications such as "He"s a real plumber' and "He's wearing proper 
clothes", i.e. those that considered the authenticity of the character, were the second most 
frequent response (M = 20.49, SD = 17.11). There was an increase in the number of 
authenticity justifications given by the 6-7-year-olds and adults in comparison to the 
preschoolers and a one-way ANOVA confinned the main effect of age, F (2, 57) = 19.12, 
P < .001. Post hoc testing (Tukey) revealed that the 6-7-year-olds and adults gave 
significantly more authenticity justifications (M = 8.09, SD = 14.29) than the 
preschoolers (M = 5.28, SD = 13.06,p < .001). 
The third most common justification was composition/origins, e.g. 'They're just 
in stories' (M = 10.09, SD = 14.37). A one-way ANOVA confinned the main effect of 
age, F (2, 57) = 26.34, p < .001, and post hoc testing (Games-Howell) indicated that the 
adults gave composition/origins justifications significantly more (M = 23.50, SD = 15.82) 
than the 6-7-year-olds (M= 6.77, SD = 9.11) and preschoolers (M= O),ps < .001. The 6-
7 -year-olds also gave this justification significantly more than the preschoolers (p < .01). 
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Table 6.3: Coding categories for the justifications with definitions and example responses 
Justification Description Example 
Specific A particular feature of the He's green; he's wearing a belt; 
Attribute character he's got a tail; they're scary. 
Authenticity Reference to a real or unreal He hasn't got a real face; he's got a 
feature of the character real beard; he's not-really a proper 
bear. 
Composition! What the character is made of or He's made out of play doh; people 
Origin where it comes from just draw them; it's animated; 
someone just made it up. 
Location Places in which the character He's on TV; he's not on our planet; 
lives or is found he's only in the film. 
Classifying Referring to a category to which It's just a cartoon character; be's an 
the item belongs ogre; it's a teddy bear. 
Prior Personal! prior knowledge or Cats can't talk; I've seen him at 
Knowledge experience of the character Disney; I caught my Mum giving 
me the presents. 
Existence Unsupported statement of belief There's no such thing; they don't 
Statement or unbelief in the character exist; I don't believe in them. 
Other Included references to No one's ever seen them; he brings 
establishing existence us presents. 
(verifiability) and events caused 
by the character (outcome) 
Uninfonnative Response was not meaningful I don't know; 'cos it is real. 
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Figure 6.1: Mean number of justifications in each category according to age group 
45 
40 
Preschoolers n = 20 
l-
• 6-7 -yr-olds n = 20 
,-.. 35 
~ e - I-o Adults n=20 '" 30 ~
'" = I-Q .-
c. 25 '" ~
J. 
f-----
0--Q 20 J. f-- I-
~ .c e 15 = -= = .-co: 10 ~ I'"'" r-I- -' 
~ - .-
5 
0 ~a 
f---- l-
II ~ ~l h IL- l ..... - .. 
Location was the fourth most common justification (M = 9.48, SD = 12.57) and 
a one way ANDV A revealed that there was no effect of age on the number of these 
justifications, F(2, 57) = 0.46, n.s (preschoolersM = 10.58, SD = 19.28; 6-7-year-oldsM 
= 10.60, SD = 8.95; adultsM = 7.27, SD = 5.59). 
Justifications including "It 's a cartoon " and "It's a man", that is they classified 
the character, accounted for an average of 6.20% (SD = 6.52) of the justifications. 
Classifications were provided by the adults more than by the children and a one way 
ANOV A confirmed the main effect of age, F (2, 57) = 9.24, P < .001. Post hoc testing 
(Tukey) revealed that the adults c/as ified significantly more (M = 10.72, SD = 6.53) than 
both the preschoolers and 6-7-year-olds (M = 3.94, SD = 5.38), ps < .001. 
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The sixth most frequent justification was prior knowledge/experience, (M = 
5.72, SD = 8.31). A one way ANOV A revealed no significant effect of age, F (2, 57) = 
0.26, n.s, (preschoolers M = 4.63, SD = 8.27; 6-7-year-olds M = 6.07, SD = to.08; adults 
M = 6.45, SD = 6.53). 
Existence statements, such as "He's just a myth" and "Ballerinas are real life, .. 
accounted for an average of 5.33% (SD = 7.79) of the justifications. A one way ANOVA 
revealed a main effect of age on the number of existence statements, F (2, 57) = 16.12, p 
< .001, and post hoc testing (Games-Howell) showed that the adults gave this 
justification significantly more (M = 11.31, SD = 8.26) than both the 6-7-year-olds (M = 
4.68, SD = 7.21, P < .03) and preschoolers (M = 0, p < .001). Also, the 6-7-year-olds 
gave this justification significantly more often than the preschoolers (p < .02). 
Other justifications were infrequent (M = 5.63, SD = 7.22), thus they were not 
analysed statistically. Finally, uninformative responses accounted for 9.52% (SD = 
23.39) of the total number of justifications and these were largely produced by the 
preschoolers (M = 26.89, SD = 34.69). 
Comparison of the justifications between the current study and Study 3 
The final analysis compared differences between the current study and the previous study 
in relation to children's justifications to determine whether the change of context 
influenced the types of factors that were considered. This was because in experimental 
tests of children's understanding of fantasy, whether a character is presented alone or in a 
pair with a real character could have a significant impact on the meaning of their 
judgement. 
The two most common justifications given by the preschoolers in the previous 
study were specific attribute (M = 26.23, SD = 24.55) and uninformative (M = 32.39, SD 
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= 30.31). While slightly more specific attribute justifications were given in the current 
study (M = 43.05, SD = 33.52), t (58) = -1.99, p < .06, the number of uninformative 
justifications remained the same (M = 29.89, SD = 34.69), t (58) = 0.63, n.s. Prior 
experience justifications were also quite common in the previous study (M = 16.30, SD = 
16.26) but they were rare in the current study (M = 4.63, SD = 8.27), t (58) = 3.69, p < 
.001, and the number of location justifications, which featured in the previous study (M = 
9.61, SD = 15.21) were the same as in the current study (M = 10.58, SD = 19.28), t (58) = 
-0.21, n.s. 
The 6-7 -year-olds in the previous study most often gave verifiability (M = 16.98, 
SD = 13.72) and location justifications (M = 15.52, SD = 15.63). In contrast, in the 
current study verifiability justifications were so rare that they were recorded as other (M 
= 10.60, SD = 8.95) while location justifications occurred equally as often in the current 
study (M = 8.28, SD = 8.93), t(58) = 1.55, n.s. In contrast, in the current study the two 
most prevalent justifications given by the 6-7-year-olds were specific attributes (M = 
29.82, SD = 19.46) and authenticity (M = 28.32, SD = 17.39). These both occurred 
significantly more than compared to the previous study (specific attributes M = 6.34, SD 
= 8.28, t (58) = -5.14,p < .001; and authenticity M= 10.19, SD = 9.95, t (58) = -6.57,p < 
.001). 
For the adults, the main justifications that occurred in the previous study were 
compOSition/origins, verifiability, existence statement, and authenticity while in the 
current study composition/origins and authenticity were most common There was no 
difference in the number of composition/origins justifications between the previous study 
(M = 28.98, SD = 8.92) and the current study (M = 23.50, SD = 15.82), t (38) = 1.35, n.s., 
but in the current study there were significantly more authenticity justifications (M = 
27.86, SD = 8.44 versus the previous study M = 12.74, SD = 6.46, t (38) = -6.36, p < 
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.001). As was the case with the 6-7-year-olds adults provided so few verifiability 
justifications in comparison to the previous study that they were classified as other, but 
the number of existence statements remained the same, t (38) = 1.18, n.s. (Study 3 M = 
14.13, SD = 6.87, current study M= 11.31, SD = 8.26). 
6.4 Discussion 
The aim of this study was to detennine whether children's real/not-real judgements and 
justifications for fantasy characters were affected by the context in which they were 
presented. In this study the fantasy characters were presented in context with real 
characters, such as Bob the Builder with a real builder, whereas in the previous study, 
fantasy characters were presented alone. Dealing first with the real/not-real jUdgements, 
in the current study 60% of the judgements by preschoolers were that the fantasy 
characters were 'not-real', an increase from 45% in the previous study. Six- and seven-
year-oIds also indicated that fantasy characters were 'not-real' in the current study (95% 
versus 83% in the previous study) while 97% of the adults' judgements in both studies 
were 'not-real'. These results suggest that the judgements of the 'not-real' status of 
fantasy characters increases when those judgements are made in a context in which both 
real and fantasy characters are present. 
The change of context in which the fantasy characters were presented also 
affected the justifications that were given for the judgments and these differences were 
most prominent among the 6-7-year-olds and adults. Preschoolers performed similarly in 
both contexts, mainly by providing justifications based on specific attributes or failing to 
give any formal response. In contrast, in the previous study 6-7 -year-oIds justified their 
responses largely by verifying the existence of the character or by describing the location 
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in which the characters are found. In the current study location justifications were given 
by the 6-7-year-olds to the same extent but verifiability explanations were so rare that 
they were included as other. In the current study the most prevalent justifications for the 
6-7-year-olds were to describe specific attributes and authenticity, which both occurred 
significantly more often than in the previous study. This suggests that some children had 
more difficulty providing a justification in the current study because they resorted to 
describing a specific attribute that they stated from the picture. It also suggests that the 
connotations of real/not-real related more strongly to notions of authenticity than 
existence as seen by an increase in the number of authenticity justifications and a 
decrease in verifiability justifications. 
Adults also gave significantly more authenticity justifications in the current 
study compared to the previous study but they produced the same number of 
composition/origin justifications and existence statements in both studies, although 
verifiability justifications were rare in the current study. Thus the adults, similarly to the 
6-7 -year-olds also considered authenticity to a greater extent than existence in the current 
study but composition/origins of fantasy and real characters were important 
considerations regardless of the context. 
The differences between the justifications produced in Studies 3 and 4, as 
anticipated, revealed that children's judgements concerning the real or not-real status of 
fantasy characters were affected by the context in which they are made. In the original 
context of fantasy characters presented alone the most common justifications related to 
how the character was made or its origins. In contrast, in the current study the addition of 
real characters served to increase consideration of the authenticity of both real and 
fantasy characters. Thus consideration of fantasy characters in a context in which there 
are also real characters emphasises notions authenticity over the nature of their existence. 
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The implications of these findings, which relate to children's understanding oftenns such 
as real and not-real, and the meaning of their real/not-real judgements will be discussed 
in Chapter 10. 
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Part 1: Summary and Conclusions 
The studies presented Part 1 arose from consideration of the evidence regarding 
children's understanding of distinctions between pretense-reality and fantasy-reality. 
Research has shown that from the age of 3-years, children can distinguish between what 
an object really is and what it represented during an episode of pretense (Flavell et al., 
1987) and children can distinguish a mental entity, such as a thought or image, from the 
real physical object it represents (Wellman & Estes, 1986). However, they sometimes 
experience confusion about the reality status of an entity that they have merely imagined 
(Harris, et al., 1991), and children up to the age of 6-7-years believe in the existence of 
fantasy beings such as monsters, ghosts and Father Christmas (Rosengren & Hickling, 
1994). Several accounts have been proposed to try and explain these contradictory 
findings concerning children's understanding of the distinctions between reality and non-
realities. 
The novel possibility that was explored in the first part of this thesis was that 
children may not interpret as intended words that are used to question their 
understanding, notably, real, really and pretend. These, and other related words, feature 
prominently in the research, for example, in Harris et al., (1991) children were asked 
whether an item that they had imagined inside their head was 'a real one?' and whether 
an item that they had imagined inside a box was 'really there' or whether they were 'just 
pretending.' Similarly, in categorisation studies children are asked to sort real and 
pretend entities into groups of 'real' and 'not-real' (Wellman & Estes, 1986), 'real' and 
'pretend' (Morison & Gardner, 1978; Sharon & Woolley, 2004; Woolleyet al., 2004), 
and 'real' and 'make-believe' (Skolnick & Bloom, 2006). 
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The argument presented in Part 1 was that the words real, really and pretend are 
used in at least two different ways in these experimental contexts. In one context they are 
used to discuss the distinction between a real, authentic object and a pretend one such as 
a real truck versus a toy truck. In another context they are used to consider the distinction 
between things that exist and those that do not, for example a dog versus a dog that flies, 
or a cat and Mickey Mouse. Therefore the question "Is X real?" could be interpreted as 
'Is X a real one?' or 'Does X exist?' For example, if a child is asked whether they think 
that a particular Father Christmas is 'real', this could be interpreted as "Is that Father 
Christmas 'the real one'?" or as "Does Father Christmas exist?" 
To explore this hypothesis Study 1 collected and analysed over 1000 utterances 
of children's speech containing the words real, really and/or pretend. These were 
collected using a combination of parental interviews and diary records that were kept for 
a period of up to one month. The utterances were analysed according to different uses of 
each of the words and the topic of the utterance. The most notable finding was that 
children rarely used the words to discuss something in terms of its fictional status but 
they frequently used the words to consider whether something was authentic or not. In 
relation to the topic of fantasy, however, the words real, really and pretend were used 
both to consider notions of authenticity and existence. 
These results suggest that when children are asked to decide whether a fantasy 
character is 'real' or 'not-real' they may interpret the question in two different ways. In 
particular, the possibility that a child will interpret a question meaning 'Does X exist?' as 
meaning 'Is X a real one?' seems a likely possibility. If this is the case, then it is not 
possible to draw firm conclusions about children's understanding of the existence of 
fantasy characters from their responses to these sorts of questions without further 
investigation. 
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Consider, for example, the study by Woolley et a1., (2004) in which 
preschoolers were asked to decide whether they thought that 'The Candy Witch', a novel 
fantasy character, was 'real or pretend', meaning do they believe in her existence. Two 
thirds of the children responded that she was 'real', which led Woolley et al., (2004) to 
conclude that "many of the children did indeed believe wholeheartedly in her existence" 
(p.461). Another conclusion that is equally possible is that children meant perhaps that 
the candy witch was a real type of witch, i.e. that she was an authentic witch, or they 
meant the extent to which she was a 'real' human. Therefore, in order to find out what 
children consider when making such judgements, Studies 2-4 sought children's 
justifications for a range of fantasy characters, post making real/not-real judgements 
about them. The aim was to explore to what extent children considered notions of 
authenticity and existence when making their judgements. 
In Study 2, children aged between 3-years and 10-years were presented with 
real and toy items - items that reflected their spontaneous uses of real, really and pretend 
in Study 1. They were asked to decide whether each item, such as a real banana and a toy 
banana, was 'real' or 'not-real' and then justify their decision. This study revealed that 
even the preschoolers had a firm understanding of the real/not-real status of real and toy 
foods, vehicles, and animals, but they were less certain of the status of children dreSSed-
up. In terms of justifications, a range of factors were considered by the children 
including describing specific attributes of the items, reliance on prior knowledge, 
classifying the items (for example as toys), considering the authenticity of features of the 
items, composition of the items, and explaining what the item does or what it is used for. 
This framework was also employed in Study 3 in which children's real/not-real 
judgements and justifications were sought for fantasy characters. Children were 
increasingly less likely to claim that the fantasy characters were 'real' with age with only 
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45% of the judgements made by the preschoolers indicating that they were 'not-real' 
compared to 90% of the judgements made by the 9-10-year-olds. The most revealing 
part of Study 3 was the justifications that children provided for their judgements and 
these included how the character was made or where it came from, evidence regarding 
the existence of the character, prior knowledge/experience of the characters, the location 
in which the characters are found, the authenticity of features of the characters, belief or 
unbelief in the character, classifying the character (for example as cartoons), and 
outcomes associated with the character. 
From the age of 6-7-years increasing importance was given to explaining how 
the character was made or its origins as well as providing evidence to verify the existence 
of the character. For example children explained that Bob the Builder is 'just made out 
of plastic' and that 'you wouldn't bump into him in the street'. Overall, the range of 
justifications that were provided indicated that many factors surround decisions about 
whether fantasy characters are 'real' or 'not-real'. Among these issues include discussion 
of whether the fantasy character exists, as well as whether the character is authentic, for 
example whether Bob the Builder is a 'real' builder or whether he has 'real' tools or just 
toy ones. 
Study 3 was limited, however, partly because of the lack of context surrounding 
presentation of the characters. In real life, children experience fantasy characters not in 
isolation but in the context of 'real' people and places, such as in a shopping centre or in 
a theme park, and in children's television shows, films, and storybooks. With this in 
mind, in Study 4, children were presented with fantasy characters alongside equivalent 
real characters. For example, Father Christmas was presented with a Postman and Bob 
the Builder with a real builder. The results from Study 4 indicated some marked 
differences in the justifications given. There was an increase in justifications focused on 
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the authenticity of the real and fantasy characters. Bob the Builder, for example, was 
compared to the real builder with comments such as: "He hasn't got proper tools" and 
"His helmet won't protect him because it isn't a real one". Children also gave more 
specific attribute and fewer verifiability justifications in this study. This suggested that 
the existence dimension of the fantasy characters was somewhat masked in favour of 
justifications based on visible features of the characters and the authenticity of those 
features. 
The results from Part 1 make a novel contribution to the literature on children's 
understanding of the fantasy-reality distinction. This is because previously, children have 
not been asked to justify their reality judgements and so it was not clear what it meant 
when they judged a fantasy character as 'real' or 'not-real'. This was an important issue 
raised by Woolley et al., (2004) who noted that children do not necessarily believe that 
fantasy characters and real people exist in the same sense, despite claiming that they are 
both 'real'. Therefore, these four studies go some way towards revealing how children 
may interpret a question eliciting a reaVnot-real judgement, and show the factors that 
children and adults consider when judging whether something is 'real' or 'not-real'. 
These studies also suggest that children's justifications for their reaVnot-real judgements 
are an integral part of those judgements and that they should be taken into account when 
drawing conclusions about children's fantasy/reality knowledge. 
In light of these findings the studies presented in Part 2 examined children's 
fantasy-reality knowledge in ways that did not require their interpretation of words 
including real, really and pretend. This aspect of understanding was chosen for two 
reasons. The first reason was that this topic has received considerable research attention 
in previous studies but a limitation of the results is that the findings rest heavily on 
children's understanding of questions containing these words. The second reason was 
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that the results from the first part of this thesis indicate that children's understanding of 
the notion of authenticity is already developed by the age of 3 and so it would be of more 
interest to focus on their developing awareness of existence. 
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Part 2 
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Chapter 7 
Study 5: Children's understanding of the existence of fantasy characters 
7.1 Introduction 
The studies in the second part of the thesis directly examined children's understanding of 
the fictional nature of fantasy characters. This was operationalised as the extent to which 
children understand that fantasy characters are restricted to inhabiting their own fantasy 
world and not the real-world. Previous research has shown that children have already 
mastered some aspects of the fantasy-reality distinction by the preschool years. Wellman 
and Estes (1986) interviewed children about real entities and 'imaginary non-existent' 
entities such as a dog that rolls over versus a dog that flies, and three-year-olds were 
accurate (over 80% correct) at labelling the entities as 'real' or 'not-real'. At the same 
age, children also have some understanding of the nature of characters on television. 
Flavell, Flavell, Green and Korfmacher (1990) found that 3-year-olds did not believe that 
real entities were actually present inside a television set and that 4-year-olds also 
understood that things on television cannot be touched, nor come out of the top of the 
television. 
However, preschoolers have by no means mastered all aspects of the fantasy-
reality distinction. They are sometimes uncertain of the reality status of fantasy figures 
that they have imagined (Bouldin & Pratt, 2001; Harris et al., 1991); and they have 
difficulty differentiating real events (e.g. a mother bird feeding its young) from fantastical 
events (e.g. a rabbit baking a cake) (Taylor & Howell, 1973), particularly when the 
emotional content is scary (Samuels & Taylor, 1994). 
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Categorisation tasks also reveal that preschoolers are uncertain of the 
ontological status of fantasy characters. Morison and Gardner (1978) asked children to 
sort real entities (e.g. a dog) and fantastical entities (e.g. a witch and Mickey Mouse) into 
categories of real and pretend. Children in Kindergarten scored 14/20 and made more 
mistakes by judging fantasy characters as real than by relegating real entities to the realm 
of fantasy. Sharon and Woolley (2004) also used this method and found that 3-year-olds 
did not perform above chance levels in their categorisations of real and fantasy entities 
whereas 4- and 5-year-olds largely knew that real entities were real, but they only 
categorised 39% of the fantasy entities as pretend. Similar results were obtained by 
Woolleyet al., (2004), indicating that a correct understanding that some characters are 
real and others are fantastical is still developing beyond the age of five. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, a recent experiment by Skolnick and Bloom (2006) 
extended children's categorisations to explore whether they treat all fictional characters 
as belonging to one single world (in which case they would all be real to one other) or 
whether they consider multiple fantasy worlds, as adults do. Children aged between 3;7 
and 6;2 were asked to judge the reality status of fantasy characters (e.g. Batman) as either 
'real' or 'make-believe' and judge how someone from a different fantasy world (e.g. 
SpongeBob) would do so. Children scored on average -0.7 and -0.6 respectively (on a 
scale from -1 indicating an answer of 'make-believe' to +1 indicating an answer of 
'real'). This indicated that children tended to judge that fantasy characters were 'make-
believe' and that characters from different fictional worlds were also 'make-believe' to 
each other. In a second study, however, children were asked to judge which actions were 
possible between two characters. Children responded that characters from within the 
same world could see, touch, and talk to each other and, on the real/make-believe 
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question used in the first study, children scored 0.5 indicating that they correctly 
understood that Batman thinks Robin is real. 
Another study (also presented in Chapter 1) that examined children's 
understanding of fantasy characters was conducted by Lee et al., (2002). They presented 
3-6-year-olds with either a story or a live staged event in which a protagonist made an 
implausible claim about a ghost that jumped out of a book and broke a glass. One 
hundred percent of the 3-year-olds and 55% of the 4-year-olds accepted the protagonist's 
claim that the ghost committed the misdeed, suggesting to Lee et al., (2002) that children 
may be unsure of the rules that govern transformations between fantasy and reality. 
In order to investigate further children's understanding of the reality status of 
fantasy characters, the current study examined the extent to which they realise that 
fantasy characters cannot act in the real world. This was achieved by use of a novel 
paradigm involving realistic scenarios. The findings of Lee et al., (2002) might suggest 
that preschoolers would not succeed in this study since they incorrectly believed that a 
ghost could come out of a book into the real world and break a glass. However, 
children's performance may be better if they are asked about realistic, everyday situations 
rather than fantastical events involving characters such as ghosts, which may invoke a 
strong emotional reaction (Samuels & Taylor, 1994). 
In Studies 5 and 6 children were asked to decide whether various characters 
could perform roles in either real-world scenarios (Study 5) or real-world and cartoon 
scenarios (Study 6). The scenarios were presented as pictures and were accompanied by 
a brief explanation of the event spoken by the experimenter. Children were given a 
choice of four different characters that could perform the required role in the event. One 
of the real life scenarios, for example, depicted a fire and children were told that the fire 
needed to be put out. The identity of the appropriate character depended on the nature of 
130 
the scenario (real-world or cartoon): children had to choose among a relevant real 
character (a fireman), a relevant cartoon character (Fireman Sam), an irrelevant real 
character (a Doctor), and an irrelevant cartoon character (a Fimble). The critical choice 
was always between the relevant real character (real fireman) and the relevant cartoon 
character (Fireman Sam). 
7.2 Method 
Participants 
Fifty seven children were recruited from two day care centres and one school in 
Berkshire, UK. There were 20 3-year-olds (mean age = 3;7, range = 3;1 - 3;11), 204-
year-olds (mean age= 4;6, range = 4;0 - 4;11), and 20 5-6-year-olds (mean age = 5;9, 
range = 5;0 - 6;7), with equal numbers of girls and boys in each age group. They were 
predominantly from white working class backgrounds. 
Stimuli and task 
Children were presented with a total of 10 photographs that each depicted a real life 
scenario. Presentation of each scenario photograph was accompanied by a verbal 
description. For example, one photograph featured smoke rising above trees caused by a 
fire and children were told that someone needed to put out the fire (see Figure 7.1. All 
scenario pictures and accompanying descriptions are shown in Appendix 7.1). The 
choice of scenarios was made on the basis of particular actions perfonned by popular 
modern day cartoon characters and for which there was an obvious 'real' equivalent 
(such as building performed by Bob the Builder in comparison to a real builder). Also, a 
range of different entities were included as were people (Fireman Sam, Bob the Builder, 
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Postman Pat and Superman), animals (Nemo, Clifford the Big Red Dog, Pingu and 
Rabbit), and vehicles (Thomas the Tank Engine and Brum). Real life events that were 
the equivalent of events carried out by the cartoon characters were chosen, such as a 
building that requires completion or a fire that needs to be extinguished. 
Figure 7.1: Picture used in the real life fire scenario and choice of characters 
Each scenario was accompanied by photographs of four different characters 
presented on a single strip and children were required to point to the character that they 
thought could carry out the role. There was only one correct answer, the relevant real 
character (the real fIreman in Figure 1), and three incorrect answers; a relevant cartoon 
character who also performed the key role (Fireman Sam), an irrelevant real character (a 
Doctor), and an irrelevant cartoon character (a Fimble). The two irrelevant characters 
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were unable (under nonnal circumstances) to fulfil the role. The two irrelevant 
characters were included as controls as a measure of whether children understood the 
scenarios. The left-right order of the characters on the accompanying strip (approx 20 
ems. x 8 ems.) was varied systematically across the scenarios. 
Procedure 
One of the strips showing four character choices was presented to the child. With the 
help of the experimenter all four characters were named to ensure that the child was 
familiar with them and had considered all of them. Next, the scenario photograph was 
introduced with appropriate language and intonation, for example: "Look! There's a fire 
in the wood; can you point to the smoke?" The second part of this introduction was to 
ensure that the child was attending to the picture. Once the child had responded they 
were told: "When there's a fire, someone has to put the fire out". The test question was 
then asked in the fonnat: "Which one of these (point to each of the 4 characters on the 
strip) can (e.g. put out the (ire) (point to scenario)?" Choice(s) were recorded by the 
experimenter and then the child was asked: "Why did you choose that one/those ones?" 
Presentation order of the I 0 scenarios was varied for each child and the test session lasted 
approximately 1 0 minutes. 
7.3 Results 
Scoring 
Selection of only the relevant real character received a score of 1 and choosing any other 
character or more than one character received a score of O. The maximum score for each 
child was 10 since there were 10 scenarios. 
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Performance on the scenarios task 
Scores for the three age groups on each of the 10 scenarios are shown in Table 7.1. 
These data show that scores increased with age and a 3 (age) x 10 (scenario) ANOVA 
confinned the main effect of age, F (2, 57) = 6.48, p < .01. Post hoc testing (Games-
Howell) revealed that the 5-year-olds chose the correct character significantly more often 
than the 3- and 4-year-olds (p < .01 and p < .05 respectively) but there was no difference 
between the 3- and 4-year-olds. There was also a significant effect of scenario, F (9, 
513) = 2.51, p < .01, with scores on the rabbit scenario being significantly lower than 
scores on the soldier scenario (p < .01). There was no interaction between age and 
scenario, F (18,513) = 1.21, n.s. 
To examine the perfonnance of individual children pass/fail scores were used 
(see Table 7.2). Using the binomial test, the pass mark was determined as 5 or above 
using the probability of being correct by chance of 25%, p < .07. This slightly less 
stringent pass mark was accepted (rather than a pass mark of 6 or above, p < .02) to take 
into account that young children may make errors owing to concentration difficulties. 
Table 7.2 shows that the number of children who passed the task increased with age but 
the distribution of pass/fail rates for the three age groups using Chi Square was not 
significantly different, X2(2, N = 60) = 0.17, n.s. 
E"ortypes 
Regarding children's incorrect judgements, the number increased significantly as a 
function of age, therefore errors were analysed as a percentage of the total number of 
errors given by each child. There were three error types (see Table 7.3). The most 
frequent error (41 %) was selection of two characters, the relevant real character and the 
relevant cartoon character (e.g. the real fireman and Fireman Sam). The second most 
134 
Table 7.1: Mean scores (and standard deviations) on each scenario according to age. 
Scenario 3-year-olds 4-year-olds 5-year-olds Total 
n=20 n=20 n=20 
Rabbit 0.25 (0.44) 0.70 (0.47) 0.70 (0047) 0.55 (0.50) 
Fireman 0.35 (0049) 0.50 (0.51) 0.80 (0041) 0.55 (0.50) 
Fish 0.55 (0.51) 0.60 (0.50) 0.70 (0.47) 0.62 (0.49) 
Dog 0.60 (0.50) 0.55 (0.51) 0.70 (0047) 0.62 (0049) 
Builder 0045 (0.51) 0.70 (0047) 0.85 (0.37) 0.67 (0048) 
Penguin 0.55 (0.51) 0.65 (0049) 0.80 (0041) 0.67 (0048) 
Train 0.60 (0.50) 0.65 (0049) 0.90 (0.31) 0.72 (0045) 
Postman 0.80 (0041) 0.65 (0049) 0.75 (0.44) 0.73 (0.45) 
Car 0.75 (0.44) 0.65 (0049) 0.90 (0.31) 0.77 (0043) 
Soldier 0.70 (0047) 0.75 (0.44) 0.95 (0.22) 0.80 (0040) 
Total (max. 10) 5.60 (2.16) 6040 (2.37) 8.05 (2.04) 6.68 (2.39) 
Table 7.2: Number of children who passed or failed the scenarios task according to age 
Number of scenarios correct 
Fail Pass 
1-4 correct 5-7 correct 8-10 correct Total number 
Age group who passed 
3-year-olds 7 9 4 13/20 (65%) 
4-year-olds 5 7 8 15/20 (75%) 
5-year-olds 2 5 13 18/20 (90%) 
Total 14 21 25 46/60 (77%) 
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Table 7.3: Mean number (and standard deviations) (expressed as %) of each error type 
according to age 
Correct and incorrect Incorrect relevant Other Total Number 
Age relevant characters character of errors 
3-year-olds n=20 22.72 (33.83) 41.79 (25.21) 35.50 (24.73) 100 (28.88) 
4-year-olds n = 19 57.03 (36.10) 35.33 (39.09) 7.64 (16.95) 100 (37.71) 
5-year-olds n= 14 45.24 (39.32) 32.74 (38.46) 22.02 (36.04) 100 (38.25) 
Total n =53 40.97 (38.51) 37.08 (33.85) 21.95 (28.24) 100 (34.57) 
common error (37%) was selection of the relevant cartoon character (e.g. Fireman Sam). 
The third error (22%) was selection of an irrelevant character or any other combination of 
characters, which was classified as 'other'. 
Oneway ANOV As were performed on each type of error to determine whether 
the pattern of errors that was made changed with age. In relation to the most frequent 
error of choosing the two relevant characters, there was a significant effect of age, F (2, 
57) = 4.52, P < .01, and post hoc testing (Tukey) revealed that the 4-year-olds made this 
error significantly more than the 3-year-olds (p < .01). There was no change with age in 
the number of errors made of choosing the relevant cartoon character, F (2, 57) = 0.33, 
n.s. but there was an effect of age in the 'other' category, F (2,57) = 5.57,p < .001. Post 
hoc testing (Tukey) indicated that the 3-year-olds made significantly more other errors 
than the 4-year-olds (p < .01). 
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Explanations for choice of character 
To explore the level of children's understanding of their choice of character, their 
explanations for their choices were analysed to detennine whether they considered the 
real/not-real nature of the task (irrespective of the accuracy of the choice). Explanations 
were coded as one of four major categories: real, capability, desire, or uninformative. 
Details of the coding categories are given below: 
Real: Child explained choice by referring to the real nature of the character in 
some way, e.g. "That's what comes into the real train station" or "It's a proper dog 
that's got real fur. " 
Capability: Child explained choice with reference to the ability of the character 
to carry out the action required for the scenario, e.g. "Because he's (Bob the Builder) a 
fixer" or "He's (fireman) got a hose and some water. " 
Desire: Child inferred that the character has an emotional response to the 
scenario, e.g. "Because he (dog) wants a bone" or "Because penguins love fish. " 
Uninformative: Child was unable to offer a response or provide a meaningful 
reason, e.g. "Because it is" or "I don't know. " 
An independent coder coded one third of the total number of explanations and 
inter-rater reliability was 91 %. Figure 7.2 shows the number of responses in each 
category of explanation according to age group. From the figure, it can be seen that the 
most common explanation was capability (71 %). Uninformative responses accounted for 
15% of the responses while real and desire explanations accounted, respectively, for 8% 
and 6% of the responses. 
137 
Figure 7.2: Pattern of explanations according to age 
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Oneway ANOV As were performed on each explanation to determine whether 
use changed with age. Significant age effects were found in the category capability, F (2, 
57) = 5.22, P < .001 , and in the uninformative category, F (2, 57) = 5.22, P < .001. Post 
hoc testing (Tukey) revealed that the 4- and 5-year-olds produced significantly more 
capability explanations (M = 7.85, SD = 2.21) than the 3-year-olds (M = 5.73, SD = 2.59, 
ps < .05). In the uninformative category, post hoc testing (Games-Howell) showed that 
the 4- and 5-year-olds gave significantly fewer uninformative explanations (M = 0.52, SD 
= 1.34) than the 3-year-olds (M = 3.53 , SD = 2.97, ps < .001). For the category real, 
there was an age trend, F (2, 57) = 2.23, P < .10, whereby the 5-year-olds gave this 
explanation more (M = 1. 56, 'D = 2.09) than the 3- and 4-year-olds (M = 0.50, SD = 
1.54, P < .10). In the de ire category there was no effect of age, F (2, 57) = 1.52, ns., (3-
year-olds M = 0.46, 'D = 0.88; 4-year-olds M = 0.95, SD = 0.98; 5-year-olds M = 0.69, 
SD = 0.72). 
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7.4 Discussion 
The results of this study reveal that young children have some understanding of the 
fictional nature of fantasy characters, that is that cartoon characters are unable to act in 
the real world. Out of the ten scenarios for which children had to choose an appropriate 
actor, the average number of correct responses of choosing the relevant real character and 
not the relevant cartoon character was 6.68/10. In other words, children tended to realise 
that a fire in the real-world could only be extinguished by a real fireman and not Fireman 
Sam. A total of 46 (77%) children passed the task by scoring significantly above the 
level that would be expected if they were choosing one of the four characters randomly 
(Le. scoring 5 or above). Although the proportion of pass/fail rates for children in the 3 
age groups were not significantly different, there was a significant age effect in relation 
to the mean number of scenarios for which children in each age group responded 
correctly. The 5-year-olds achieved a significantly higher mean score than the 3-4-year-
olds suggesting that preschoolers are sometimes unsure of the relation between fantasy 
and reality. 
Before drawing any conclusions about children's performance, it is important to 
consider whether an aspect of the method may have increased the likelihood that children 
passed the task. It could be argued that children were able to choose the correct 
character, not because they understood the distinction between 'real' and 'not-real' but 
because they used a matching strategy by relying on contextual cues available in the 
pictures to match the correct character to the scenario. This is unlikely, however, because 
the backgrounds in the scenarios and character pictures were carefully chosen to be 
dissimilar. For example, in the real life fire scenario the background of the photograph 
was a rural location while the background to the real fireman picture was of a fire-engine 
forecourt (refer back to Figure 7.1). In addition, the pictures of the two relevant 
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characters (e.g. Fireman Sam and the real fireman) had similar backgrounds, reducing the 
possibility that the child could choose the correct character by simply matching (as can be 
seen in the scenarios presented in Appendix 7.1). 
There is another aspect of the task design, however, that may have been more 
likely to enhance children's performance: the correct answer was always the relevant real 
character and not the relevant cartoon character, so children may have formed the 
strategy 'always choose the appropriate real character' despite the fact that it's location 
on the strip was varied among the scenarios. Therefore in Study 6, an approach was 
adopted to prevent this by extending the scenarios to include cartoon scenarios. This 
meant that the relevant real character was the correct answer in the real life scenarios and 
the relevant cartoon character was the correct choice in the cartoon scenarios. 
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Chapter 8 
Study 6: Children's understanding of the ontological status of fantasy 
characters in two different tasks 
8.1 Introduction 
Study 5 showed that children as young as 3-years-old have some understanding of the 
ontological status of fantasy characters, that is, that fantasy characters cannot interact 
with the real world. The children thus knew, for example, that Fireman Sam could not 
extinguish a real fire but that a real fireman could. Although the preschoolers were not 
always accurate in their choice of character, 46 (77%) passed the task by scoring 
significantly above the level expected if they were choosing randomly. A potential 
problem with the design of that study, however, was that the correct choice was always a 
real character. To address this issue the current study replicated that study but included 
scenarios in which the correct choice was the relevant cartoon character because the 
scenario was from a cartoon. In this study, a cartoon character was the correct choice in 
half of the scenarios and a relevant real character was the correct choice in the remaining 
half. 
Previous research suggests that children might perfonn differently on the real 
life scenarios and the cartoon scenarios. Morison and Gardner (1978) and Sharon and 
Woolley (2004) both found that children were more likely to err in categorisation tasks 
by judging fantasy characters as 'real' than by relegating real characters to the world of 
fantasy. This was also found in Study 4. In the present study, therefore, it was 
anticipated that children would perfonn better when asked to choose, for example, who 
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could extinguish a fire in the cartoon world of 'Pontypandy' (Fireman Sam or a real 
fireman) compared to when they were asked who could extinguish fire in real life. 
In addition to the scenarios task, in the current study children were also given a 
categorisation task in which they were asked to sort the 20 focal characters from the 
scenarios (e.g. Fireman Sam and the real fireman) into categories of real and not-real. 
This task was included in light of the results from studies such as Skolnick and Bloom 
(2006) and Sharon and Woolley (2004) in which children's performance on explicit 
judgement or categorisation tasks differed from their performance on tests of implicit 
understanding. Recall that in Skolnick and Bloom (2006) children were asked to label 
explicitly characters as 'real' or 'make-believe'. In making this type of judgement, 
children incorrectly judged that Batman thinks Robin is make-believe. In a different task 
children had to use an 'action-based' or implicit approach by deciding which actions 
were appropriate between pairs of characters and in this task they correctly judged that 
Batman can see, touch, and talk to Robin. 
Woolley and colleagues (Sharon & Woolley, 2004; Woolleyet aI., 2004) also 
directly compared explicit fantasy-reality judgements with a task of implicit 
understanding. In the study by Sharon and Woolley (2004), children completed a 
standard categorisation task and a task that involved assigning physical, biological, 
social, and mental properties to real and fantasy characters. Three-year-olds did not 
differentially attribute properties to real and fantasy characters but 4- and 5-year-olds 
correctly granted more human-like properties (such as eating dinner with one's family 
and sleeping) to entities they had classified as real than to entities that they had classified 
as pretend. This contrasted with children's performance in the categorisation task in 
which only one third of their fantasy categorisations were correct. 
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In the current study, therefore, children's performance was compared on the 
scenarios task, which measured implicit understanding, and the categorisation task, which 
required an explicit real/not-real judgement. Following the pattern of results obtained by 
Skolnick and Bloom (2006) and Sharon and Woolley (2004), children were expected to 
score higher on the scenarios task than the categorisation task. 
8.2 Method 
Participants 
Fifty-one children participated, divided into three age groups: there were 17 in the 
younger age group (mean age = 3;3, range 3;0 - 3;5), 17 in the middle age group (mean 
age = 4;1, range = 3;7 - 4;4), and 17 in the older age group (mean age = 4;8, range = 4;5 
- 4; 11). There were approximately equal numbers of girls and boys in each group. 
Children were recruited from two nurseries and one school in Berkshire, which serve 
predominantly white, working-class families. 
Scenarios task 
As in Study 5 there were 10 scenarios, but each scenario had two versions: in one version 
the scenario was a photograph from real life (as in Study 5) and in the other version it 
was a screen shot of a popular children's cartoon (there were 20 scenarios in total)6. The 
two versions of each scenario were manipulated electronically to make them as similar as 
possible by matching them for content and composition so that the main difference was 
6 The 10 real life scenarios were also used in the previous study but some alterations were required in order 
to make comparisons with the cartoon scenarios. 
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Figure 8.1: Picture used for the cartoon fire scenario and choice of characters 
their reality status. An example of a cartoon scenario is given in Figure 8.1. The choice 
of characters remained the same as they were for Study 5 with two real characters and 
two cartoon characters in each set, and of these, one was relevant and one was irrelevant. 
The 20 scenarios were divided into two sets: Set I comprised 5 real life 
scenarios and 5 different scenarios depicted as cartoons; and Set 2 comprised the 
remaining scenarios. (Scenario pictures and accompanying descriptions for Set 1 are 
shown in Appendix 8.1 and for Set 2 they are shown in Appendix 8.2). Each child 
received scenarios either from Set 1 or Set 2. Across the two sets, therefore, each 
scenario occurred both in a real life and a cartoon version but children saw only one 
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version so that there was no possibility of carry over effects. Scenes within each set were 
presented in a random order. The procedure was the same as that used in the previous 
study. 
Categorisation task 
Twenty individual colour pictures (4 em x 7 ems) comprising the relevant real and 
cartoon characters from the character choices presented in the scenarios task were used 
(e.g. a fireman and Fireman Sam, a builder and Bob the Builder) (see Appendix 8.3 for 
pictures of the stimuli). With the help of the experimenter all of the characters were 
named to ensure that the child was familiar with them. When necessary, the 
experimenter named the character for the child. Next, two opaque containers were placed 
in front of the child. The child was told that one container was for "Pictures of things 
that are real" and the other container was for "Pictures of things that are not-real". A 
quick check was made to see whether the child had remembered which container was for 
'real things' and which container was for things that were 'not-real' by asking them to 
point to each one as they were named. Most children did this correctly but some needed 
reminding. The position of the containers was counterbalanced so that half of the 
children experienced the 'real' container on the left and the other half experienced the 
'real' container on the right. The pictures were subsequently reintroduced in a random 
order and the child was asked: "Is X (name of character) real (picture was held over the 
real container) or not-real (picture was held over the not-real container)?" and then the 
picture was given to the child to place in one of the containers. 
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Procedure 
Children were tested individually on two separate occasions spaced about one week 
apart. On one occasion they completed the scenarios task and on the other occasion they 
completed the categorisation task. The order of the tasks in the two test sessions was 
counterbalanced so that half of the children received the scenarios task first and half the 
children received the categorisation task first. 
8.3 Results 
Scoring 
On each task, a correct answer received a score of 1 and an incorrect answer was scored 
O. On the scenarios task the correct answer was the selection of the relevant character 
with the same reality status as the scenario photograph and on the categorisation task 
correct responses were to judge the cartoon characters as 'not-real' and the other 
characters as 'real'. The maximum score on the scenarios task was 10 and the maximum 
score on the categorisation task was 20. 
Peiformance on the scenario task 
Differences in how the three age groups performed on the scenario task and whether there 
was an effect of the reality status of the scenario (real life or cartoon) were investigated. 
Preliminary analysis revealed no effects of set within the scenario task, t (46) = 0.69, n.s. 
(Set 1 M = 6.58, SD = 1.82; Set 2 M = 6.25, SD = 1.51), and no effect of task order, t (46) 
= 0.00, n.s. (Scenario task first M = 6.42, SD = 1.75; Scenario task second M = 6.42, SD 
= 1.58). Subsequent analysis were collapsed across set and task order. 
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The mean number of correct responses was 6.47/10, as can be seen in the left 
half of Table 8.1. Although there was a trend towards higher scores with age, a 3 ( age) x 
2 (scenario type: real life vs cartoon) ANOV A revealed that the age effect was not 
significant, F (2, 48) = 1.8, n.s. On subsequent analyses the data were collapsed across 
age. There was also no effect of the reality status of the scenarios, F (1,48) = 0.42, n.s, 
meaning that children were equally accurate when the scenario was depicted as a real life 
photograph and when it was depicted as a cartoon. In other words, children who were 3-
4-years of age understood to an equal extent, for example, that a real fire can only be 
extinguished by a real fireman and that a fire in the cartoon world of 'Pontypandy' can 
only be extinguished by 'Fireman Sam'. There was no interaction between age and 
scenario type, F (2, 48) = 1.7, n.s. 
Table 8.1: Mean scores (and standard deviations) on the scenarios task according to age 
Correct Incorrect 
Mean Real Cartoon Total Relevant Irrelevant Total 
age Scenario Scenario (max. 10) Character Character (max. 10) 
(max. 5) (max. 5) (max. 5) (max. 5) 
3;3 3.12 2.76 5.88 2.47 1.65 4.12 
n= 17 (1.17) (1.20) (1.62) (1.01) (1.32) (1.62) 
4;1 2.94 3.65 6.59 2.41 1.00 3.41 
n= 17 (1.39) (1.22) (1.58) (1.33) (0.87) (1.58) 
4;8 3.41 3.53 6.94 2.41 0.65 3.06 
n= 17 (1.06) (1.12) (1.75) (1.42) (0.79) (1.75) 
Mean 3.16 3.31 6.47 2.43 1.10 3.53 
n=51 (1.21) (1.22) (1.68) (1.24) (1.08) (1.68) 
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To examine the performance of individual children pass/fail scores were used 
(see Table 8.2). As in Study 5, the pass mark was determined as 5 or above on the 
binomial distribution using the probability of being correct by chance of 25%, p < .07. 
Table 8.2 shows that the number of children who passed the task was similar at each age 
and the distribution of pass/fail rates for the three age groups using Chi Square was not 
significantly different, r(2, N= 51) = 2.32, n.s. 
Table 8.2: Number of children who passed or failed the scenarios task according to age 
Number of scenarios correct 
Fail Pass 
1-4 correct 5-7 correct 8-10 correct Total number 
Mean age who passed 
3;3 4 11 2 13/17 (76%) 
4;1 1 13 3 16/17 (94%) 
4;8 2 7 8 15/17 (88%) 
Total 7 31 13 44/51 (86%) 
E"ortypes 
Regarding the incorrect judgements that children made, there were two types. One error 
was selection of the relevant character with the incorrect reality status (e.g. the real 
fireman instead of Fireman Sam) and the second error was selection of an irrelevant 
character. Table 8.1, on the right hand side, shows that more errors involved choosing a 
relevant character with the incorrect reality status (69%) then an irrelevant character 
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(31%), and a paired t test showed that this difference was significant, t (50) = 5.92, p < 
.001. 
Explanations for choice of character 
To explore the level of children's understanding of their choice of character, their 
explanations for their choices were analysed to determine whether they considered the 
real/not-real distinction implied by the task (irrespective of the accuracy of the choice). 
Explanations were coded as one of four major categories: relationship, capability, desire, 
or uninformative. An explanation that was coded as relationship was when the child 
made a relationship between the chosen character and the scenario, e.g. "Because they 
(people) can go in there (carriage)" or referred to a pre-existing relationship between the 
character and the scenario, e.g. "Bunny rabbits live in the wood", and "Sharks eat fish". 
The remaining three categories were the same as those in Study 5 (see Section 7.3). 
An independent coder classified explanations from one third of the participants 
and inter-rater reliability was 85%. Figure 8.2 shows the number of responses in each 
category of explanation according to age group. This figure shows that the most common 
explanation was capability (42%) and uninformative responses were also common, 
accounting for 35% of the responses. Relationship and desire explanations were less 
common and accounted for 16% and 7% of the explanations respectively. 
Oneway ANOV As were performed on each explanation to determine whether 
patterns of explanation changed with age. Significant age effects were found in the 
categories capability, F (2,48) = 3.70, p < .03, and uninformative, F (2, 48) = 4.37, P < 
.02. Post hoc testing (Tukey) showed that the 4;8 age group produced significantly more 
capability explanations (M = 5.12, SD = 2.50) than the 3;3 age group (M = 2.82, SD = 
2.67, p < .05). In the uninformative category post hoc testing (Games-Howell) showed 
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Figure 8.2: Pattern of explanations on the scenarios task according to age 
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that this pattern was the reverse (4;8 age group M = 2.24, SD = 2.41 ; 3;3 age group M = 
5.41 , SD = 3.94, P < .05). For the explanations desire and relationship there were no 
effects of age (Desire, F(2, 48) = 1.34, n.s, 3;3 M= 1.18, SD = 1.38; 4;1 M = 1.82, SD = 
l.38; 4;8 M = l.83, SD = l.13 : Relationship, F (2, 48) = 0.26, n.s, 3;3 M = 0.59, SD = 
l.06; 4; 1 M = 0.65, 'D = 0.93 ; 4;8 M = 0.82, SD =0.95). 
Performance on the categori ation task 
Differences in how the three age groups performed on the categorisation task as well as 
whether there was an effect of type of character (real or cartoon) were investigated next 
(see Table 8.3). Preliminary analysis indicated that there was no effect of task order, t 
(46) = 0.44, n. . (Categorisation task first M = 12.42, SD = 4.61 ; Categorisation task 
second M = 11 .83, 'D = 4.51), so subsequent analysis were collapsed across task order. 
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Table 8.3: Mean scores (and standard deviations) on the categorisation task for type of 
character according to age 
Mean age Real Characters Cartoon Characters Total 
(max. 10) (max. 10) (max. 20) 
3;3 n= 17 6.12 (3.59) 3.65 (2.78) 9.76 (2.93) 
4;1 n = 17 7.94 (2.61) 4.06 (4.05) 12.00 (4.80) 
4;8 n = 17 9.00 (1.84) 6.65 (3.20) 15.65 (3.72) 
Mean n= 51 7.69 (2.97) 4.78 (3.58) 12.47 (4.53) 
Table 8.3 indicates that accuracy increased with age and a 3 (age) x 2 (character status: 
real vs cartoon) ANOVA confirmed the main effect of age, F (2, 48) = 9.90, p < .001. 
Post hoc testing (Games-Howell) revealed that the 4;8 age group categorised more 
characters correctly than the 4;1 (p < .001) and the 3;3 age groups (p < .05). Although 
there was no interaction between age and character, F (2, 48) = 0.53, n.s., there was an 
effect of character, F (1,48) = 18.54,p < .001. Table 8.3 shows that real characters were 
correctly categorised as 'real' more often (77%) than cartoon characters were correctly 
categorised as 'not-real' (48%). 
To investigate the effect of reality status of character in each age paired t tests 
were conducted on each age group. These revealed that character status had no effect on 
scores for the 3;3 age group, t (16) = 1.78, n.s. who claimed, for example, that both the 
real fireman and Fireman Sam were 'real' equally as often (61 % and 64% respectively). 
There was, however, an effect on the categorisation behaviour of the 4;1 age group, t (16) 
= 3.30,p < .001, and 4;8 age group, t (16) = 2.65,p < .01. Children in these two groups 
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were more likely to judge, for example, that the real fireman was 'real' (85%) than they 
were to judge that Fireman Sam was 'not-real' (54%) 
To examine the perfonnance of individual children on the categorisation task 
pass/fail scores were used (see Table 8.4). Using the binomial test, the pass mark was 
determined as 15 or above using the probability of being correct by chance of 50%, p < 
.04. This pass mark was used rather than 14 because the alpha level at 14 was p = .12, 
which was considered too lenient. Table 8.4 shows that the number of children who 
passed the task increased with age and the distribution of pass/fail rates for the three age 
groups using Chi Square was found to be significantly different, X2(2, N = 51) = 11.11, P 
< .001: one 3;3-year-old passed the task, five 4;I-year-olds passed the task, and ten 4;8-
year-olds passed the task. 
Table 8.4: Number of children who passed or failed the categorisation task according to 
age 
Number of correct judgements 
Fail Pass 
1-14 correct 15-17 correct 18-20 correct Total number 
Mean age who passed 
3;3 16 1 0 1117 (6%) 
4;1 12 0 5 5/17 (29%) 
4;8 7 1 9 10/17 (59%) 
Total 35 2 14 16/51 (31 %) 
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Comparison of performance on the scenarios task and the categorisation task 
Children's performance on the scenarios task and categorisation tasks were compared to 
determine whether they performed better on the scenarios task. For this analysis pass/fail 
scores were used because scores on the scenarios task and categorisation task were not 
analogous owing to there being a different number of options from which to select a 
response on the two tasks: on the scenarios task there were four options from which to 
select a response while on the categorisation task there were only two options. Pass/fail 
scores for each child according to age group on the two tasks are shown in Table 8.5. It 
can be seen that the total number of children who passed both of the tasks increased with 
age while the total number of children who passed only one or none of the tasks 
decreased with age. Of the 30 children (59%) who passed one of the tasks 29 of these 
children passed the scenarios task and failed the categorisation task while only 1 child 
from the 4;8 age group failed the scenarios task and passed the categorisation task. This 
proportion of passlfail rates for the three age groups was compared using Chi Square 
which showed that the distribution was significantly different across age, '1}( 4, N = 51) = 
10.80,p < .03. 
Table 8.5: Number of children who passed or failed both of the tasks using a pass mark of 
5 on the scenarios task and a pass mark of 15 on the categorisation task 
Mean age Failed Both Passed 1 task Passed Both Total 
3;3 4 12 1 17 
4;1 1 11 5 17 
4;8 1 7 9 17 
Total 6 30 15 51 
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In relation to the pass/fail criteria selected for the scenarios task, however, it 
could be argued retrospectively that children did not often choose an irrelevant character, 
thus they were making a binary choice, i.e. between the two relevant characters (e.g. 
Fireman Sam and the real fireman)7. Therefore a more conservative pass mark on the 
binomial would be 8 (/10) with there being a 50% probability of being correct by chance, 
p < .10. The results using this stricter criterion are shown in Table 8.6, where it can be 
seen that 6 children passed the scenarios task and failed the categorisation task but 9 
children passed the categorisation task and failed the scenarios task. At first sight, this 
pattern appears to suggest that children performed better on the categorisation task than 
on the scenarios task rather than the other way round as argued previously. However, 
closer inspection of these data casts doubt on this conclusion. Of the 9 children who 
passed the categorisation task but failed the scenarios task, 6 of them chose an irrelevant 
character at least once. Thus it could be argued that those children, at least, were not 
making a binary decision but were choosing one from four characters. In contrast, of the 
6 children who passed the scenarios task but failed the categorisation task only 1 child on 
1 occasion chose an irrelevant character. Thus it seems that these children may have 
been making a binary decision because, on the whole, they did not choose the irrelevant 
characters on the scenarios task. In contrast, it seems that other children (i.e. those that 
failed the scenarios task but passed the categorisation task) were making a decision on the 
scenarios task based on the four choices available because they chose the irrelevant 
characters more than the other group of children. 
7 Thanks to Peter Bryant for making this point 
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Table 8.6: Number of children who passed or failed the two tasks using a pass mark of 8 
on the scenarios task and a pass mark of 15 on the categorisation task 
Passed 1 
Mean Failed Passed Passed Passed Total 
age Both scenarios categorisation Both 
3;3 14 2 1 0 17 
4;1 11 1 3 2 17 
4;8 4 3 5 5 17 
Total 29 6 9 7 51 
This can be taken as evidence that successful performance on the 4-choice 
scenario task did involve the active exclusion of irrelevant possibilities and so it is 
appropriate to use the 0.25 criterion for determining pass/fail performance. It is, however, 
clear that the decision about which probability to use cannot be determined 
unambiguously and further studies will be required to shed light on the decision 
processes that young children use in responding to the scenarios task. 
8.4 Discussion 
The results of this study support and extend the findings of Study 5 by showing that 3-
and 4-year-olds have started to form an understanding that real characters cannot act 
within cartoon worlds and also that cartoon characters cannot act within the real-world. 
Of the ten scenarios that children had to judge, the average number for which they choose 
the correct character was 6.47/10. In other words when shown a picture ofa cartoon fire 
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from the cartoon town of Pontypandy for example, children largely realised that only 
Fireman Sam and not a real fireman could extinguish it. To the same extent, they also 
understood that a real life fire could only be extinguished by a real fireman and not 
Fireman Sam. Although performance did not increase significantly between the ages of 3 
and 4, the high number of individual children who passed the task (N = 44, 86%) adds 
strength to these results. 
The results from the scenarios task thus challenges the traditional claim that 
young children are uncertain of the ontological status of fantasy characters (Morison & 
Gardner, 1978; Lee et aI., 2002; Sharon & Woolley, 2004) and supports Sharon and 
Woolley's (2004) conclusion that children have a more developed appreciation of the 
boundary between fantasy and reality than is often supposed. In particular, the findings 
contrast with those from the study conducted by Lee et aI., (2002) in which most 
preschoolers incorrectly judged that a fantasy character could act within the real world. 
Almost all of the preschoolers in that study accepted the claim that a ghost could come 
out of a book and break a glass in the real-world. In contrast, in the present study only 
about one third of responses from children were incorrect and of those, just over two 
thirds made the equivalent error found in Lee et aI., (2002), such as judging that Fireman 
Sam could extinguish a fire in the real world and vice versa. 
In the current study no difference was found between the accuracy of children's 
choice of characters in the real life scenarios compared to the cartoon scenarios. In light 
of previous research, which suggested that children make more errors by judging fantasy 
characters as real than by relegating real characters to the realm of fantasy (Morison & 
Gardner, 1978; Sharon & Woolley, 2004), this was unexpected. However, such previous 
conclusions have been drawn from studies that tested children's performance on 
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categorisation tasks and the demands of such tasks are quite different from the scenario 
task employed in the current study. 
On the categorisation task, 12.47 (62%) of the judgements were correct and 
only 16 children (31 %) passed the task. In addition children categorised more real 
characters correctly as 'real' (77%) than they categorised cartoon characters as 'not-real' 
(48%). These results reflect those obtained in Study 4 as well as previous research by 
Morison and Gardner (1978) and Sharon and Woolley (2004). They both found that 
children make more errors by relegating fantasy characters to the realm of reality than by 
relegating real entities to the realm offantasy. 
A critical aspect of this study, however, was whether children scored higher on 
the scenarios task than the categorisation task, following the results obtained by Sharon 
and Woolley (2004) and Skolnick and Bloom (2006). This was done by comparing the 
pass/fail data for individual children across the two tasks using a pass mark of 5 on the 
scenarios task and 15 on the categorisation task. Just under one third of the children (15) 
passed both of the tasks, 6 children failed both of the tasks, and the majority (30) passed 
one of the tasks. Of that majority, 29 passed the scenarios task and failed the 
categorisation task and only 1 passed the categorisation task and failed the scenarios task. 
Thus these data support the hypothesis that performance on the scenarios task would be 
better than performance on the categorisation task. The results also reflect the differences 
that were found by Sharon and Woolley (2004) and Skolnick and Bloom (2006) when 
comparing children's performance on two tasks that assessed the same underlying 
concept in different ways. Both of those studies compared children's performance on a 
categorisation task with either a properties attribution task (Sharon & Woolley, 2004) or 
an 'action-based' task in which children were required to judge which actions were 
appropriate between pairs of characters (Skolnick & Bloom, 2006). On the categorisation 
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task children sorted characters correctly only one third of the time (Sharon & Woolley, 
20(4) and tended to judge incorrectly. for example, that Batman thinks Robin is make-
believe (Skolnick & Bloom. 2006). In contrast, the two alternative tasks revealed that 
children were cognisant of the properties with which real and fantasy characters possess, 
and they knew, for example. that fantasy characters from within the same world can hear 
and touch one another but that fantasy characters from different fictional worlds cannot. 
How may this difference in perfonnance across these sorts of tasks be 
explained? Woolley (2006) argues that these types of contradictory findings support the 
growing body of evidence for dissociations between children's behavioural or 'action-
based' choices and their ability to reason verbally (Woolley, 2006). Woolley (2006) 
proposes that the dissociation between verbal and behavioural responses can be explained 
by the fact that "they reflect implicit-explicit knowledge representations - with implicit 
procedures (first appearing in behaviour) eventually being 're-described' into 
conscious~v accessible knowledge (accessible to verbalisations)" (p.1542). Woolley 
(2006) cites work by Kanniloff-Smith (1992) who provided a representational 
redescription model concerning the implicit-explicit knowledge shift. Karmiloff-Smith 
(1992) proposed that children are able to perfonn tasks before the knowledge required for 
them is explicitly available to the cognitive system. Gradually, with development, such 
implicit knowledge becomes redescribed until the point at which it is considered explicit 
in the cognitive system and available for verbal scrutiny. Karmiloff-Smith's model 
explains how children performed well in the scenarios task but perfonned poorly in the 
categorisation task. 
Kanniloff-Smith's (1992) model also explains how, on the scenarios task, 
children perfonned well but were unable to explain their choice of character by referring 
explicitly to the realInot-real nature of the task. The most common explanation given by 
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children in the current study and the previous study was capability or, in other words, 
they described abilities or properties of a character that rendered it capable of perfonning 
the role. For example in the real-life-fire scenario, children explained their choice of the 
real fireman on the grounds that he wore protective clothing, drove a fire-engine, and 
could use a hose to put water on the fire. These explanations were not, however, 
sufficient to distinguish between the real fireman and the cartoon fireman who could also 
perfonn this role: Fireman Sam also wears a fireproof uniform, drives a fire-engine, and 
puts out fires using a hose. In order to differentiate between Fireman Sam and the real 
fireman it was necessary to refer to their reality status. In the previous study (Study 5) 
children only gave this type of explanation 8.2% of the time and in the current study 
where children were on average approximately 9 months younger, this type of 
explanation was entirely absent. Thus, children's explanations did not reflect the level of 
understanding that they demonstrated in the task by choosing the correct character over 
two thirds of the time. 
An issue that remains unresolved is what precisely is the nature of the 
categorisation task that makes it difficult for preschoolers? There are two variables that 
need to be investigated separately. In categorisation tasks, children make an explicit 
decision about the reality status of a character, and they are required to do so according to 
labels such as 'real', 'not-real' 'pretend' etc, thus the effects of the method of sorting and 
the language used need to be disentangled. Recall from Study 1 that children used the 
word real to refer to existence as well as authenticity when talking about fantasy 
characters. Therefore, it may be that children's difficulty is not with the explicit nature of 
the sorting method but in the explicit nature of the task commands in relation to the 
language used. 
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In the next study (Study 7) therefore, preschoolers completed a modified 
categorisation task in which they sorted characters into two different sets, but words such 
as 'real' or 'pretend' were not used by the experimenter. Instead, two pictures were used, 
one to represent the notion of the real-world and one for the cartoon world. If children's 
failure on the standard categorisation task was because of confusion over terms such as 
real and not-real then they should be able to respond significantly above chance levels on 
this modified task (using pictures instead of words). Alternatively, if their performance 
remains the same when these words are not used, then this would suggest that it is the 
explicit nature of the sorting method with which preschoolers have difficulty. 
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Chapter 9 
Studv 7: Children's categorisations of food and characters 
9. J Introduction 
The aim of the current study was to detennine whether children's difficulty on the 
real/not-real categorisation task was because they were required to make an explicit 
judgement or whether it was because they experienced confusion about the meaning of 
the tenns 'real' and 'not-real'. This was achieved by asking children to decide in which 
of two locations real and fantasy characters live, as depicted by generic photographs of a 
real city and of a cartoon city8. Thus in this modified task the labels 'real' and 'not-real' 
were not used. 
9.2 Method 
Participants 
Forty-five children participated, divided into three age groups. There were 10 in the 
younger age group (mean age = 3;2, range 3;0 - 3;5); 19 in the middle age group (mean 
age = 3;9, range = 3;6 - 4;4); and 16 in the older age group (mean age = 4;lO, range = 4;5 
- 5;4), with approximately equal numbers of girls and boys in each group. Children were 
recruited from nurseries in Berkshire and Oxfordshire, which both serve predominantly 
white, working-class families. 
8 Although Skolnick and Bloom (2006) found that children perceive multiple fantasy worlds in which, for 
example, Batman cannot see, hear, or touch SpongeBob Square Pants, two generic pictures, one 
representing the fantasy world and one the real world were used in the current study. This meant that the 
design of the task remained the same as the standard categorisation task, enabling a direct comparison 
between the standard and the modified versions. 
161 
Stimuli and task 
The real and cartoon characters that children were required to sort were identical to those 
used in the previous study (see Appendix 8.3 for the stimuli). Instead of sorting these 
characters into categories of real and not-real two pictures were selected after pilot 
testing to represent the notion of the real-world and the fantasy world (see Figure 9.1t 
A second categorisation task involving items of food was introduced to serve as a warm 
up and to emphasis the distinction that was being sort. In this task, children had to 
allocate pictures of real and cartoon food. such as a picture of a real banana and a cartoon 
picture of a banana (see Figure 9.2), either to a picture of a real kitchen or a cartoon 
kitchen (see Figure 9.3). Food was used because the results from Study 2 showed that 
preschoolers made quite accurate reaVnot-real judgements for real and toy food. 
Figure 9.1: Pictures representing the notion of the real world (left) and cartoon world 
(right) 
9 1be picture used to represent the cartoon world was actually from the cartoon 'The Simpsons'. This cartoon 
is not aimed at preschoolers and a brief check on some children indicated that they did not know where it was 
from. In the actual study, only one older child said that it was The Simpsons but he, for the majority, 
correctly judged that the fantasy characters lived there. 
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Figure 9.2: Example items from the food sorting task 
Figure 9.3: Pictures representing a real kitchen (top) and a not-real kitchen (bottom). 
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Procedure 
One of the kitchen pictures was introduced to the child accompanied by the introduction: 
"Look at this kitchen. It's got a sink, a window, a fridge, and it has lots of cupboards. " 
Then the picture of the other kitchen was introduced with the same description. Instead 
of placing the pictures to the left and right of the child, one was placed above the other 
one leaving a gap in the middle. This was done to reduce the likelihood that children 
would perseverate (place consecutive items with the same picture) or alternate (place 
alternate items with alternate location pictures). 
Next it was explained that: "Some food lives in this kitchen (experimenter 
pointed to one kitchen) and some food lives in this kitchen (experimenter pointed to the 
other kitchen). and you've got to show me where the food lives, OK?" Children were 
then shown an example using the real and cartoon bananas with the following 
explanation: "Look at these bananas (The two banana pictures were placed on the table 
in the gap in between the two kitchen pictures.). This banana lives in this kitchen 
(experimenter placed one of the banana pictures into the appropriate kitchen) and this 
banana lives in this kitchen (experimenter did the same with the other banana picture). " 
Then the pictures were removed and the child asked to: "Show me where these bananas 
live." When the child gave a correct response the experimenter said: "That's right" and 
if the child responded incorrectly the experimenter said: "Actually, look carefully", 
repeated the demonstration and asked the child again. Only 5 children responded 
incorrectly on the first attempt and they all responded correctly on their second attempt. 
The pictures of the bananas were removed and the child was told: "Now, you 
have to decide where the rest of the food lives. Remember, some food lives in this kitchen 
(experimenter pointed to a kitchen) and some food lives in this kitchen (experimenter 
pointed to the other kitchen), OK?" Items were introduced by name in a random order 
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with the instruction: .. Which htchen does the __ live in?" and the picture was handed 
to the child to place in one of the kitchens. The experimenter was careful not to look at 
either of the two pictures while asking this question. After the child had made their 
judgement the picture was removed and the next one was introduced. No feedback was 
given. 
Twice during the procedure the location of the kitchen pictures was swapped in 
order to remind children to consider each picture and to help to prevent them becoming 
stuck in a response set. Once all of the food pictures had been sorted children were asked 
to give two general explanations regarding their choices, one for the real kitchen and one 
for the cartoon kitchen. Specifically, children were asked: "Now, can you tell me, why 
did you think that all this food (children's choices were shown to them) lives in this 
kitchen? " and the same question was asked with respect to the other kitchen. Half of the 
children were asked for an explanation for the real kitchen followed by the cartoon 
kitchen and half the children were asked for their explanations in the reverse order. 
Children were thanked for perfonning the task and then the character categorisation task 
was introduced. 
Before children were given the real and cartoon character categorisation task all 
of the characters were introduced in turn in a random order and named with the child. 
This was done to ensure that the child was familiar with the characters. The character 
pictures were then removed and one of the 'world' pictures was introduced, accompanied 
by the description: "Look at this place. It has grass and trees, lots of buildings and 
shops, cars and trains, and behind there is the sea" and the child was encouraged to 
inspect the picture. Next the picture of the other world was introduced with the same 
description, and the order with which each picture was introduced to each child was 
counterbalanced. This time there was no wann-up item and the child was told: "Some 
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things live in this place (experimenter pointed to one o/the places) and some things live 
in this place (experimenter pointed to the other place), and you have to decide which 
place the things live in. OK?" The task was completed in the same manner as the food 
task. 
9.3 Results 
Scoring 
Placing a character into the correct world (the cartoon world for the cartoon characters 
and the real world for the real characters) received a score of 1 and an incorrect choice 
was given a score of O. The maximum score in the food task was 20 and the maximum 
score in the character task was 20. 
Performance on the food and character categorisation tasks 
Differences in how the three age groups performed on the food and the character sorting 
tasks were investigated (see Table 9.1). This table shows that accuracy increased with 
age on each of the tasks and that scores on the food task were consistently higher than 
scores on the character task. A 3 (age) x 2 (task) repeated measures ANOVA confirmed 
the main effect of age, F (2, 42) = 17.01, p < .001. Post hoc testing (Games Howell) 
revealed that accuracy increased significantly between each age group as age increased 
(3;2 vs 3;9 age group p < .05; 3;2 vs 4;10 age group p < .001; 3;9 vs 4;10 age group p < 
.01). 
The main effect of task was also confirmed, F (1, 42) = 20.87, P < .001, 
indicating that children sorted more items offood correctly than the characters. To assess 
the effect of task in each age group three paired t tests were conducted. These revealed 
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that there was no effect of task on the perfonnance of the 3;2 age group, t (9) = 1.23, n.s. 
but there were significant effects of task in the 3;9 age group, t (18) = 3.60, p < .01, and 
the 4; 10 age group, t (15) = 3.68, P < .01. These two groups scored significantly higher 
on the food task compared to the character task, i.e. they were more likely to sort the real 
and toy food into the correct kitchens than they were to sort the real and cartoon 
characters into the correct worlds. There was no interaction between age and task, F (2, 
42) = 0.98, n.s. 
Table 9.1: Mean scores (and standard deviations) on the two categorisation tasks 
according to age 
Food Task Character Task 
Mean Real Food Cartoon Total Real Cartoon Total 
age Food (max. 20) Characters Characters (max. 20) 
3;2 5.70 6.20 11.90 5.00 5.50 10.50 
n = 10 (2.87) (2.30) (4.38) (2.45) (2.92) (2.92) 
3;9 7.89 8.37 16.26 6.26 6.68 12.94 
n = 19 (3.21) (2.09) (4.48) (2.77) (1.86) (3.29) 
4;10 9.81 9.75 19.56 8.88 7.44 16.32 
n = 16 (0.54) (0.58) (0.81) (1.75) (2.28) (3.52) 
Mean 8.09 8.38 16.47 6.91 6.69 13.60 
n=45 (2.97) (2.15) (4.49) (2.76) (2.17) (3.88) 
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To examine the perfonnance of individual children on the two categorisation 
tasks pass/fail scores were used (see Table 9.2). As in Study 6, the pass mark was 
determined as 15 or above on the binomial using the probability of being correct by 
chance of 50%. p < .04. Table 9.2 shows that the number of children who passed both of 
the tasks increased with age while the number of children who failed both of the tasks 
decreased with age. Of the 13 children who only passed 1 task they all passed the food 
task and failed the character task. The distribution of pass/fail rates for the three age 
groups using Chi Square was significantly different, X2(4, N= 45) = 22.62,p < .001. 
Table 9.2: Number of children who passed and failed the food and character 
categorisation tasks 
Mean age Failed Both Passed 1 task Passed Both 
3;2 n = 10 7 (70%) 2 (20%) 1 (10%) 
3;9 n = 19 7 (37%) 7 (37%) 5 (26%) 
4;10 n = 16 0 4 (25%) 12 (75%) 
Total 14 (31%) 13 (29%) 18 (40%) 
Explanations for categorisations 
To gain further insight into children's understanding of the categorisation tasks, their 
explanations were analysed to determine whether they considered the real or not-real 
nature of the task, for example by explaining that "It's a pretend kitchen, " or "Because 
they're not-real food because you can't eat them, " or "That's a real place and these are 
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all real." An independent coder classified explanations from one third of the participants 
and inter-rater reliability wa 98%. 
Figure 9.4 shows the number of reallnot-real explanations that were produced 
on each of the two tasks according to age. From this figure it can be seen that the number 
of these explanations increased with age and a 3 (age) X 2 (task) repeated measures 
ANOYA confirmed the main effect of age, F (2, 42) = 8.85, P < .001. Post hoc testing 
(Tukey) revealed that the 4; 1 0 age group gave significantly more reallnot-real 
explanations (M = 2.81 , SD = 1.56) than children in both the 3;9 (M = 1.11, SD = 1.49) 
and 3;2 age groups (M = 0.60, V = 1.26, P < .01). There was no effect of task on the 
number of real not-real explanations produced, F (1, 42) = 3.81, n.s. and no interaction 
between age and task, F (2, 42) = 0.98, n.s. 
Figure 9.4 : umber of real not-real explanations given in the food and character tasks 
according to age (max. 2 for each task) . 
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Performance on the character categorisation task according to reality status 
Before scores on the modified character categorisation task from the current study could 
be compared with those obtained on the standard categorisation task used in Study 6, a 3 
(age) X 2 (character status: real or cartoon) AN OVA was performed on scores from the 
task in the current study (see the right hand side of Table 9.1). There was a significant 
main effect of age. F (2, 42) = 10.20, p < .001, and post hoc testing (Tukey) indicated 
that the 4; 10 age group scored significantly higher than both the 3;9 (p < .01) and 3;2 age 
groups (p < .00 I), with no difference between the younger two groups. This effect of age 
was the same as that obtained on the standard categorisation task from Study 6. In 
contrast to that study, however, in the current study there was no effect of status, F (2, 
42) = 0.13, n.s .. indicating that both real and cartoon characters were categorised 
correctly equally as often. 
Comparison of performance on the standard character categorisation task (Study 6) and 
the modified categorisation task (current study) 
Scores from the standard version of the character categorisation task used in Study 6 were 
compared with scores on the modified version used in the current study (see Table 9.3). 
Table 9.3 shows that the mean number of characters sorted correctly in the previous study 
was 12.47 while in the current study it was 13.60. This was a small gain in the predicted 
direction but it was not significant, t (94) = -1.30, n.s. A closer comparison of the results 
however, indicated that children sorted an average of 2 more cartoon characters correctly 
in the modified task than in the standard task and this increase was significant, t (94) = -
3.18, P < .01. This suggests that preschoolers are more likely to indicate that a cartoon 
character lives in a cartoon world than they are to say that a cartoon character is 'not-
real' . 
170 
Table 9.3: Mean scores on the standard version (Study 6) and the modified version 
(current study) of the character categorisation task 
Standard (Study 6) Modified (current study) 
Real Characters 7.69 (2.97) 6.91 (2.79) 
Cartoon Characters 4.78 (3.58) 6.69 (2.19) 
Total (max 20) 12.47 (4.53) 13.60 (3.92) 
Finally, numbers of individual children who passed the character categorisation 
task in the current study and Study 6 were compared using pass/fail scores (see Table 
9.4). As in Study 6, the pass mark was determined as 15 or above on the binomial using 
the probability of being correct by chance of 50%, p < .04. Table 9.4 shows that more 
children passed the modified version of the task used in the current study (18, 40%) 
compared to number of children who passed the standard version used in the Study 6 (16, 
31%). However, the distribution of pass rates for the three age groups using Chi Square 
was not significantly different, Xl( 1, N = 96) = 0.78, n.s. 
Table 9.4: Number of children who passed the character categorisation task in the 
standard version (Study 6) and the modified version (current study) 
Age group Study 6 Current study 
Younger 3-year-olds 1117 (6%) 1110 (10%) 
Older 3-year-olds and 5117 (29%) 5/19 (26%) 
younger 4-year-olds 
Older 4-year-olds 10/17 (59%) 12/16 (75%) 
Total 16/51 (31 %) 18/45 (40%) 
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9.4 Discussion 
This study was designed to explore why there is a discrepancy between preschoolers' 
understanding of the fictional status of fantasy characters when assessed using 
categorisation tasks compared to other measures such as the scenarios task (used in 
Studies 5 and 6). In the standard version of the categorisation task children were required 
to sort real and cartoon characters into categories of 'real' and 'not-real'. Typically, 
children under the age of 5 years perfonn poorly on this task, and they are inclined to 
categorise fantasy characters incorrectly as 'real' (c.t: Study 6; see also Morison & 
Gardner, 1978; Sharon & Woolley, 2004). This has led to the conclusion that young 
children are uncertain about the ontological status of fantasy characters. 
Other studies, which have employed less explicit measures to test children's 
understanding of fantasy, have shown that preschoolers do have some understanding of 
the status of existence of fantasy characters: in Studies 5 and 6, children scored 6.68/10 
and 6.47/10 respectively on the scenarios task, indicating that they had some 
understanding that fantasy characters cannot act in the real world and vice versa. Sharon 
and Woolley (2004) also found that preschoolers differentially attributed more human-
like properties to characters they had judged as 'real' than to characters that they had 
classified as 'pretend'. 
In the current study, children completed a modified version of the categorisation 
task whereby they sorted real and cartoon characters on the basis of where they thought 
each character lived, rather than whether they thought that they were 'real' or 'not-real'. 
Thus two pictures were used to convey the notions of the cartoon world and the real 
world, and critically, words such as 'real' and 'not-real'/'pretend' were not used. This 
modified version provided a method to establish whether children's difficulty in the 
standard categorisation task was because they experienced confusion about the meaning 
172 
of the terms 'real' and 'not-real' rather than a conceptual confusion about the ontological 
status of fantasy characters. 
Overall, although there was no difference between the number of characters 
sorted correctly in the modified task and the standard version, there was a difference in 
relation to character status: children's judgements for cartoon characters were 
significantly more accurate in the modified task compared to the standard version. 
Therefore using a picture to convey the notion of the cartoon world significantly 
improved children's ontological judgements concerning cartoon characters compared to 
when they were required to judge whether or not they were 'real'. In other words, 
preschoolers' understanding that cartoon characters do not live in the real world was 
significantly better than their understanding that cartoon characters are 'not-real'. 
Although children's difficulty in the standard categorisation task does not 
wholly appear to be related to their confusion over the sorting labels as originally 
hypothesised, it may be that the terms are ambiguous in relation to cartoon characters. 
When children are required to judge whether a fantasy character is 'real' or 'not-
real' I'pretend' they may be uncertain whether the authenticity of the character is in 
question or its existence. This suggestion makes sense in light of two observations. First, 
Harris et al., (2006) propose that it is unusual to question the existence of something 
presupposed to exist, thus it seems likely that an alternative interpretation of the question 
will be sought if a child presupposes the existence of the character in question. Second, 
the findings from Study 1 revealed that children use the words real and pretend in their 
everyday speech to consider both the authenticity of fantasy characters and whether or 
not they exist. In the standard categorisation task, therefore, children sometimes may 
have sorted the cartoon characters according to whether they thought that they were, in 
some way, authentic or not. For example they may have classified Bob the Builder as 
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'real' because he wears a proper hard hat and concluded that he must be a 'real' builder 
rather than a mere look-alike. Alternatively, some children may have come to the 
opposite conclusion, i.e. that he is not a real/genuine builder because he only uses plastic 
tools and classified him as 'not-real'. Furthermore, some children could have considered 
whether Bob the Builder exists and concluded that he is 'real' on the basis that they have 
seen him on the T.V. None of these interpretations support the conclusion that a child is 
confused over the reality status of a cartoon character by claiming that it is 'real'. 
Similarly, the alternative argument cannot be made, that if a child categorises Bob the 
Builder as 'not-real' then they necessarily understand the nature of his existence. The 
results of Studies 5 and 6 do, however, indicate that preschoolers have begun to form an 
understanding of the fictional status of fantasy characters by being aware that they cannot 
act within the real world. 
Despite the improvement in children's real/not-real judgements concerning 
cartoon characters in the modified task compared to the standard task, the current study 
showed that children's understanding in this domain lags behind their knowledge of the 
status of cartoon/toy food. These results support those obtained in Studies 2 and 3 in 
which 85% of preschoolers' real/not-real judgements concerning real and toy objects 
were correct in Study 2 while only 45% of their judgements regarding cartoon characters 
were correct in Study 3. 
In the current study, the youngest age group (mean age 3;2) achieved a 
significantly lower score than the older age groups in both the food and the character 
categorisation task. Their poor performance on the food task is particularly surprising 
given that preschoolers scored highly in their judgements of items of real and toy food 
and other toy objects in Study 2. There are several possibilities for this difference, each 
stemming from the way in which the real/not-real judgement tasks were presented. In 
174 
Study 2, children had to indicate whether they thought that paired items of real and toy 
food were 'real' or 'not-real'. In contrast, in the current study the items of real and 
pretend food were presented individually and children had to make a dichotomized 
decision for each one. Another difference between the current study and Study 2 
concerned the way in which the food was represented. In Study 2, the food items were 
presented as objects of real and toy food while in the current study they were presented as 
photographs of real food and pictures of cartoon food. Research on children's 
understanding of pictures may explain why they had difficulty with the version used in 
the current study. When adults talk to children about pictures they refer only to the 
picture's referent and do not acknowledge that they are representations, and children 
normally ignore the picture as a thing in itself and respond directly to the referent 
(Thomas et al., 1994). An adult sharing a picture book with a child, for example, may 
exclaim: "Look at that nice horse!" or ask the child to 'point to the horse', assuming that 
the child wil1 understand that the conversation is about pictures of horses and not real 
horses (example cited in Thomas et al., 1994). Therefore, if children's normal tendency 
is to attend only to the referent then they may have interpreted the cartoon picture as its 
referent, i.e. a real kitchen. 
This factor may also explain why the youngest age group achieved a low score 
in the world categorisation task, i.e. they may have viewed the picture of the cartoon 
place as its referent, a real city, rather than as the thing in itself. This explanation, 
however, does not explain why the older children did not seem to evidence this tendency 
in either the character or the food task, bearing in mind that research shows no 
developmental change between the ages of 3- and 4-years in children's perception of 
pictures as their referents (e.g. Thomas et aI., 1994). 
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Another explanation may account for the difficulty experienced by the youngest 
age groups in the two tasks in the current study and this centres on the procedure that was 
required to sort the characters. It was noted during pilot testing that the action of placing 
the food and characters with one of the two location pictures caused some children to 
perseverate or alternate. In contrast, the procedure of Studies 2 - 4 did not so easily 
afford these strategies because children were required to indicate verbally 'real' or 'not-
real' for each item. This may also explain why, in Studies 5 and 6, the 3-year-olds scored 
highly since they had to choose one character from an array of 4 and so their 
understanding was less likely to be masked by the demands of the task. 
Turning now to children's explanations for their judgements, as was the case in 
Studies 5 and 6, children rarely offered an explanation that encompassed discussion of 
the reality status of the categories or the individual exemplars. In the food task the total 
number of such explanations was 45% (41/90) and in the character task it was lower 
(31190 = 34%). Some explanation for why this may be was given in the discussion of 
Study 6 (see Section 8.4). 
To summarise, this study was conducted to determine whether preschoolers' 
difficulty on the standard categorisation task was related to their confusion regarding the 
meaning of the category labels 'real' and 'not-real'. The current study modified the 
categorisation task so that pictures were used to signify the notions of the real world and 
the cartoon world rather than the spoken labels 'real' and 'not-real'. The results of the 
modified task showed that preschoolers categorised significantly more cartoon characters 
correctly by placing them with the picture of the cartoon world than they did in the 
standard task by judging that cartoon characters were 'not-real'. Factors that may 
account for their difficulty in the standard categorisation task include their bias towards 
interpreting pictures as their referents and/or their use of alternative strategies to sort the 
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items, such as perseverating or alternating. Further research could shed light on which 
explanation is most likely. For example, 3-year-olds' performance on the standard 
categorisation task using items of real and cartoon food could be tested to determine 
whether they do indeed view pretend food as 'not-real' but were reluctant to view it as 
absent from the real world. 
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Part 2: Summary and Conclusions 
The second part of this thesis was concerned with the effects of language on children's 
understanding of the ontological status of fantasy characters. Two different tasks were 
used, a novel task (the scenarios task), which did not involve use of words such as real 
and pretend and two different types of categorisation tasks. It was important that the 
novel tasks did not use these words in light of the findings from Part 1 which showed that 
children use and interpret these words in relation to authenticity as well as existence 
(Studies I, 3 and 4). Therefore it cannot be certain that when these words are used to 
question children's understanding of existence, children interpret them in this way. 
In the first study in this part (Study 5) a novel paradigm was designed to test 
whether 3-5-year-olds understand that fantasy characters are restricted to the realm of 
fantasy and cannot act within the real world. Importantly, this avoided use of the words 
real and not-real. This scenarios task involved showing children real-life scenarios (for 
example a fire) in which somebody was required to perform a role (put the fire out). 
Children had to choose one character from a choice of 4 to fulfil the role. There were 
two relevant characters that could potentially carry out the role (a real fireman and 
Fireman Sam) and two characters that could not (a real Doctor and a cartoon Fimble). 
The critical choice was between the two relevant characters on the basis of their reality 
status, with the correct answer being the one that was real (the fireman). 
The results showed that 3-4-year-olds have begun to form a basic understanding 
of the ontological status of fantasy characters in the sense that they understand that they 
cannot act in the real world: almost two thirds of their responses were correct. This 
contrasts with the traditional claim that children tend to be confused about the ontological 
status of fantasy characters when tested using words such as real. This difference was 
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hypothesised to be because the scenarios task did not require children to interpret the 
meaning of words such as real and pretend. which was a potential problem with previous 
research because of the different interpretations afforded by uses of these words. 
Study 6 was conducted to strengthen the results from Study 5 by including 
cartoon scenarios that were presented among the real life scenarios. This meant that for 
half of the scenarios the correct answer was the real character and in the other half of the 
scenarios the correct answer was the cartoon character. The results supported and 
extended the findings from Study 5 by showing that preschoolers also understand to the 
same extent, that real characters cannot act within the fantasy world. In other words they 
understood that a real fireman cannot extinguish a fire in the cartoon world when the task 
did not require their interpretation of real and not-real. 
In Study 6 the same children also completed a standard categorisation task in 
which they sorted the 20 relevant real and cartoon characters from the scenarios task as 
either 'real' or 'not-real'. On this task, children performed poorly with only 16 children 
(31 %) responding significantly above chance, although more real characters were 
correctly categorised as 'real' than cartoon characters were categorised correctly as 'not-
real' . From these results alone it could be concluded that children wrongly believe that 
fantasy characters exist. However, the results from the scenarios task in Studies 5 and 6 
showed that children understand at least one aspect of the ontological nature of fantasy 
characters, namely that they cannot act in the real world. However, another factor could 
have accounted for children's apparent difficulty in the categorisation task and skill in the 
scenarios task: the nature of the task - the categorisation task required children to make 
an explicit real/not-real judgement while the scenarios task did not. Thus it seems that 
when a task does not require children to interpret words such as real and not-real. which 
can express both notions of authenticity and existence, their performance improves. To 
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explore this, in the final Study 7 children categorised the same 20 characters according to 
where they live and not whether they were 'real' or 'not-real'. The two choices were 
either the 'real world' or the 'cartoon world' and these were represented using pictures, 
not words. 
The results from this modified categorisation task were interesting. Similarly to 
the standard task used in Study 6 only two thirds of the characters were sorted correctly, 
however where there was an effect of character in the standard task, in the modified task 
the effect disappeared. This meant that in the modified task significantly more 
judgements for cartoon characters were correct, or in other words, children placed more 
cartoon characters in the cartoon world in the current study compared to those that were 
judged as 'not-real' in Study 6. Thus perhaps in Study 6 children were uncertain about 
the meanings of the terms 'real' and 'not-real' particularly in relation to the fantasy 
characters. However, this explanation does not wholly account for the fact that so few 
children passed the modified categorisation task in comparison to the majority of children 
who passed the scenarios task. It was concluded that further research is required to 
pinpoint the source of preschoolers' difficulty in completing categorisation tasks of this 
nature. 
To conclude, the results from the second part of this thesis reveal that children 
as young as 3 years of age have begun to form an understanding of an important aspect of 
the nature of existence of fantasy characters, i.e. that they cannot act in the real world 
(Studies 5 and 6) and also that real characters cannot act in fictional worlds (Study 6). 
This understanding appears to be somewhat masked by categorisation tasks in which real 
and cartoon characters are judged as 'real' or 'not-real'. In a modified categorisation task 
in which pictures were used instead of these labels to mark the notions of the real world 
and the cartoon world, children placed correctly significantly more cartoon characters in 
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the cartoon world in comparison to their judgements that cartoon characters were 'not-
real' in the standard categorisation task. This suggests that the word real, as found in 
Study 1, was interpreted in relation to both the notions of authenticity and existence with 
regard to the topic of fantasy characters. This led some children to judge that the 
characters are real (perhaps meaning authentic), but also that they live in a cartoon (not-
real) world. It was concluded that further research is required to explore the extent of 
young children's understanding of the existence of fantasy characters using subtle 
measures that avoid use of terms such as real, not-real, really and pretend. 
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Chapter 10 
General Discussion and Conclusions 
The studies presented in this thesis were conducted to explore possible reasons for the 
contradictory evidence pertaining to children's understanding of different real/not-real 
distinctions. In Chapter 1 it was explained that two particular real/not-real distinctions 
have been the focus of previous investigations. The first is the distinction between real 
and pretend and the second is the distinction between the real and the fantastical. In the 
case of the real-pretend distinction children's understanding of both symbolic and 
imaginary pretense have been of predominant interest, and in the case of the real-fantasy 
distinction children's beliefs in the existence of mythical, supernatural, or imaginary 
beings has been a primary concern. The issue that was addressed in this thesis was 
whether children's interpretation of critical terms used in task commands such as real, 
not-real and pretend. masks the extent to which they are judged to be aware of real/not-
real distinctions. Of specific interest was children's understanding of the ontological 
status of fantasy characters, in light of the different connotations of these words to refer 
to notions of authenticity and existence. 
In this chapter the two key themes that emerged from the studies will be 
presented and discussed in terms of their methodological implications for testing 
children's understanding of real/not-real distinctions. Finally, some directions for future 
research will be presented. 
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10.1 Connotations of the words 'real'. 'really' and 'pretend' 
10.1.1 Authenticity 
The first key finding that emerged from the studies was that the most frequent 
connotation of the words real. real~v and pretend related to the notion of authenticity. In 
Study 1. 2-7-year-old children's everyday uses of the words real, really and pretend were 
collected through parent interviews and diaries. The analysis of children's uses of these 
words revealed that they largely commented on and discussed notions of authenticity in 
relation to a variety of different items and events in their environments. These included 
differences between real and unreal objects (such as real and toy/plastic food and 
vehicles), differences between really doing something versus pretending to do something 
(such as eating or sleeping), and differences between really being somebody and just 
dressing-up as that person (such as a fireman or a ballerina). 
Children's understanding of authenticity was explored empirically in Study 2, in 
which children were required to justify their real/not-real judgements concerning real and 
toy food, vehicles, animals, and people dressing-up. All the children, including 
preschoolers, were very accurate in making such judgements, although the justifications 
provided by the preschoolers were often uninformative. Six-seven-year-olds, 9-10-year-
olds and adults provided rich and varied justifications, including both explicit and 
implicit references to the notion of authenticity. An explicit reference included such 
words as 'real,' 'realistic,' or 'proper', such as "It's not got a real crust" and "It's not 
real(v the proper colour yellow ... it's too bright yellow". Other justifications implicated 
the notion of authenticity. Some examples include "You can only play with it (toy car), " 
implying that the car is a substandard version of a proper vehicle because it cannot offer 
transportation, and "It's (toy banana) made o.f plastic, " which implies that the banana is 
not a genuine, authentic banana owing to its composition. 
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Therefore. Studies 1 and 2 revealed that children use the words real, really and 
pretend to discuss the authenticity of things in their everyday environment and that their 
real/not-real judgements concerning these everyday items are largely accurate. 
Furthermore, when school-aged children justify why these items are 'real' or 'not-real' 
they are able to comment on the nature of the authenticity of them. From these two 
studies it was concluded that children's use and interpretation of tenns such as real, 
real~v and pretend in relation to the notion of the authenticity of objects is already fairly 
well established in the preschool years. 
The finding that children's early discussions of real/not-real were largely 
concerned with authenticity was also supported, surprisingly, by their justifications for 
their real/not-real judgements about fantasy characters. The justifications that children 
gave Studies 3 and 4 sometimes featured explicit or implicit references to the notion of 
authenticity. For example they explained that Bob the Builder "Doesn't have proper 
tools ", that the picture of Father Christmas is " ... not the real one because he hasn't got 
any presents", and that Winnie the Pooh is .. ... only a pretend bear because bears don't 
wear I-shirts ". Children who gave these types of justifications thus considered the 
fantasy characters as inauthentic or substandard versions of 'the real one' or 'real ones' in 
some way. In other words, they considered that Bob was not a real/genuine builder, that 
the picture of Father Christmas was not depicting the real one, and that Winnie the Pooh, 
despite being a bear, was not a real/authentic bear. 
In the second study of children's real/not-real judgements about fantasy 
characters (Study 4) in which judgements were made alongside real characters, notions of 
authenticity were evident to an even greater extent. When children justified their 
real/not-real judgements concerning Bob the Builder and the real builder for example, 
they commonly considered whether Bob was a real builder or a real person, or whether he 
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was wearing real builders' clothing, used real tools and machinery, or had real building 
companions. 
10.1.2 Existence 
The other meaning of real. real(v and pretend that emerged from Studies 1-4 related to 
the notion of existence, although this meaning was not as strongly evident as the 
connotation relating to authenticity. In the diary data collected in Study 1 children 
discussed existence in relation to a narrow range of topics, namely animals and fantasy. 
They discussed, for example, whether dinosaurs are still alive or extinct, wondered 
whether there are any such things as witches, and worried about whether there really was 
a monster in their bedroom wardrobe. 
When asked to justify their real/not-real judgements for fantasy characters in 
Studies 3 and 4, children considered, to some degree, the nature of their existence. Thus 
they explained, alongside other factors, whether there is any such character (in the world 
or in real life), whether anyone has ever seen a character, and whether they or other 
people believe in a character. They also adduced evidence about whether a character can 
or cannot act in the world. The extent to which children justified their judgements by 
referring to the notion of existence, however, depended on age and the context in which 
the judgement was made. Nine-ten-year-olds and adults gave more existence 
justifications than younger children and in Study 4 existence justifications were produced 
less often than in Study 3 where the real/not-real judgements were not made in a given 
context. These findings suggest that, despite the connotations of real, really and pretend 
being most strongly related to notions of authenticity, children can comment on and 
consider the nature of existence of fantasy characters, although age and context affect the 
extent to which they do this. 
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In light of these findings from Part I the second part explored the extent to 
which children understand the nature of existence of fantasy characters. The most 
important goal of this research was to do so in a way that avoided use of terms such as 
real and not-real or pretend to assess the influence of language on children's 
understanding of fantasy and reality. 
10.2 Children's understanding of the existence offantasy characters 
In Part 2, the key finding that emerged was that preschoolers have a more sophisticated 
understanding of the nature of existence of fantasy characters than previous research has 
suggested. In the scenarios task words such as real and pretend were not used by the 
experimenter because Studies 1-4 suggested that these would imply notions of 
authenticity rather than existence, especially as the scenario context included real 
characters. Across 10 scenarios preschoolers choose the correct character approximately 
two thirds of the time, suggesting that they have begun to form an awareness of the 
nature of the existence of fantasy characters, namely that fantasy characters cannot act 
within the real world and vice versa. This is despite the fact that preschoolers (1) only 
occasionally discussed the existence of fantasy in their everyday conversations using the 
words real, rea/~v and pretend (Study 1); (2) only occasionally gave existence 
justifications for their real/not-real judgements of fantasy characters (Studies 3 and 4); 
and (3) tended to categorise fantasy characters as 'real' (Study 6). 
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10.3 Methodologicallmplications 
10.3.1 Testing children's understanding of the existence of fantasy characters using 
words such a5 'real, ' 'real(\" and 'pretend' 
The findings suggesting that the primary connotations of real, really and pretend relate to 
the notion of authenticity and that children seem more able to reason about the 
ontological nature of fantasy when these words are avoided, has important 
methodological implications. These implications centre on the language that is used in 
tasks that are designed to assess children's understanding of the fictional nature of 
fantasy characters. This was illustrated in Study 6 when children's performance in the 
scenarios task and in a standard categorisation task was compared. 
In that Study, 44 children (86%) scored significantly above chance in their 
choice of character on the scenarios task while only 16 children (31 %) scored above 
chance in their categorisation of real and cartoon characters as 'real' and 'not-real'. In 
light of the findings in the first part of this thesis, this difficulty on the categorisation task 
was attributed to use of the category labels 'real' and 'not-real'. This was because 
performance on the scenarios task did not rest on children's interpretation of these words 
while the categorisation task did. To test this hypothesis Study 7 modified the 
categorisation task so that, instead of sorting characters to the labels 'real' and 'not-real,' 
pictures were used to represent the notion of the real world and the cartoon world. At 
first glance the results did not appear to support the hypothesis that preschoolers ' 
difficulty in the categorisation task was due to their misunderstanding of the terms 'real' 
and 'not-real' since their overall performance on the modified task was not significantly 
different from their performance on the standard task. However, children's 
categorisation of cartoon characters improved significantly in the modified task. This 
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suggested that preschoolers understand that cartoon characters live in the cartoon world 
to a greater extent than they understand that cartoon characters are 'not-real'. 
One implication of this difference in perfonnance across tasks is that use of the 
tenns real and not-real masks the extent to which children are attributed an 
understanding that fantasy characters do not exist. Consider the study by Woolley et aI., 
(2004) in which 3-5-year-olds were asked whether they thought that the Candy Witch 
was • real or pretend'. Clearly this question was intended by the authors as a question 
about existence since they claimed that 'many of the children believed wholeheartedly in 
her existence'. The results from this thesis suggest, however, that this conclusion may be 
misleading. It is likely that at least some of the children did not interpret the question 
asked by Woolley et al.. (2004) in relation to existence but, rather, saw it as a question 
about authenticity. for example, they may have considered whether the Candy Witch was 
an authentic witch or an authentic human. These are even more likely possibilities given 
that children were asked whether the Candy Witch was 'real' alongside other 'real' 
entities such as their teacher and a cat (cfStudy 4). 
This interpretation is also supported by an observation made by Harris et aI., 
(2006). They noted that it unusual to question the existence of something that is believed 
to exist. This would not adhere to the rules that underlie the 'co-operative principle' for 
effective communication (Grice, 1975) or to relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson, 
198611995). Several studies have shown that the speech of preschoolers is already 
sensitive to these sorts of rules (Siegal, 1997) since they learn to take turns In 
conversation, and adjust their speech to the characteristics of the listener (Shatz & 
Gelman. 1973). In experimental settings these rules are often set aside: an experimenter 
may, contrary to the co-operative principle, pose questions where the answer may appear 
obvious. (For example, on repeated questioning the child may change their answer 
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assuming that their first response was incorrect when it was not (Gelman, 1982». Unlike 
adults. preschool-aged children do not expect such rules to be broken so they interpret the 
question in a different way to the one intended (Siegal, 1997). This may partly explain 
why, when children are asked to decide whether a fantasy character is 'real' or 'not-real', 
they do not interpret it as a question about existence if they already presuppose the 
existence of the entity in question. 
In light of the potential ambiguity in the interpretation of such questions about 
reality. it is clear that future research should consider carefully the wording of questions 
that are intended to probe children's judgements about existence. For example, a recent 
study by Harris et al.. (2006) asked the less ambiguous question: "Are there really in 
the world?" with regard to real (e.g. a giraffe), scientific (e.g. germs) and impossible (e.g. 
flying pigs) entities. Although the children in Study 1 in this thesis did not use really to 
consider existence very often, the question posed by Harris et aI., (2006) clearly cannot 
be about authenticity. The youngest children in their study were 4-5-years-old and they 
responded as accurately as the 7-8-year-olds by correctly and confidently claiming that 
real and scientific entities exist. For impossible entities, however, although older 
children were more confident in denying their existence than the younger children both 
age groups tended to deny their existence. It would be revealing to see how younger 
children, i.e. 3-year-olds would interpret the question posed by Harris et al., (2006) and to 
see how children would deal with the same question with regard to cartoon characters. 
Another way in which children have been questioned about ontological status 
uses the word exi. .. t. In a study conducted Woolley and Wellman (1992) children were 
asked: "Have you el'er seen X?" in conjunction with the question: "Does X exist?" as 
well as whether one can think and dream about X. This was in relation to real and non-
existent imaginary entities such as an ant crawling on the ground and an ant riding a 
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bicycle. This appears to be one of the few studies that have actually used the word 
exist, with the majority. as noted in Chapter 2, tending to use the word real instead. 
Interestingly. Woolley and Wellman (1992) found that children aged as young as 3-years 
responded quite accurately to these questions: they scored 93% on the 'existence' 
question and 91 % on the 'seen' question. This seems to suggest that 3-year-old children 
understood this question posed by Woolley and Wellman, at least in relation to imaginary 
non-existent objects and animals. There is, however, a possible problem with the 
Woolley and Wellman (1992) study in that the answer to the 'have you seen' question 
and the existence question was always either 'yes' or 'no' to both. 
It would be revealing to explore how children respond to similar questions using 
the tenn exist in relation to fantasy characters, in particular, cartoons or culturally 
supported characters such as Father Christmas. This is because, presumably, the correct 
answer to the • seen ' question would be 'yes' but the correct answer to the 'exist' question 
would be 'no'. Would children be willing to express this contradiction? Another issue is 
how children interpret these questions with regard to the level of visibility or existence 
implied: cartoon characters are 'seen on T.V.' but not 'in the street' (as some children 
explained Study 3), and Father Christmas exists, in the sense that people from a Western 
culture know about the character, despite also knowing that there is no such person 
capable of flying around the world and delivering presents in one night. 
10.3.2 Testing children's understanding of the existence of fantasy characters using 
categorisation tasks 
The second methodological implication of the results concerns the use of categorisation 
tasks to examine children's understanding of the ontological status of fantasy characters. 
The general conclusion from such tasks, in which young children tend to categorise 
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incorrectly fantasy characters as 'real', is that they believe in their existence. The studies 
presented in this thesis raise two implications in relation to categorisation tasks: the first 
is the way in which the category labels are represented, and the second concerns the 
method of sorting employed. 
In Study 6 children completed a categorisation task by placing pictures of 
characters into one of two containers labelled 'real' and 'not-real.' Alternatively in Study 
7 these labels were replaced with pictures, one to represent the real world and one to 
represent the cartoon world. Although performance was in the predicted direction with 
children scoring higher in the categorisation task in Study 7 (68%) than in Study 6 (62%) 
this difference was not significant. However, categorisation of the cartoon characters was 
significantly higher in Study 7 (67% vs 48% in Study 6) suggesting that children's 
interpretation of 'real' and 'not-real' may have been particularly problematic in relation 
to the fantasy characters lO (refer back to Section 9.4 for discussion of this point). From 
these data., it can be concluded that children are more likely to classify fantasy characters 
as belonging to the cartoon world than they are to judge that they are 'not-real'. 
Therefore pictures should be considered as a useful way to represent the distinctions in 
categorisations tasks assessing children's understanding of 'real' and 'not-real'. 
The second implication of the results from the categorisation tasks used in this 
thesis stems from the different methods of sorting employed. In Studies 2 and 4 children 
were presented with real and not-real entities and they had to indicate verbally whether 
they thought that each one was 'real' or 'not-real'. In contrast, in Studies 6 and 7 
children were required to allocate individual items to one of two containers. During pilot 
testing in Studies 6 and 7 it became apparent that some of the younger children became 
10 It could be argued that use of the word 'pretend' would be a better contrast than 'not-real' but the results 
from Study I showed that this word has the same connotations as 'real'. Also, previous research has used 
both 'not-real' and 'pretend' as contrasts to 'real' and this does not seem to effect the general conclusions. 
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stuck in a particular response set II, either by perseverating l2 or alternating. This same 
phenomenon was also noted in a study by Browne and Woolley (2004) where they found 
that some preschoolers became stuck in a response set when categorising events as either 
'magic' or 'not-magic'. In contrast, this did not seem to be an issue in Studies 2 and 4 of 
this thesis. Therefore it is important to be aware that, for some young children (i.e. those 
under the age of 3;6) the demands of the sorting procedure, as employed in Studies 6 and 
7, are quite high. Thus measures need to be taken to reduce the tendency for children to 
exhibit an inappropriate response set. 
10.4 Further Research 
On the basis of the results presented in this thesis it is clear that more research is needed 
to explore unanswered questions relating to children's understanding of the distinctions 
between what is 'real' and what is 'not-real'. Two major questions include: how does 
children's interpretation of the language involved in discussions of 'real' and 'not-real' 
relate to their conceptual understanding of the fictional status of fantasy characters? and 
how do children learn about what does and does not exist?' In the remaining part of this 
chapter, suggestions will be proposed for how these two questions may be examined. 
10.4.1 Longitudinal study of children's everyday uses of 'real " 'really', and 'pretend' 
One way in which the first question involving the possible relation between language and 
understanding can be investigated is to conduct a longitudinal study. The diary study 
II Note that in the actual procedure for Study 7 the location of the pictures was swapped during testing to 
limit the tendency for children to do this. 
12 This is similar to the "A not B" error made by infants when, after witnessing an object being hidden in 
location B following an initial hiding in location A, they repeat their search for the object at location A 
(Bower. 1982). 
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(Study I) was limited because it employed a cross-sectional design, meaning that the 
pattern of change over time within individual children could not be examined. A 
longitudinal study of children's everyday uses of these words could be conducted by 
recruiting a group of 30 children, who have not yet used either of the target words, at 
around the time of their second birthday. This would be advantageous because it would 
reveal whether or not children's initial uses concern authenticity rather than existence. 
This would also provide an important baseline over which to view the developmental 
process of change over the forthcoming few years. Although the results from this thesis 
do not speak directly on the issue of children's initial uses, it seems a likely possibility 
that they would relate to authenticity rather than existence. 
A diary record would be kept until the child reaches the age of about 5-years, or 
until the range of uses of the words found in Study 1 have been recorded. In light of the 
implications of the results from Study 1 for testing children's understanding of the 
ontological status of fantasy characters, it would be useful to ask parents to include in the 
diary records their child's use of the terms such as exist and existence as well as phrases 
such as 'any such thing, ' and general discussions of belief in fantasy characters. 
Children's performance could also be measured using the tasks that were 
designed for the studies presented in this thesis. This would enable important 
comparisons to be made between children's language use and their level of understanding 
of real/not-real distinctions. It would be expected that children who demonstrated more 
flexible uses of these words would be those who score higher in tasks such as the 
scenarios task and the categorisation tasks. 
Another extension to Study 1 could be to explore how children's uses of real, 
real~v and pretend are similar or different to adult uses. Adults would be expected to 
display a wider range of uses than children but the interesting question would be whether 
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adults made the same emphasis on authenticity compared to existence, as was evident 
from children's everyday uses. From ad lib observations made by the author, this would 
be expected to be the case. Perhaps this is not surprising given that existential matters do 
not often arise in everyday conversation, which is in contrast to wondering whether 
something is authentic or not. Consider the following scenarios: a cashier who served a 
teenager alcohol wondered whether their ID was genuine; a parent who bought a fruit 
drink for their child checked whether it contained real fruit or artificial flavourings; a 
musician who heard a song and tried to establish whether the music was played by real 
instruments or synthesisers; an employee, upon hearing a fire-alarm, considered whether 
it was a drill or a genuine fire, and a visitor, upon seeing an apparently real flower 
display, touched a leaf to make sure their observation was correct. These examples serve 
to illustrate that the notion of authenticity it a common occurrence in everyday matters. 
Adults (n = 20) could be asked to keep a diary for one month in the same way as parents 
did for the children tested in Study 1. The utterances that they recorded would be 
analysed in the same way as the children's uses and this would enable comparisons to be 
made between children's and adults' uses. 
10.4.2 The development of children 's understanding of existence 
The second topic for further research concerns the ways in which children learn about 
what does and does not exist. One implication for such research concerns the way in 
which real/not-real distinctions are construed conceptually. Previous research has tended 
to view an understanding of the pretense-reality distinction as separate from an 
understanding of the fantasy-reality distinction, with knowledge of the former being 
shown to develop earlier than the latter. However, the studies in this thesis suggest that 
children's construal of fantasy has is roots in the pretense-reality distinction, or more 
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specifically, in the notion of authenticity. Thus rather than two (or more) separate 
real/not-real distinctions, these should perhaps be viewed as two ends of one continuum. 
This continuum would place knowledge about authenticity at one end and knowledge 
about existence at the other: in other words, an understanding that toy bananas are 'not-
real' would be at one end and understanding that Father Christmas is 'not-real' at the 
other end. The middle ground is perhaps the region in which children learn about the 
nature of existence of fantasy characters which grows from an appreciation that fantasy 
characters lack authenticity. 
This idea is perhaps what is implied in a comment made by Woolley (1997) in 
her review of children's understanding of fantasy and reality in which she proposed that 
"A developing understanding that the world is not always as it seems, that appearances 
and other representations can misrepresent reality, may help children to conceptualize 
the existence of a not-real world" (p.l 007). She also notes that entities that do not exist 
often seem real in certain ways making it a 'tricky problem' to verify the non-existence 
of such things. The results from this thesis certainly showed that children perceive 
fantasy characters in terms of their authenticity and existence. Therefore, further research 
is required, first to explore how children begin to understand that fantasy characters lack 
authenticity in comparison to real characters, and second to determine how they learn to 
appreciate that such characters do not exist in the real world. 
Another way in which children may learn about existence has been investigated 
by Paul Harris and colleagues (e.g. Harris & Koenig, 2006; Harris et al., 2006). They 
argue that although much research in cognitive development (e.g. Vygotsky, 1986) 
implies that young children construct theories about the world around them via their own 
direct first-hand observations and experiences, use of this 'empirical' strategy is limited. 
He proposes that children must also rely on the testimony of others to learn about 
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unfamiliar concepts for which no first hand experience is available, such as the historical 
past, the invisible. and the fantastical (Harris, 2007). Furthermore use of an empirical 
strategy is limited because it would lead children to be inappropriately cautious in 
denying the existence of entities in these domains such as germs and oxygen (Harris et 
al.,2006). 
Harris et al., (2006) showed that children are sensitive to the pattern of 
testimony which surrounds different domains of entity. In their study, 5-6-year-old 
children clearly distinguished between endorsed beings (e.g. God and Santa Claus) whose 
existence they tended to assert, and equivocal beings (e.g. ghosts and mermaids) whose 
existence they tended to deny, even though they had not encountered either type of being. 
Harris and colleagues (e.g. Dias & Harris, 1990; Clement, Koenig & Harris, 2004; 
Koenig & Harris, 2005) have also conducted experiments to examine young children's 
trust in testimony from selected informants. In these experiments, a familiarisation phase 
introduces preschoolers to two informants who make conflicting claims regarding the 
name or use of an object: one informant names or uses it correctly while the other one 
does not. In the test phase children are shown an unfamiliar object, which is named and 
used by both of the informants, and then the child is invited to indicate what they think 
the object is called or for what purpose it is used. Summarising across these experiments, 
the results revealed that preschool-aged children do display selective trust and prefer to 
endorse information from the accurate informant. 
There is also evidence that preschoolers are guided by the reactions of other 
listeners when deciding on the trustworthiness of an informant (Fusaro & Harris, 2005, 
cited in Harris, 2007). In the study conducted by Fusaro and Harris (2005) preschoolers 
listened as an informant made implausible claims about a depicted animal such as: "This 
fish lives in trees ". When two listening bystanders nodded in agreement with the claim 
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children were more likely to accept the claim compared to when two bystanders frowned 
in disagreement. Therefore. children can collate evidence from their own experience and 
the testimony from others to form beliefs about what does and does not exist. 
The results from this thesis speak as to what type of testimony may be 
particularly effective for children to learn about the nature of existence of fantasy 
characters. That is. as suggested by the results from the scenarios task, children may rely 
on information about whether a character can act in the real-world or has real-world 
consequences 13. This hypothesis could be tested by presenting children with a range of 
novel fictional entities and systematically varying the pattern of testimony that 
accompanies each one. For example, one group of children could hear a non-existent 
entity such as a surnit being described in terms of actions that are possible in the real 
world ( "It rides to work on a train ') and the other group could hear it described in terms 
of actions that are impossible ("It rides to work on a snail "). Children would then be 
asked to decide whether they think that there is any such thing as a surnit. If children are 
sensitive to the pattern of testimony that they receive then those in the former group 
should confirm the existence of surnits and those in the latter group should not. If 
children do judge the reality status of novel entities on the basis of their knowledge of 
possible actions in the world then this would reveal an important factor in the 
development of children's knowledge of distinctions between 'real' and 'not-real'. 
13 This may explain why children do not deny the existence of Father Christmas and the Tooth Fairy, who 
bring real presents and real money respectively, wen up to their 8th birthday (Kowitz & Tigner, 1961). 
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